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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation addresses three questions regarding investments in agricultural research 
and development (R&D): why, how much, and why not more? The economics literature 
sees profit as the principal incentive to investing in agricultural R&D. However, this 
profit motive is constrained by many factors, which makes it quite complicated to detect a 
direct link between R&D investment and impact. Conceptually, this link could be 
captured by an R&D opportunity curve, which links the investment in a portfolio of R&D 
projects with (expected) rates of return to individual R&D projects. 
 
While such a link between R&D investment and impact is usually assumed to be implicit, 
this dissertation attempts to make this link explicit and estimate the shape and position of 
the agricultural R&D opportunity curve for different sets of countries (developed versus 
developing) and for different time periods (early 1960s versus early 1980s). This is done 
by bringing together information on investment levels in agricultural R&D (the how much 
question) with information obtained from a large number of different studies on rates of 
return to agricultural R&D. 
 
The question of “How much is invested in agricultural R&D?” is addressed in a series of 
four chapters that have been published previously as articles. They show that in both 
developed and developing countries, the growth in investment in public agricultural R&D 
has slowed down steadily during the past 30 years. Nevertheless, between 1961 and 1991 
public agricultural research investments in developed countries increased in real terms 
(i.e., net of inflation) by a factor of 2.7 and in developing countries, by a factor of 5.3. 
Despite this growth, however, there has not been a notable decline in the average rate of 
return to investments in agricultural R&D. This finding can only be reconciled by 
assuming that the R&D opportunity curve is not constant but shifts (and in this case 
positively) through time. 
 
The estimated shape and position of the R&D opportunity curves provides a good starting 
point for assessing the widely shared perception that there is underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D. An important finding of this dissertation is that in relative terms, 
developing countries not only have a considerably more limited portfolio of profitable 
agricultural R&D projects to choose from than developed countries, but their capacity to 
select, finance, and implement those opportunities is also substantially weaker. Hence, 
underinvestment in agricultural R&D tends to be more critical in developing than in 
developed countries. 
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“For man by the Fall fell at the same time from his state of innocence and 
from his dominion over created things. Both these losses can even in this 
life be partially repaired; the former by religion and faith and the latter by 
arts and sciences.” 
 
Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626)1 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Innovation is a step into the unknown, into the unpredictable. In contrast to production, 
innovation has long been considered a unique activity or event that does not repeat itself 
or which follows a certain predictable pattern. Hence, it could not be captured in 
mathematical equations or economic models. So, while acknowledging its importance, 
economists have long treated innovation as an exogenous factor, as manna from heaven. 
Why and how it occurred remained unknown and unexplained, or in Rosenberg’s words, 
“economists have long treated technological phenomena as events transpiring inside a 
black box” (Rosenberg 1982, p.1). 
 
Nevertheless, as reflected by the steep increase in innovations during the past century, 
innovation itself has become a matter of routine activity – governments and private 
companies nowadays invest large sums in research and development (R&D) and related 
innovative activities. With the rise of innovation as a routine activity, it has become 
possible to start detecting the economic processes and forces that advance it. And so, 
since the 1960s, economists have made considerable progress in opening up the 
“innovation” black box, although a great deal remains unexplored. This dissertation is a 
part of this tradition and attempts to make a contribution to a better understanding of the 
economic processes that shape agricultural innovation around the world. In addition, 
given massive rural poverty and food insecurity in large parts of the world, it is critical to 
understand whether and how agricultural innovation can make a difference. Merely 
investing more in agricultural R&D is too simple an answer – there is a limit to what agri-
cultural R&D can do. 
                                                     
1 Sir Francis Bacon’s work marked a turning point in Western thinking about the contribution of science to 
economic welfare. Before Bacon, the generally accepted viewpoint was that attempts to improve conditions 
on earth were pointless because these conditions were the result of Adam and Eve’s original sin in Paradise. 
Salvation was only possible in the afterlife. In the New Atlantis, Bacon called this way of thinking into 
question and, instead, suggested that organized and effectively applied science could undo the Biblical Fall 
(at least partially) and improve the condition of mankind (Martin and Nightingale 2000). 
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This dissertation focuses on the most visible part of innovation in the economy, namely 
that of R&D undertaken by research organizations, universities, and the R&D branches of 
commercial enterprises. These specialized agencies by no means capture the whole 
innovation process, nor are they the only source of innovation. Farmers, for example, 
have through daily trial and error improved their farming practices for thousands of years 
and did not stop doing that after the introduction of formal agricultural research around 
the turn of the last century. On the contrary, today’s farmers are testing and adapting new 
farming practices more intensively than ever before. Nevertheless, when trying to make 
comparisons across countries and over time, investments in agricultural R&D can be 
considered a reasonable proxy for the relative intensity of innovation taking place in 
agriculture. 
 
This dissertation addresses the following three sets of questions: 
 
(1) Why do we invest in agricultural R&D? What, according to economic theory, 
drives investment in agricultural R&D, and what are the constraints? 
(2) How much do we invest in agricultural R&D? How have investment patterns 
changed through time? And, how do regions and countries at different stages of 
economic development differ in terms of the intensity of their agricultural R&D? 
(3) Why, despite an impressive track record, have we not invested more in 
agricultural R&D? How much more could we have invested? And, are optimal 
levels of investment in agricultural R&D the same for all countries at all times? 
 
Part I of this dissertation (chapter 2) deals with the first set of questions. It describes and 
discusses the basic concepts and ideas that have shaped the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation and focuses on the question of what drives the innovation process and what 
holds it back. Chapter 2 starts with a summary and discussion of the neoclassical 
perspective on technical change (induced innovation and endogenous growth), followed 
by alternative views from other economic and non-economic approaches. 
 
Part II of this dissertation (chapters 3-6) deals with the second set of questions, which are 
more of an empirical nature and which are addressed in a series of four previously 
published articles. They report on the ongoing surveys undertaken by the Agricultural 
Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) project – a project that is implemented jointly 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the International Service 
for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR). Chapters 3 and 4 report on developments in 
the global capacity for agricultural R&D and document the differences between regions 
and countries at different stages of economic development. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses specifically on the agricultural R&D capacity of sub-Saharan Africa. It 
reports how African countries in the aftermath of their independence have struggled with 
building their own agricultural R&D capacity. Despite some good progress in capacity 
building during the 1970s and 1980s, in more recent years, the thin demonstrable pay-off 
of agricultural R&D at the macro level and the deplorable state of most government 
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finances has pushed many agricultural research organizations in Africa into a negative 
downward spiral of funding cuts and poor performance. 
 
Chapter 6 is a case study on the financing of agricultural R&D in the Netherlands – one 
of the most productive agricultural producers in the world. It gives a detailed overview of 
the changes that have taken place in the financing of agricultural R&D between 1970 and 
1995, as well as the underlying changes in the institutional setting and policies. 
 
Part III deals with the third set of questions. The impact of agricultural R&D, in 
developing as well as developed countries, has generally been quite impressive as docu-
mented by numerous rate-of-return studies (Alston et al. 2000; Evenson 2001). Hence, 
most leading agricultural economists argue that there is substantial underinvestment in 
public agricultural R&D (Ruttan 1980; Pinstrup-Andersen 2001). However, there are two 
apparent weaknesses in this underinvestment argument: (1) it is not the rate of return on 
the average R&D project that matters, but the rate of return on the marginal R&D project, 
and (2) the evidence on rates of return itself may possibly be biased. 
 
Since rates of return play such an important role in determining underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D, chapter 7 reviews the most commonly used rate-of-return method-
ologies and identifies their limitations and possible biases. Chapter 8 structures the under-
investment hypothesis more explicitly by introducing a simple model that captures the 
underinvestment argument in strict economic terms. It provides the basis for a new 
interpretation of rate-of-return results and, in particular, their distribution. Rates of return 
on agricultural R&D projects collected by Alston et al. (2000) provide the empirical 
underpinning of the model. Once the gap in agricultural R&D investment is defined more 
precisely, it is possible to explore more effectively how the gap can be explained. Some 
of the possible explanations are methodological, while others point to issues such as 
incomplete information, poor priority setting, tax burden, budget rigidity, and political 
bias in the selection of R&D projects. The latter explanation is taken a step further, using 
the model to test the effect of introducing a positive bias towards agricultural R&D 
projects that specifically target poor farmers. 
 
Chapter 9 draws the principal conclusions and highlights the importance of both human 
and social capital in agricultural innovation. It argues that social capital plays a major role 
in creating the right environment in which R&D investment can prosper and in which the 
promise of a better future can be realized. Economic underdevelopment not only means 
that there is a smaller portfolio of profitable R&D projects to choose from, but the ability 
to identify and exploit these opportunities is also more limited. In other words, the R&D 
underinvestment gap is greater for developing countries than for developed countries. 
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Part I: A Theoretical Perspective on Innovation 
 
For a long time, economists have treated technology as an external factor that comes as 
manna from heaven. Solow (1957), in his classic article on “Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function,” showed that a great deal of the growth in output went 
unexplained by measuring just the growth in (capital and labor) input use. He labeled this 
unexplained residual as “technical change,” covering both technological and (although 
less explicitly) institutional innovations. Until that time, economists had emphasized the 
importance of capital accumulation in explaining economic growth, but now they had 
stumbled upon a factor that seemed to be far more important than the increased use of 
capital.1 
 
Solow’s (1957) article opened up a major research agenda for the economics profession 
on how to integrate the processes of technological and institutional innovation into 
economic theory and, hence, reduce the unexplained residual. There is no question that 
considerable progress has been made during the past 40 years, but with few exceptions, 
economists have focused on technological rather than institutional innovation as the 
ultimate mainspring of growth. However, as North (1990) has argued: 
 
. . . the growth of productivity that has occurred since the rise of the West is as much 
attributable to the development of institutions that have allowed us to reduce transaction 
costs, and thereby to exploit more fully the potential gains from exchange, as it is to our 
increased control over nature.  
 
Olson (1996) takes an even more radical position and argues that institutions are a more 
critical factor in explaining differences in income per capita than access to technology, 
capital, or natural resources, or differences in the quality of marketable human capital. 
However, because it is difficult to measure transaction costs, economists have tended to 
assume institutions as given and shy away from institutional innovation (North and 
Wallis 1994). 
 
The chapter that follows summarizes the ideas and concepts about technological and 
institutional innovation that form the basis for this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 By modeling technology as embodied in machinery and plants, Solow (1962) tried to provide a partial 
explanation that has become known as the “vintage capital theory.”  
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2. Innovation theories 
 
This chapter describes and discusses the ideas and concepts that have structured or 
influenced my thinking about technological innovation and which form the basis for this 
dissertation. The unifying theme of this theoretical overview is to understand why we 
invest in (agricultural) R&D. What are the economic incentives to do so? And what are 
the constraints that research investors may meet on their way? 
 
To understand the neoclassical perspective on innovation, section 2.1 discusses how 
economists have modeled technical change as a shift in the production function. A basic 
assumption made in this dissertation – and by most economists – is that investments in 
(agricultural) R&D can enhance and speed up this shift. The induced innovation theory 
tries to make this link explicit, at least theoretically, and provides a framework for 
tackling questions concerning the rate and direction of technical change (section 2.2). 
 
The endogenous growth theory (section 2.3) also builds on the production function. 
While rather abstract in nature, the theory has been highly influential in shaping recent 
thinking about how knowledge and the creation of new knowledge and technology may 
explain differences in economic prosperity. 
 
The production function, the induced innovation theory, and the endogenous growth 
theory are all rooted in the neoclassical tradition. Section 2.4 discusses three of the more 
prominent extensions or critiques of the standard neoclassical tradition coming from 
game theory, institutional economics, and evolutionary economics. Of these three 
approaches, evolutionary economics has distanced itself most significantly from the 
neoclassic tradition. 
 
The standard neoclassical approach remains very abstract about the innovation process 
itself and treats technology as a black box, which is not very satisfactory, to say the least. 
Section 2.5 provides a selective summary of ideas and concepts derived from the science 
and technology (S&T) literature that shed more light on the innovation process itself. 
Many of these ideas and concepts come from historians, political and social scientists, as 
well as economists who are prepared to operate outside the neoclassical straightjacket. 
Their ideas provide important clues on how innovation processes work and could be 
enhanced. Section 2.6 summarizes the principal conclusions. 
 
 
2.1 The production function and technical change 
 
The production function constitutes the centerpiece in the neoclassical perspective on 
technological innovation. It is a device by which economists try to capture complex 
input-output relationships and distill from them information on how such relationships 
repeat themselves over and over again. First proposed by Wicksteed in 1894, a production 
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function summarizes the conversion process of various inputs X into a final output Y as 
follows: 
 
Y = f (X1, X2, . . . , Xm) [2.1] 
 
Important assumptions usually made regarding the production function are constant 
returns to scale (when all inputs increase by x%, output will also increase by x%) and 
diminishing marginal productivity (when one input increases and the rest are kept 
constant, additional output will gradually decline). At the macro level, inputs are usually 
reduced to the standard production factors – labor (L) and capital (K) – so that the 
production function can be written as: 
 
Y = f (L, K)  [2.2] 
 
The production function provides economists with a powerful tool to empirically 
investigate production processes. Initially, a fixed production function was assumed. 
Hicks (1932) and Schumpeter (1934), however, introduced the idea that the production 
function is not necessarily fixed but may shift over time so that the same inputs produce 
more output (or the same output is produced with fewer inputs). They attributed such a 
shift to technical change. It was not until the 1950s, however, that this idea became part 
of mainstream neoclassical economics through work on total factor productivity by 
economists like Abramowitz (1956), Fabricant (1959), Kendrick (1961), Mills (1952), 
Schmookler (1952), and Solow (1957). 
 
In his seminal article on “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” 
Solow (1957) calculated that gross output per man-hour doubled over the period 1909-
1949 in the USA, with 1/8 of this increase attributable to increased use of capital and 7/8 
to technical change. Until that time, economists had emphasized the importance of capital 
accumulation in explaining productivity growth, but now they had identified a factor that 
seemed to be far more important than the increased use of capital. The real – measurable 
– importance of technical change in the economy became clear for the first time.2 It 
forced economists to start thinking more seriously about the factors that shape technical 
change. 
 
By dividing both sides of equation 2.2 by Y and assuming constant returns to scale, the 
production function takes the form of a unit isoquant: 
 
Y* = f (K/Y, L/Y)  [2.3] 
 
                                                     
2 How to distinguish a shift along the production function from a shift of the production function itself has 
been a major source of debate in the literature. See Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) for an overview. 
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where Y* represents a unit volume of output (e.g., a ton of wheat). In this case, technical 
change expresses itself as an inward movement of the production isoquant (see figure 
2.1). As we will see in the next section, the induced innovation theory uses this particular 
representation of the production function. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Technical change as a shift of the production isoquant 
 
 
2.2 The induced innovation theory 
 
During the 1930s, a time of massive unemployment, many economists and policymakers 
were worried about the impact of technical change on employment. Hicks (1932), in his 
Theory of Wages, argued that there is no inherent labor-saving bias (i.e., a reduction of 
labor input relative to capital input) in technological innovation. Rather, he said, rising 
wages could be expected to induce entrepreneurs to seek labor-saving innovations in 
order to offset rising labor costs. More generally, he argued that: 
 
A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to invention, 
and to invention of a particular kind – directed to economizing the use of a factor which 
has become relatively expensive. (Hicks 1932) 
 
Hicks labeled this process induced innovation, but he did not specify the mechanism by 
which it would occur. It was only in the 1960s, when economists started to search for 
ways to explain technical change, that Hicks’ induced innovation hypothesis attracted 
renewed attention and more complete induced innovation models were developed.3 
Ahmad (1966) made a key contribution to the induced innovation theory by introducing 
the concept of an innovation possibility curve. He defined this curve as the envelope of all 
potential production processes an entrepreneur might develop, given the current state of 
                                                     
3 See Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) for an overview of induced innovation models developed by Ahmad 
(1966), Kennedy (1966), Fellner (1971), Nelson and Winter (1973), and Radner (1975).  
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knowledge, with a given amount of R&D expenditure. Each production process in the set 
is characterized by an isoquant with a relatively low elasticity of substitution (figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Ahmad’s induced innovation model 
 
An isoquant I in figure 2.2 represents the technically efficient combinations of factor 
inputs that produce a fixed amount of output. Constant economies of scale are assumed. 
The factor price ratio, represented by a line PP, defines the economically efficient 
combination among the technically efficient combinations. So the economically efficient 
combination in period t is point A on isoquant It, which is part of a larger innovation 
possibility curve IPCt. The innovation possibility curve in period t+1 is defined by all 
possible production processes (represented by It+1, ' 1+tI , etc.) that could be developed with 
a given research budget. It is assumed here that the IPC shifts neutrally and It+1 is not 
dependent on It. If the factor price ratio remains the same, the technically and 
economically optimal combination in the next period would be point B on isoquant It+1. 
However, if the factor price ratio changes, as represented by line QQ, point C on isoquant 
'
1+tI would be the optimal point to choose. 
 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) challenged the idea that with technical change the whole 
production function shifts, or for that matter, the whole innovation possibility curve. They 
argued that it is more likely that improvements in production techniques would cluster 
(i.e., It+1 depends upon It) around those that are already in use, rather than embracing all 
other theoretically available factor combinations. In this case, instead of the whole curve 
shifting inwards, it is more likely that the curve will develop bumps, as it were, leading to 
higher levels of productivity over a relatively narrow range of combinations of capital to 
labor that are close to the existing range of technologies in use. The implications of this 
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refinement are that technical change may not necessarily lead to a widening choice in the 
range of available technologies and that any bias in technical progress is unlikely to be 
random. It may very well strengthen existing bias, e.g., capital-intensive technologies are 
more likely to lead to further improvements in such technologies. 
 
In the induced innovation theory, two aspects of technical change stand out: its direction 
and its rate. Of these two, direction has received considerably more attention in the 
literature than rate. However, the two are closely linked because technical change is 
assumed to move in the direction that is most profitable, given relative factor scarcities, 
and hence yields the highest rate of technical change for a given R&D investment. The 
next two sections discuss the two dimensions of technical change in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 The direction of technical change 
 
Perhaps the most successful application of the induced innovation theory has been the one 
made by Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985) to agriculture.4 They introduced their own 
version of the innovation possibility curve, namely that of the metaproduction function, 
which they describe as follows (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, p.134–135).5 
 
The metaproduction function can be regarded as the envelope of commonly conceived 
neoclassical production functions. In the short run, in which sub-stitution among inputs is 
circumscribed by the rigidity of existing capital and equipment, production relationships 
can best be described by an activity with relatively fixed factor-factor and factor-product 
ratios. In the long run, in which constraints exercised by existing capital disappear and are 
replaced by the fund of available technical knowledge, including all alternative feasible 
factor-factor and factor-product combinations, production relationships can be adequately 
described by the neoclassical production function. In the secular period of production, in 
which the constraints given by the available fund of technical knowledge are further 
relaxed to admit all potentially discoverable possibilities, production relationships can be 
described by a metaproduction function which describes all conceivable technical 
alternatives that might be discovered. 
 
The Hayami-Ruttan version of the induced innovation theory centers on the two primary 
production factors in agriculture: land and labor. The paths of agricultural innovation in 
Japan and the USA since the late 19th century provide a very convincing illustration of 
how differences in relative factor scarcities induce technological innovation in different 
directions. Labor-scarce US agriculture focused predominantly on agricultural mechaniz-
ation (i.e., labor-saving technologies), while land-scarce Japanese agriculture emphasized 
biological and chemical innovations (i.e., land-saving technologies). 
 
                                                     
4 See also Binswanger and Ruttan (1978), Thirtle and Ruttan (1987), and Ruttan (2000). 
5 Hayami and Ruttan see their metaproduction function merely as an operational definition of the innovation 
possibility curve in the sense that it can be measured empirically from observable data (Hayami and Ruttan 
1985). 
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Figure 2.3, adapted from Binswanger (1978b), illustrates how, at the level of the firm (or 
farm), technical change can lead to changes in factor proportions as argued by Hicks. 
Technical change is defined here as the proportional decrease in unit costs of production 
achievable by an innovation when both the old and the new techniques operate at their 
optimal input combination and when factor prices are held constant. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Rates and biases of technical change 
 
Let I and I' be, respectively, the unit isoquants before and after the technical change. The 
slope of the line DE is the ratio of the factor prices – labor and capital (or land in the case 
of agriculture). A firm (or farm) that produces output at point C is technically inefficient. 
If it moves from C to B, it becomes technically efficient. However, at B the firm still 
makes an allocation error because moving to point A, which is the economically efficient 
point, can reduce costs further. 
 
Any inward movement of the isoquant reflects a technical change. When the isoquant 
moves from I to I', costs (not including the costs of research and adoption) are reduced by 
the amount of GE, in terms of labor, or FD, in terms of capital. The relative savings in 
resources due to technical change is GE/OE and FD/OD. Note that the three new 
technologies – I', I'', and I''' – are identical in terms of relative resources saved. What 
differentiates them is the factor-saving bias of the technical change. While all factor 
combinations on the line OA are Hicks-neutral (having no change in factor proportions), 
all possible factor combinations in the triangle OAD are labor-saving (relative to the 
original technology, A) and those in the triangle OAE are capital-saving. All factor 
combinations within the quadrant OAl AAc save on both factor inputs relative to A. The 
labels labor-saving and capital-saving refer to the factor input that is saved most. 
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So far little has been said about the level of investment in R&D required to achieve the 
new technology: it is either kept constant (Ahmad) or not specified (Binswanger). 
 
2.2.2 The rate of technical change 
 
The induced innovation is largely silent on the rate of technical change,6 as it fails to 
specify a link between R&D investment and technical change. However, any discussion 
on the rate of technical change is based on the assumption that a relationship between 
R&D investment and technical change exists. Without some regularity between 
innovative input and impact, there is little for the policymaker or the company strategist 
to relate to. Metcalfe (1995) captures this relationship in an innovation possibility frontier 
(see figure 2.4). The innovation possibility frontier relates the reduction in unit product-
ion cost achieved in a given time period to investment in R&D. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The innovation possibility frontier 
 
C0 in figure 2.4 is the current cost level and CL is the best improvement that can be 
achieved given the current state of the art. XE is the minimum research investment needed 
before any improvement in technology is achieved. Shortening the time period (i.e., 
trying to achieve the cost reductions earlier in time) shifts the innovation possibility 
frontier upwards. 
                                                     
6 Ben-Zion and Ruttan (1978) make an attempt at determining the rate of technical change but do not get 
further than asserting that technical change is higher in periods of rising demand than in periods of falling 
demand. 
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An implicit assumption often made regarding the innovation possibility curve as well as 
the innovation possibility frontier is that increases in productivity are permanent. Without 
any further R&D investment, productivity will stay the same. However, and this is 
particularly true for biological technologies, increases in productivity may not be 
permanent and may erode over time as new diseases emerge. As Adusei and Norton 
(1990) demonstrated, a substantial part of agricultural R&D investment can be labeled as 
maintenance research, i.e., research that is needed just to keep the production function at 
its current position or the unit cost of production at its current level.7 Therefore, the right 
way to compare R&D investment opportunities is against a scenario of what would 
happen if one did not invest in R&D. 
 
Strictly within the neoclassical theory, the optimal level of R&D investment by a firm (or 
for that matter, by a government research agency) is determined by the point where 
marginal research costs equal marginal research benefits.8 Adopting the model of the firm 
as an optimizing innovator developed by Nordhaus (1969) and Metcalfe (1995), five 
different factors that define the appropriate scale of R&D investment can be identified: 
 
(1) The initial scale of the market and its expected growth rate: the greater both of 
these are, the greater the optimal amount spent on R&D. This reflects the idea 
that the exploitation of innovations is subject to increasing returns. 
(2) The capability of the firm to appropriate R&D benefits: the better this capability 
is (either through market power or legal protection), the more the firm will be 
prepared to invest in R&D. 
(3) The marginal productivity of R&D, as determined by the firm’s command of the 
design configuration and its ability to organize and manage the innovation 
process. The greater the marginal productivity, the greater the optimal research 
spending. 
(4) The cost of capital invested in the R&D program that is taken to be equal to the 
rate of discount in computing the present value factor: the greater this rate of 
discount, the smaller the optimal amount spent on R&D. 
(5) The time horizon over which the firm assesses the present value of profits from 
innovation: the larger this is, the greater the incentive to invest in R&D. 
 
Jointly, these factors determine the profitability of a firm investing in R&D. It may well 
turn out, however, that an investment in R&D is not profitable at all because, either singly 
or jointly, research is not productive enough, the market is too small, the discount rate too 
high, or the possibility of appropriating the R&D benefits too small. 
 
A limitation of Metcalfe’s model (and that of many other innovation models) is that it 
does not consider risk and uncertainty. The story would still hold true if the firm is 
assumed to be risk-neutral and if probabilities of outcomes could be calculated and all the 
                                                     
7 According to Adusei and Norton (1990), the USA devotes roughly one-third of total agricultural production 
research to maintenance. Given the greater incidence of crop diseases in the tropics, the share of maintenance 
research in tropical areas is probably even higher. 
8 See Nordhaus (1969), Binswanger (1978), and Metcalfe (1995). 
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variables reinterpreted as mathematical expectations. Without these conditions, there is a 
much more complicated story to tell, in which risky prospects have to be translated into 
certainty equivalents via an expected utility function, or explicit attention has to be given 
to the variance as well as the expected values of outcomes.9 In an expected utility 
framework, less will be spent on R&D the greater the risk of project “failure,” the greater 
the loss associated with failure, the smaller the gain associated with success, and the 
greater the degree of risk aversion. While for many routine activities, risks can be insured, 
for innovation activities this is quite unlikely (and in practice, uncommon) because of the 
information asymmetries associated with innovation that cause moral hazards and adverse 
selection problems. 
 
Major complications emerge when one tries to link the outcomes of Metcalfe’s micro-
economic model on the rate of technical change with more aggregated ones at industry or 
sector level.10 In particular, four complicating factors stand out, namely: (a) approp-
riability of research benefits, (b) technology diffusion, (c) research duplication, and (d) 
market structure and competition. Metcalfe’s model assumes that the innovating firm can 
prevent others from using the new process or technology. Remove this assumption and 
there is a far more complicated story to tell. Technology can spill over to other firms, 
creating (social) benefits that cannot be appropriated by the innovating firm. This leads to 
a major gap between private and social incentives to invest in R&D.11 
 
Metcalfe’s model also assumes that the diffusion of technology within and between firms 
is immediate. But, even within a firm, the uptake of new process technology takes time 
because capital goods have to be replaced and new skills learned. Also, the controlled 
diffusion of technology to other firms by means of patents and joint ventures is 
complicated and far from immediate. The uncontrolled diffusion of technology is even 
more complicated.12 
 
In Metcalfe’s model, duplication of R&D is not an issue. At the level of industry, 
however, this is a source of major concern, which is closely related to the issue of market 
structure and competition. One of the older debates in the S&T literature relates to 
Schumpeter’s (1942) argument that a large firm operating in a concentrated market is 
more innovative, so there is a trade-off between perfect competition and innovative 
activity. While competition is considered an important positive force in innovation 
processes, it, at the same time, places constraints on the appropriability of R&D benefits 
(intellectual property rights and trade secrecy can only counterbalance this to some 
extent). This not only reduces the amount an individual firm will invest in R&D, but also 
leads to more duplication of the R&D effort. The Schumpeterian hypothesis about firm 
                                                     
9 Anderson (1991) provides an overview of the role of risk and uncertainty in agricultural research. See also 
Freeman and Soete (1999) for a discussion of risk and uncertainty related to innovation in private industry. 
10 Binswanger (1978b) noted similar complications but focused mainly on the direction of technical change. 
11 By using trade secrecy or patents, private firms can try to stop or slow down the free spillover of 
technology and appropriate a larger part of the research benefits, which in turn, affects their incentive to 
invest in R&D.  
12 Geroski (2000) provides an excellent overview of such diffusion issues. 
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size, market concentration, and innovative activity has been tested extensively in the 
literature, but this has not yielded a final verdict on the issue (Cohen 1995). Nevertheless, 
two tentative conclusions seem to transpire from the literature: (a) there are no economies 
of scale with respect to firm size in the invention process (on the contrary, small firms 
seem to be more creative) and (b) a market structure that is neither fully competitive nor 
monopolistic creates the best incentives for innovation. 
 
In a highly fragmented and competitive industry or sector with weak technology property 
rights, the private incentives to invest in R&D are also weak. Moreover, the chance of 
duplicating the research effort is high. This leads to a situation in which the market 
produces a level of innovative activity that is substantially below what a “socially 
managed industry” would produce and at a higher unit cost (Arrow 1962; Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1980). Agriculture is a classic example of a sector that fits this description. 
Government intervention may overcome this situation by (a) strengthening technology 
property rights, (b) facilitating joint research efforts between firms in the same industry, 
or (c) providing public R&D.  
 
While Metcalfe’s model of the firm as an optimizing innovator provides some important 
elements for understanding differences in innovation rates among firms, the model 
largely fails to capture the interaction between firms in a market or industry and how this 
may affect innovation incentives. At the other end of the spectrum, macroeconomic 
growth theory (see next section) completely abstracts from industries and markets and 
focuses on aggregate economic growth. What is missing is a consistent model concerning 
the rate of technical change at the sector or industry level, which links R&D input to 
impact. In chapter 8, an attempt will be made to fill this void. 
 
Nevertheless, what Metcalfe’s model makes explicit is that an investment in (agricultural) 
R&D is made on the basis of expected profitability. Despite the difficulty in directly 
observing the link between R&D investment and impact (an investment in infrastructure, 
for example, has a far clearer cause and effect), it is the profit motive that steers the 
allocation of resources towards R&D investment. And, it is relative factor scarcities that 
signal in which direction innovation has the highest payoff. 
 
 
2.3 Endogenous growth theory 
 
Understanding long-run economic growth is one of the more challenging theoretical 
issues in economics. The bottom line of the standard neoclassical economic growth 
models is that in the long run, the economy will grow as fast as its population – the 
growth rate of which is exogenous to the model. The effects of institutional and 
technological innovation on the rate of economic growth are seen as transient. Once they 
have been fully incorporated, the economic growth rate will return back to the population 
growth rate and to income-per-capita growth of around zero. During the past century, 
however, the world has experienced population growth in combination with growth in 
income per capita that has been unprecedented. Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956) 
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amended this inconsistency between theory and fact in the 1950s by adding a technology 
term to the model. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show, the implication of this fix is 
that the steady-state growth rate of the economy is equal to that of the rates of population 
and technology growth combined. Both, however, are exogenous to the economic growth 
model – not a very satisfying solution. It was only in the 1980s that economists again 
paid serious attention to the inadequacy of the neoclassical economic growth theory. In 
particular, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) initiated a new boom in research on economic 
growth models, which replaced the exogenously driven explanations of long-term 
economic growth by a new type of growth model in which the key determinants of 
growth are endogenous to the model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
 
What is perhaps most characteristic of these endogenous growth models is that they break 
out of the neoclassical straightjacket of diminishing returns across all inputs. In particular, 
the models emphasize increasing returns to knowledge (since using knowledge does not 
necessarily exclude others from using it, i.e., knowledge is considered nonrivalrous) as an 
important feature of long-term economic growth. This was built into the models by 
assuming that knowledge is a capital good with an increasing marginal product – an idea 
that was borrowed from Arrow’s (1962) paper on learning by doing.13 Initially, the 
accumulation of knowledge (or the learning by doing) was, itself, still exogenous to the 
model, but more recent versions of the endogenous growth model also try to capture the 
deliberate creation of knowledge through R&D by profit-maximizing agents (Romer 
1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion-Howitt 1992). A simple version of these 
R&D-based models of economic growth, modeled after the production function, can be 
summarized in the following two equations: 
 
( )αα YALKY −= 1   [2.4] 
 
and 
 
ALAA δ=&  [2.5] 
 
where Y is output, A is knowledge, and K is capital. Labor is used either to produce (LY) 
or to search for new knowledge (LA). Equation 2.4 is a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function, and equation 2.5 typifies the R&D equation in the R&D-based endogenous 
                                                     
13 Four broad categories of learning and knowledge accumulation that shape up innovation processes can be 
identified: (1) learning as joint product with other activities involving the production and use of technology 
(Arrow’s [1962] learning by doing), (2) learning as a result of using a product, which feeds back into product 
design and development (Rosenberg’s [1982] learning by using), (3) learning as a result of interaction with 
other organizations (Lundvall’s [1992] learning by interacting), and (4) learning as a result of a formal 
internal discovery process, typically organized around a directed R&D program. All four learning processes 
usually operate jointly, although their relative importance varies across firms, industries, and economies as 
well as over time. While each of them has its own characteristics and set of incentives, what they have in 
common is that knowledge resides in people. In the knowledge economy, the focus has shifted from physical 
to human capital. 
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growth models (Jones 1995). Here, the growth in knowledge ( AA& ) is equal to the 
number of people attempting to discover new ideas (LA) multiplied by the rate at which 
R&D generates new ideas (δ). Holding the latter constant, the model predicts that an 
increase in the level of resources devoted to R&D should increase the growth rate of the 
economy. Jones (1995) argues that this “scale-effect” prediction is grossly inconsistent 
with the facts: despite an eightfold increase in the R&D labor force in the five principal 
developed countries over the past 50 years, average growth rates have remained fairly 
stable.14 Nevertheless, the great contribution of the endogenous growth pioneers is that 
they shifted the focus of the neoclassic economic growth theory from physical to human 
capital. 
 
2.3.1 A semi-endogenous, R&D-based growth model 
 
Jones (1995) proposes an alternative specification of the R&D equation in which an 
addition to the stock of knowledge ( A& ) depends on the number of people conducting 
R&D multiplied by the rate at which R&D generates new ideas: 
 
ALA δ=&  [2.6] 
 
Rather than assuming that the rate at which new ideas are being discovered (δ) is 
constant, Jones suggests that this may be a function of the amount of accumulated 
knowledge in the economy and parameterizes the arrival rate (δ~ ) as follows: 
 
ϕδδ A=~  [2.7] 
 
Two opposite forces determine φ. On the one hand, the amount of accumulated 
knowledge may contribute to the production of new knowledge today through positive 
spillovers – past inventions make the researchers who follow more productive. On the 
other hand, the more knowledge that has been accumulated, the more difficult it will be to 
create new knowledge (assuming that there is an end to what can be known).15 Basically, 
these two opposite forces have strong parallels with Machlup’s (1962) ideas about 
agenda-enhancing and agenda-reducing R&D. In that sense, R&D can reduce as well as 
replenish the pool of attainable knowledge. 
 
A further refinement introduced by Jones is the consideration of duplication in R&D, 
which reduces the total number of innovations produced by LA units of labor. Therefore, it 
is not LA that belongs in the R&D equation but λAL , 0 < λ ≤ 1. Incorporating this change 
into equations 2.6 and 2.7 yields the R&D equation: 
                                                     
14 Also, an alternative specification, which relates the growth of knowledge to the share of labor devoted to 
R&D rather than the quantity, is inconsistent with the facts (Jones 1995). 
15 Romer (1998) argues that “It’s not the opportunities in nature that are scarce. It’s the human talent to 
pursue the many opportunities we face.” 
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ϕλδ ALA A=&  [2.8] 
 
When φ=1 and λ=1, the above equation reduces to the R&D equation assumed in the 
models of Romer, Grossman-Helpman, and Aghion-Howitt (see equation 2.5). What 
stands out clearly here is the arbitrariness of their assumption that φ = 1. One might make 
a plausible case for increasing returns to R&D so that φ > 0, but φ = 1 represents a 
completely arbitrary degree of increasing returns. By assuming that 0 < φ < 1, Jones 
(1995) shows that his model can produce a balanced growth path that is consistent with 
an increasing R&D labor force. 
 
By rewriting equation 2.8 in terms of the growth of knowledge, Jones (1995) shows that a 
constant growth rate of knowledge (which one assumes by definition along the balanced 
growth path) can be consistent with an increasing number of scientists, provided that λAL  
and A1-φ grow at the same rate, a restriction that will naturally tie down the growth rate of 
knowledge: 
 
ϕλδ −= 1ALAA A&  [2.9] 
 
In addition, by differentiating both sides of equation 2.9, Jones (1995) solves the balanced 
growth-rate path of knowledge explicitly, which also pins down all the other interesting 
growth rates in his model: 
 
gA = gy = gc = gk = λn/1-φ [2.10] 
 
where n is the growth rate of the labor force and gy, gc, and gk are the growth rates, 
respectively, of output per worker, per capita consumption, and the capital-labor ratio. 
Equation 2.10 indicates that long-run per capita growth is ultimately tied to the growth 
rate of the labor force and the parameters φ and λ, which determine external returns (as 
well as returns to scale) in the R&D sector. Therefore, we are back to where the standard 
neoclassical model started, namely that the growth rate depends ultimately on the growth 
rate of the labor force (and thus of population), an exogenous variable. But, as Jones 
(1995) argues, growth in his model is endogenous in the sense that it derives from the 
pursuit of new technologies by rational, profit-maximizing agents. 
 
Using an extended version of his model, Jones (2000) attributes roughly 30% of the post-
1950 growth of the US economy to the rise in educational attainment, 50% to the rise in 
research intensity (i.e., the share of the labor force working in R&D), and only 10%–15% 
to the steady-state growth rate of the economy. The latter is (along the lines of equation 
2.10) driven by the worldwide discovery of new ideas, which in turn is tied to world 
population growth. The US capital-output ratio declined slightly during the second half of 
the twentieth century and, in Jones’ growth-accounting framework, it had no positive 
impact on the growth of labor productivity during this period. Jones argues that the US 
economy has been far from its steady-state growth rate for a long time and that much of 
the post-1950 growth has been driven by transition dynamics. However, educational 
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levels cannot expand forever, nor can R&D intensity. Once their growth rates slow down 
or disappear, the per capita growth rate will return to its substantially lower, but still 
positive, steady-state rate. 
 
An important parallel can be found in the dramatic increase in physical capital and the 
corresponding rise in the capital-output ratio that drove much of the nineteenth century 
growth in the US. However, once the transition to a capital-intensive economy was made, 
the contribution of capital to further per capita growth came to an end. But growth rates 
did not decline because other factors, such as educational attainment and research 
intensity, took over. This leaves us with the question, “When will the transition to a 
knowledge-intensive economy come to an end?” One can only speculate that this moment 
is still far away as the “research intensity is less than one percent of the labor force, so 
that the upper bound imposed by nature does not seem likely to bind in near future” 
(Jones 2000, p.31). 
 
2.3.2 Absolute and conditional convergence 
 
What transpires from these rather abstract economic growth models is that economies 
will converge to the same income per capita in the very long run.16 Countries may at 
times forge ahead, as the now developed countries did in their transition to a capital-
intensive economy between, say, 1800 and 1950 and as they continue to do in their 
current transition to a knowledge-intensive economy. Where does this leave the develop-
ing countries? Certainly, catching up is difficult when the target is moving fast. But as 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have shown, it can be done. 
Which raises the question, “What has held other developing countries back from 
following at the same or an even faster rate?” 
 
One suggestion made in the economic growth literature is that one should distinguish 
between absolute and conditional convergence of economies. In the case of absolute 
convergence, the hypothesis is that poor economies can unconditionally catch up with 
rich countries (implicitly assuming that the steady state for all countries is the same), 
while in the case of conditional convergence, the hypothesis is that each country has its 
own steady state, towards which it will converge.17 Sampling a wide range of variables 
that may proxy for differences in steady-state positions (such as education, life 
expectancy, and political stability), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that their 
inclusion makes a major difference across a sample of 127 countries. When these 
additional variables are held constant, the relation between per capita growth rate and the 
initial level of income per capita becomes significantly negative, as predicted by the 
neoclassical growth theory. The conditions that define the steady state of each economy 
                                                     
16 Dosi et al. (1994) provides an alternative, “evolutionary ” model of long-term development, which allows 
initially identical countries to differentiate over time. In their model, the random luck of early success in 
innovation reinforces later innovative advances.  
17 Cho and Graham (1996) stress that such convergence may happen from below as well as from above. 
Moreover, they come up with a surprising finding: that poor rather than rich countries operate above their 
steady state. 
21 
 
may be considered fixed in the short to medium term, but in the long run, they may 
change, making the steady state itself a moving target. 
 
Hall and Jones (1998) take a different perspective. They demonstrate that differences in 
physical capital and educational attainment only partially explain the differences in output 
per worker across countries. The unexplained residual stands out as a far more relevant 
factor in explaining these differences. They then go on to explain this large variation in 
productivity across countries by differences in the social infrastructure, which they 
define as those institutions and government policies that provide the incentives for 
individuals and firms in an economy. So rather than differentiating by steady-state 
determinants, as done by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Hall and Jones turn to the ideas of 
institutional economists like North (1973, 1990) and Olson (1982, 1996) to explain what 
holds countries back from catching up. They argue that differences in social infrastructure 
(the parameters of which largely overlap with the steady-state determinants) across 
countries cause large differences in capital accumulation, educational attainment, and 
productivity and, therefore, large differences in income across countries. Hence, unleash-
ing the potential and unconditional convergence of poor countries requires, above all, 
good institutions and government policies, or to quote Olson (1996, p. 19): 
 
. . . the large differences in per capita income across countries cannot be explained by 
differences in access to the world’s stock of productive knowledge or to its capital 
markets, by differences in the ratio of population to land or natural resources, or by 
differences in the quality of marketable human capital or personal culture. Albeit at a high 
level of aggregation, this eliminates each of the factors of production as possible 
explanations of most of the international differences in per capita income. The only 
remaining plausible explanation is that the great differences in the wealth of nations are 
mainly due to differences in the quality of their institutions and economic policies. 
 
2.3.3 The unexplained residual 
 
By including human capital and the creation of new knowledge in its growth model, the 
endogenous growth theory has made progress in reducing the unexplained residual and in 
improving our understanding of the economic growth process. Still, an uncomfortably 
large residual remains unexplained. The emerging consensus in the literature is that the 
missing factor in the present economic growth models is that of the social dimension of 
economic activity – the way economic actors interact and organize themselves. 
Abramowitz (1986), for example, stresses the importance of social capability; Hall and 
Jones (1998), that of social infrastructure; Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000), that of social 
capital; and Nelson and Sampat (2001), that of social technology to explain differences in 
economic growth and productivity. The four concepts overlap to a large extent and all 
four have incorporated institutional concepts and ideas. However, measurement of the 
various “social” concepts stands out as particularly problematic and is often left 
unresolved. Grootaert’s (1998) paper on social capital explicitly addresses the issue of 
measurement and lists more than 50 different indicators that have been used in one way 
or another to measure social capital. However, there is no consensus yet on the definition 
of social capital or how to measure it. 
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Putting the right combination of natural, physical, human, and social capital to work is 
what differentiates rich countries from poor ones. Also, in agriculture these four factors 
probably explain to a large extent observed differences in productivity. Each factor 
constitutes a potential bottleneck in achieving higher agricultural productivity and 
provides insight into a part of the productivity puzzle, but never the complete picture. 
 
In a rather abstract and aggregate way, endogenous growth theory tries to establish a link 
between the human effort to innovate and economic growth – between R&D investment 
and impact. By attributing increasing returns to knowledge, the endogenous growth 
theory provides a very positive outlook on the future and on what human ingenuity can 
do. It also provides an explanation of why economic growth in developed economies has 
not slowed down and why many of the doom scenarios of pollution and depletion of 
resources have had little predictive value. Human inventiveness has been capable of 
overcoming many of the predicted constraints on further economic growth by 
significantly reducing pollution and by cutting spillage of scarce resources. Nevertheless, 
not all countries seem to exploit knowledge as a source of economic growth with equal 
success. What holds these countries back is not so much the lack of human capital, but 
the lack of social capital that is needed to create the right environment for innovation to 
prosper. 
 
 
2.4 Beyond neoclassical theory 
 
One of the more serious critiques of the neoclassical innovation theory is that its 
microeconomic foundation, based on the theory of the firm as profit maximizer, is 
dismally weak (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). It is possible to give a full account of the 
neoclassical innovation model without once mentioning the term entrepreneur or the 
inherently risky nature of R&D investment decisions. The relative factor scarcities are the 
magnets by which the neoclassical innovation process is pulled, but its internal 
mechanism – the learning, search, and formal R&D processes – remains a black box. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) propose a notably different, evolutionary economics, approach 
to technical change, which will be discussed in section 2.4.1. 
 
The new institutional economics offers more of an extension than a critique of the 
neoclassical (innovation) theory. It argues that institutional innovation, by reducing 
transaction costs, may be as important in explaining productivity growth as technological 
innovation (North 1990). Olson (1996) takes an even more radical position and argues 
that institutions are a more critical factor in explaining differences in productivity than 
access to technology, capital, or natural resources – or differences in the quality of 
“marketable” human capital. 
 
Yet another extension to the neoclassical theory comes from game theory. It argues that 
firms do not make innovation decisions in isolation but try to anticipate what their 
competitors may do. So, rather than seeing firms as just stand-alone profit maximizers 
(the standard neoclassical assumption), game theory argues that firms’ innovation 
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decisions are also influenced by strategic considerations vis-à-vis other competitors. 
According to game theory, strategic considerations can both speed up and slow down 
investments in R&D. 
 
2.4.1 Evolutionary economics 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) provide a notable alternative to the standard neoclassical 
approach to technical change in their seminal book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change. They argue that neoclassical economics has such difficulty accommodating 
technical change into its theory because of two principal assumptions on which it has 
been built: (1) the maximizing behavior of economic agents and (2) equilibrium. 
Orthodox microeconomics assumes that firms seek to maximize profits (or any other 
objective) with given assets and technology and with full knowledge of the market and 
possible opportunities. There is no room for bounded rationality or uncertainty in 
describing technical change, which leads to a lack of descriptive realism in the 
characterization of firm behavior. In addition, technical change is a dynamic process and 
creates disequilibria and therefore does not fit well with a comparatively static 
equilibrium. Although neoclassical economic theory is flexible enough to accommodate 
some of these criticisms in its models, Nelson and Winter propose a more radical break 
with neoclassical orthodoxy and propose an evolutionary approach to technical change. 
 
This evolutionary approach is built on three basic concepts. The first is that of 
organizational routines. At any time, organizations have built into them a set of ways of 
doing things and ways of determining what to do, which can typically be expressed in 
terms of identifiable rules of thumb. They reflect the bounded rationality that shapes their 
day-to-day decision-making. These routines are of course geared towards profit making, 
but not necessarily towards profit maximization, as assumed by neoclassical theory. The 
second concept is that of search routines, which encompass all those organizational 
activities that are associated with the evaluation of current routines and which may lead to 
their modification, to more drastic change, or to their replacement. These activities are 
themselves partly routine and predictable, but they also have an unpredictable, stochastic 
character. However, whatever new routines emerge, they are largely bounded by the 
current routines in use. Moreover, imperfect understanding and imperfect, path-dependent 
learning entails persistent heterogeneity among organizations, even when they face 
identical information and identical notional opportunities.18 The third concept is that of 
the selection environment of an organization, which is the ensemble of considerations 
(including profit) that affects well-being and, hence, the extent to which an organization 
expands or contracts. To use the evolutionary metaphor more explicitly: routines are the 
genes of the organization, and search generates mutations in these routines, which will 
survive or not depending on how well they fit the environment (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
 
                                                     
18 In contrast, neoclassical economics assumes that all firms have full knowledge of all potential opportunities 
and hence they all behave in the same way. 
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These concepts form the basis for various evolutionary simulation models, which, as 
Nelson and Winter claim, can explain the observed macro-economic facts as well as the 
neoclassical equilibrium models. A major critique of those simulation models, however, 
is that they lack the mathematical rigor and transparency of orthodox equilibrium models 
and tend to be rather unstable (Krugman 1996).19 
 
Dosi (1997) argues that the evolutionary economic theory can easily accommodate 
induced innovation arguments. Adopting an evolutionary perspective, inducement can 
work in four ways: 
 
(1) Changes in relative prices and in demand or supply conditions may well affect 
the search heuristics of a firm. 
(2) Such changes may also influence the relative allocation of search efforts to 
different technologies or products. 
(3) These first two mechanisms of “inducement” rest on the ways changing market 
conditions influence incentives and, in turn, the way these incentives affect 
behavioral patterns – either in terms of search heuristics or allocation rules.20 
However, changing relative prices can easily “induce” changes in the directions 
of technical change (even holding the search behavior of firms constant) via the 
selection of the stochastic outcomes of the search itself. 
(4) Even when one assumes the extreme case that economic agents are totally inertial 
in their production routines, market selection will favor those firms that use the 
“better” techniques (conditional on prevailing prices) via their differential ability 
to invest in production capacity. 
 
The identified mechanisms operate without any reference to production functions or 
innovation possibility curves, but together they make a good case for induced innovation. 
Dosi (1997) argues that the evolutionary version of induced innovation is considerably 
more convincing than the neoclassical one, which only considers mechanisms one and 
two. 
 
A weakness of both the neoclassical and evolutionary induced innovation theory is that 
they focus on existing firms and their behavior. They say very little about new firms 
entering the market. However, as Schumpeter has argued, most (and in particular the 
most radical) new technologies and products come with new firms and new plants. The 
evolutionary approach is even more restrictive than the neoclassical one in the sense that 
it restricts the set of technological opportunities that a firm may explore to those that are 
close to the current set. Today’s production routines define those of tomorrow, just as 
                                                     
19 “Evolutionary theorists, even though they have a framework that fundamentally tells them that you cannot 
safely assume maximization-and-equilibrium, make use of maximization and equilibrium as modeling devices 
– as useful fictions about the world that allow them to cut through the complexities. And evolutionists have 
found these fictions so useful that they dominate analysis in evolution almost as completely as the same 
fictions dominate economic theory” (Krugman 1996). 
20 In the biological evolution theory, mutations are completely random, while in the socioeconomic version, 
economic actors may steer innovations in anticipation of a changing selection environment. 
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mutations in species take place only very gradually. The introduction of new species or 
species coming from another habitat is not considered. However, for the developing 
countries, this is probably a more relevant way of looking at the introduction of new 
technologies, as they usually come with new (and often foreign) firms. 
 
Nevertheless, selection mechanism three still holds. When the newcomer does not face 
any local competition, any production routine will fit so long as it is competitive with 
imports. Transport costs, import levies, undervalued exchange rates, etc., may all help to 
create a relatively large space of possible (and not always state-of-the-art) input-output 
combinations. When there is local competition, new or imported production routines have 
to be more efficient than the existing local ones. However, imported production routines 
can be radically more efficient than the local production routines21 and therefore 
relatively insensitive to the local factor price ratio. Moreover, new firms that are linked to 
multinational companies often have access to cheaper capital and knowledge and hence 
face a different relative factor price ratio than local companies. 
 
Perhaps the evolutionary approach helps us most clearly to understand when induced 
innovation can be expected: namely, in those instances where production routines can 
only be changed gradually and where the entrance of newcomers into the market with 
vastly superior technology is unlikely. Industry does not fit this description very well; 
agriculture, however, does. This is probably also why induced innovation in the general 
S&T literature is not more than a footnote, while in agricultural economics, it plays such 
a prominent role. 
 
Land-labor ratios in agriculture change slowly, with small gradual steps. The supply and 
division of land binds the adoption of new technology to a relatively narrow path, which 
changes only slowly but steadily through time. Unlike capital, land cannot be moved 
around. Moreover, improvements in production techniques and economies of scale in 
industrial production are more erratic than in agriculture. Agricultural production routines 
that depend more on capital than on land, such as intensive poultry production, clearly fit 
less well with the induced innovation perspective. The declining importance of land and 
labor as inputs in modern agriculture also makes the induced innovation perspective less 
relevant. 
 
Although evolutionary economics radically breaks with two important assumptions made 
by neoclassical economics (maximizing behavior and general equilibrium), it subsumes 
rather than displaces the induced innovation arguments. In some ways, it makes an even 
stronger case for induced innovation by providing it with a considerably more realistic 
description of the microeconomic processes taking place than does the neoclassical 
description, which is based on the theory of the firm. Empirically, however, the 
evolutionary description provides very little to explain differences in rates of technical 
change. Evolutionary theory is particularly useful in so far as the process of reaching the 
optimum is of interest rather than the optimum itself (Gomulka 1990). 
                                                     
21 Economies of scale often play a critical role in cost reduction. 
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2.4.2 New institutional economics 
 
Economists are usually aware of the importance of institutions but find it hard to deal 
with them and therefore tend to keep them outside their models.22 New institutional 
economics tries to give institutions their proper place in explaining economic phenomena 
by looking upon institutions as the rules of the game and their manifestation as property 
rights as important vehicles to reduce transaction costs. This latter aspect is based on the 
belief that, in contrast with neoclassical assumptions of full information and choice 
rationality, economic actors are constrained by incomplete information and process it 
through mental constructs that can result in inefficient paths. They act under bounded 
rationality, which is also one of the key assumptions of evolutionary economics. When it 
is costly to transact (and usually it is), then institutions matter. 
 
North and Wallis (1994), in a rather unnoticed but inspiring article, looked at the 
interplay between institutional and technical change at the level of the firm, two areas that 
are usually studied separately, assuming that either technology or institutions are given. 
By considering the transformation and transaction functions of a firm simultaneously, 
North and Wallis argue that a typical firm is not concerned with minimizing either 
transformation costs (optimal technique) or transaction costs (optimal institutions) in 
isolation; a firm is interested in minimizing total costs. Neither type of cost is independent 
– changes in transaction costs may lead to changes in transformation costs and vice versa. 
While the introduction of a new technology reduces transformation costs, it may at the 
same time increase transaction costs. A good example is the recent introduction of 
genetically modified (GM) crops. The European market requires GM crops to be kept 
strictly separate from their non-GM counterparts, which has unexpectedly increased 
transaction costs and reduced the profitability of the new technology.23 Another example 
is how the shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture depends on the development 
and adoption of institutions that can facilitate the significantly increased volume of 
transactions and lower their costs. 
 
By differentiating transformation from transaction costs, North and Wallis (1994) provide 
a framework that helps to disentangle the effects of institutional and technical change on 
both types of cost and, in particular, the less-known cross cases of technology affecting 
transaction costs (e.g., the use of ICT) and institutions affecting transformation costs (i.e., 
environmental regulations). This framework provides a deeper understanding of the 
complex interdependent structure of an economy as it evolves, enabling us to see more 
                                                     
22 A notable exception has been Ruttan (1978) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985). They extended their induced 
innovation perspective to induced institutional innovation. While there is general agreement that 
technological and institutional innovation come in tandem and that they are complementary, the evidence for 
induced institutional innovation is considerably less convincing than that for induced technological 
innovation. Political and social processes are a lot more complex than what can be explained by the relative 
scarcity of production factors only. They are just one of many factors at stake in such a process. 
23 In this case, new legislation is needed to define the maximum level of contamination that is acceptable as 
well as the way such contamination will be tested; responsibility for implementing and supervising the 
certification has to be delegated; international agreements on standards have to be negotiated, etc.  
27 
 
clearly the interplay between technical and institutional change. However, while 
conceptually enlightening, empirically, transaction costs have been assumed by most 
economists as either not measurable or only partially so.24 North and Wallis (1994) 
themselves argue that, “Under that assumption, theories that propose an important role for 
institutional change in explaining the development of economies must necessarily be 
content with making assertions that can rarely be confirmed or falsified, since the 
economic variable they rely on, transaction costs, is unobservable.” In that sense, 
economists have made far more progress in the empirical analysis of technical change 
than of institutional change – an imbalance that severely restricts our understanding of 
how innovation processes affect productivity. 
 
2.4.3 Game theory 
 
In an ideal competitive market, an economic actor can make rational economic decisions 
in a “stand alone” fashion – that is, without considering her or his interactions with other 
economic actors. An economic actor only needs to consider his or her own situation and 
the “conditions of the market.” However, in situations where competition is incomplete 
(which is often), this assumption becomes flawed and strategic advantage vis-à-vis other 
economic actors starts to play a role in making rational decisions. 
 
The contribution of game theory is that it provides alternative models that can deal 
simultaneously with profit maximization and strategic advantage arguments. The variety 
of game-theoretic models that one can choose from is endless. However, what they all 
have in common is that a game consists of a set of rules governing a competitive situation 
in which players choose actions designed to maximize their own winnings or to minimize 
their opponent’s winnings; the rules specify the possible actions for each player, the 
amount of information received by each as the game progresses, and the amounts won or 
lost in various situations. A player’s strategy is a plan for actions in each possible 
situation in the game. A player has a dominant strategy if that player’s best strategy does 
not depend on what other players do. 
 
A Nash equilibrium is a solution in a strategic game with the property that no player can 
increase his or her payoff by choosing a different action, given the other players’ actions. 
A strategic game, however, does not necessarily have a Nash equilibrium, or for that 
matter a single one. 
 
Game-theoretic models are applied widely to situations involving strategic decision, 
including various aspects of technological innovation. One of the more standard textbook 
examples of game theory is that of patenting. By casting it as a “race horse” game (i.e., 
the winner takes all), it shows that the market will invest substantially more in R&D 
(resulting in duplication of effort) than what is optimal from a social point of view. In 
other words, the technical change attained is costlier than strictly necessary. By 
                                                     
24 Transaction costs that are particularly hard to measure include the time needed to acquire information, 
queuing, bribery, and so forth, as well as losses from imperfect monitoring and enforcement (North 1990). 
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introducing the possibility in the patent race game of licensing the technology, one 
increases the profit incentive but also lowers the costs of being the loser, which reduces 
the competitive threat (i.e., the strategic argument). Therefore, the overall effect on R&D 
investments of licensing technology cannot a priori be established (Shapiro 1985). 
 
The interaction between market structure and innovative activity has been another area in 
which game-theoretic modeling has provided major insights. In particular, Arrow (1962) 
and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) have made important contributions to our understanding 
of how the market may generate levels of innovation activity that are suboptimal relative 
to a socially managed market. More recent work along the same lines by Beath, 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1995), focuses on the intriguing strategic trade-off between 
product differentiation and cost reduction, and its implications for innovation and R&D 
investment. 
 
Game-theoretic modeling has also been applied in studies of technology diffusion. 
Insights derived from such studies include the following ideas: (a) strategic rivalry can 
force companies to adopt technology too early (technology has not yet been fine-tuned 
sufficiently and so learning costs are high) and (b) early adopters, by taking a risk, create 
positive spillovers for followers (their learning costs are lower). Excess inertia may occur 
when none of the potential adopters wants to take the first step (Beath, Katsoulacos and 
Ulph 1995). 
 
The traditional or “rationalistic” game theory is static in the sense that it solves the game 
with a given number of players. Evolutionary game theory improves upon traditional 
game theory by providing a dynamic describing how the population of players may 
change over time. In this way, for example, the question can be addressed as to whether 
the dynamic process of competition is one in which incumbents maintain or extend their 
position of technological supremacy (persistent dominance) or whether they are taken 
over by some rival whose incumbency is in itself short-lived (action/reaction). Given the 
variety of factors at work in determining the outcome of strategic dynamic competition 
among firms, it is not surprising that the existing game theory literature on this topic can 
be rather confusing, with different models yielding different and often conflicting results. 
However, this is true for all game-theoretic models in the sense that their outcomes very 
much depend on how the game is structured. Change one assumption and the outcome 
can be quite different. 
 
As argued earlier, the standard neoclassical innovation theory treats much of the 
innovation process as a black box. The three extensions or critiques of the standard theory 
discussed in the previous sections each try to model the innovation process in a more 
realistic way. In all three approaches, however, profit remains the lead incentive to 
investing in R&D. While evolutionary economics drops the assumption of profit 
maximization, the other two approaches reveal how profit maximization can be 
constrained by institutional factors or strategic considerations due to imperfect markets. 
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2.5 Alternative perspectives on the innovation process 
 
The previous sections focused on the dominant economic perspectives on technical 
change, which all remained rather abstract. This section briefly summarizes some of the 
other perspectives on innovation that stem from the more general S&T literature. With 
contributions from political and social scientists as well as historians, this literature is 
considerably more descriptive. Nevertheless, it may provide important clues about what 
triggers innovation or what holds it back. 
 
2.5.1 Technological innovation: supply push or demand pull? 
 
While the linear model of innovation, based on Schumpeter’s sequence of invention-
innovation-diffusion in strict temporal order, has prevailed for a long time, during the 
1970s, scholars began to recognize that such strict linear interpretation does not hold.25 
Innovation processes in real life are much more complex, with a great deal of feedback. 
In particular, the idea that all technological innovation is based on science was seriously 
questioned and, hence, the relevance of public support for basic science.26 
 
In this climate, quite a number of studies were published that argued that the innovation 
process is not supply-driven by developments in basic sciences, but it depends mainly on 
market demand. Innovations are in some sense “called forth” or “triggered” in response to 
demands for the satisfaction of certain classes of “needs.” Or, to put it more simply, 
necessity is the mother of invention. In a critical (and now classical) review of studies 
that emphasize the influence of market demand upon innovation, Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1979) showed that the empirical evidence presented does not support the primacy of 
market demand forces within the innovation process. Besides the flawed conceptual and 
methodological framework of most studies, the demand-pull case is admittedly weakest 
for the most significant innovations. Therefore, Mowery and Rosenberg (1979, p. 143) 
conclude that: 
 
. . . rather than viewing either the existence of a market demand or the existence of a 
technological opportunity as each representing a sufficient condition for innovation to 
occur, one should consider them each as necessary, but not sufficient, for innovation to 
result; both must exist simultaneously. 
 
While there are instances in which one or the other may appear to predominate, most 
evidence points to the conclusion that a satisfactory theory of innovation must take into 
account both the supply and demand factors. Or, as Freeman and Soete (1997, p. 201) 
argued, “Necessity may be the mother of invention, but procreation still requires a 
partner.” 
 
                                                     
25 These three stages differentiate between the development of a new technological idea (invention), its first 
use in economic production (innovation), and the spread of the innovation (diffusion). 
26 There are many examples of innovations that preceded the scientific understanding of their working (e.g., 
the steam engine, the use of fertilizers, and many medicines). 
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The emerging consensus is that neither the technology-push nor the demand-pull models 
adequately capture the technological innovation process. Instead, innovation is seen as an 
interactive process with various complex and diverse feedback processes (David 1993; 
Clarck and Guy 1998). Ruttan (2001) proposes a third way to look at invention, which he 
bases on ideas formulated by Usher in the 1950s (Usher 1954). Rather than considering 
invention as an act of a genius (the technology push) or as resulting from the stress of 
necessity (the demand pull), Usher proposes a third approach, namely that of cumulative 
synthesis. Based on Gestalt psychology, Usher argues that major inventions emerge from 
the cumulative synthesis of many relatively simple inventions, each of which requires an 
individual “act of insight.” In the case of an individual invention, there are four essential 
steps (Ruttan 2001, p. 67): 
 
(1) Perception of the problem, in which an incomplete or unsatisfactory pattern or 
method of satisfying a want is perceived. Perception of the unsatisfactory 
performance is often induced by changes in the external economic environment. 
(2) Setting the stage, in which elements or data necessary for a solution are brought 
together through some particular configuration of events or thought. Among the 
elements of the solution is an individual who possesses sufficient skill in 
manipulating the other elements. 
(3) The act of insight, in which the essential solution of the problem is found. Usher 
stresses the fact that large elements of uncertainty surround the act of insight. It is 
this uncertainty that makes it impossible to predict the timing or the precise 
configuration of a solution in advance. 
(4) Critical revision, in which the new invention is redesigned or reengineered to 
meet the technical and economic requirements for successful adoption and 
diffusion. 
 
A major or strategic invention represents the cumulative synthesis of many individual 
inventions, each of which has usually gone through all the separate steps. 
 
Ruttan (2001) considers Usher’s cumulative synthesis theory particularly appealing as it 
provides a unified theory of the social processes by which “new things” come into 
existence, one that is broad enough to encompass the whole range of activities 
characterized by the terms science, invention, and innovation. In addition, it clarifies the 
points at which conscious efforts to speed the rate or alter the direction of innovation can 
be effective, namely, at the second and fourth steps. By setting the stage, fewer elements 
are left to chance, which increases the probability of success. However, it is in step four – 
the critical revision – where most conscious effort is usually concentrated. In this step, 
invention is also more an act of skill rather than an act of insight. 
 
2.5.2 Small steps, big jumps, and dead ends 
 
A frequently made distinction is that between continuous and discontinuous technological 
innovation. According to Schumpeter (1928), innovation always creates a discontinuity. 
Some innovations differ more from what they substitute for. It is just a matter of degree, 
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but there is no objective scale to separate continuous from discontinuous innovations. 
Still, the notion that there are significant differences between major or radical break-
throughs and incremental, cumulative improvements is quite pervasive in the S&T 
literature. 
 
Enos (1958), for example, distinguishes between an alpha phase and a beta phase in the 
innovation process. The alpha phase covers the introduction of a completely new product 
or production process, while the beta phase covers the later improvements of the product 
or the production process.27 In his study on the oil refinery industry, Enos found that the 
beta phase generated far higher cost savings than the former. Rosenberg (1982) cites 
several other studies with similar results. The Green Revolution in agriculture has 
unfolded in a similar way. 
 
In a broad analogy with Kuhn’s concept of a “scientific paradigm,” Dosi (1982) 
introduced the concept of a technological paradigm and a technological trajectory. The 
latter constitutes a pattern of “normal” problem-solving activities on the grounds of a 
technological paradigm, resulting in incremental, cumulative improvements. Similar to a 
scientific paradigm, a technological paradigm sets the stage for the innovation process by 
defining the problem as well as the method of how to solve the problem and thereby 
defining images of possible paths of technological improvement. It reduces as well as 
focuses the innovation process. Improvements along the technological trajectory are 
usually shaped by economic incentives, while shifts in technological paradigms are more 
the result of scientific breakthroughs. 
 
Others, clearly with more tangible technologies in mind, have labeled this concept of the 
technological paradigm/trajectory a design configuration, within which “technology 
develops in terms of sequences of innovations improving products and processes within 
the constraints of given design principles” (Metcalfe 1995, p. 459-461). A further 
distinction can be made between the architecture of a configuration, its core, and the 
component parts, which make up complex artifacts. A great deal of innovation takes place 
in an incremental fashion with the architecture of design altered little and the focus being 
on improved components. More radical innovations alter the architecture and, in doing so, 
redefine the knowledge base on which the configuration depends. For example, the 
automobile is a design configuration that has already lasted for more than 100 years, but 
its components have been improved continuously. 
 
Related to these concepts of technological paradigms and design configurations is the 
notion of path-dependency in technical change (e.g., Arthur 1989). A central idea of this 
line of thought is that the development or use of some technologies may be subject to 
self-reinforcing, positive feedback cycles that, once set in motion by what may be 
considered small, random events, may become “locked in” to a particular path of 
development. However, the particular path that emerges need not be socially optimal ex 
                                                     
27 The first automobile was not much more efficient than the horse car (probably even less efficient). It was 
only because of a steady stream of improvements that the automobile became the superior technology. 
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post, which suggests that the invisible hand does not necessarily work its magic in such 
settings.28 Much of the research on this theme focuses on the emergence of a technical 
standard in the early phases of a new technology and the long-term impact this has on 
further technological developments. 
 
Technological paradigms and design configurations can become dead ends at a certain 
point of time, leading to declining returns to R&D. A shift in the technological paradigm 
or a new design configuration is needed to open up a new trajectory, with new 
opportunities and chances. Machlup (1962) made a similar and enlightening distinction 
between agenda enhancing R&D and agenda reducing R&D. The latter type of R&D 
explores the opportunities along a given technological trajectory, while the former opens 
up new trajectories and new innovation opportunities. Similarly, conceptualizing R&D as 
a stochastic search process, Evenson and Kislev (1976) argue that basic science increases 
the productivity of applied research by increasing the pool of technological opportunities 
from which one can choose. 
 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) provide yet another perspective and argue that product 
markets experience a life cycle over which the nature of innovation changes in a 
predictable manner. Initially, in an emerging product market, the emphasis is on product 
innovation, as numerous small firms compete to establish a market position. Radical new 
product ideas are tested, and eventually a dominant design emerges. With a dominant 
design come product standardization and a shift towards process innovation. Innovation 
efforts at this stage are concentrated on realizing the benefits of large-scale production, 
mechanization, and cutting product costs. As a result, the industry becomes more 
concentrated, the potential for further process innovation is eventually exhausted, and 
ultimately, the industry becomes subject to external threats from competing products that 
eschew the dominant design. A new product life cycle can start. While the development 
of some industries fits this sequential model quite nicely, there are others where the 
different stages of the life cycle are rather blurred (Cohen 1995). 
 
2.5.3 National systems of innovation 
 
In recent years a national system of innovation (NSI) school of thought has emerged in 
the S&T literature. It looks upon the process of technological innovation as embedded in 
a complex network of interacting organizations and institutions. The term national system 
of innovation first appeared in the literature in the late 1980s.29 However, with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as one of the very 
                                                     
28 A classic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, which was adopted quite early in the development 
of the typewriter for technical reasons rather than being the most efficient layout from the point of view of the 
typist. Even after the original technical problems had been resolved, the keyboard layout could not be 
changed because it had become the accepted standard (David 1985). Perhaps today’s equivalent to this story 
is that of word-processing software.  
29 It was the title of a section in Dosi et al. (1988) to which several of the later key authors contributed.  
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early proponents of the NSI concept, it rather quickly entered the vocabulary of national 
and international policymakers.30 
 
The study of national systems of innovation started off with rather simple and descriptive 
analyses of innovation systems that tried to explain differences in innovation activity and 
performance across countries. In more recent years, however, the theoretical under-
pinning of the NSI approach has been substantially improved by the addition of insights 
from various streams of (economic) thinking, including evolutionary economics, 
institutional theories, theories of learning, and systems theory. 
 
Metcalfe (1995, p. 462-463) defines a national system of innovation as follows: 
 
. . . that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within 
which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As 
such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store, and transfer the 
knowledge, skills, and artifacts, which define new technologies. The element of 
nationality follows not only from the domain of technology policy but from elements of 
shared language and culture which bind the system together, and from the national focus 
of other policies, laws and regulations which condition the innovative environment. 
 
Being such a young field of study, definitions have not settled down yet and the analytical 
emphasis changes from author to author. Some interpret an NSI narrowly and regard it as 
a specific sector of the economy (e.g., universities and R&D organizations) supported by 
specific institutions (e.g., patent rights), while others look upon it more broadly as a 
certain aspect of the economic process located in almost every part of the economy 
(Johnson 1997). Lundvall (1992, 1996), for example, emphasizes that the everyday 
learning experiences and activities of engineers, sales representatives, and other 
employees, as well as of consumers, make important contributions to innovation. Such 
learning is most intense where economic actors interact. Hence, innovation is strongly 
embedded in the prevailing economic structure. It determines to a large extent what is 
going to be learned and in which areas innovations are going to take place. DeBresson et 
al. (1996) show, using input-output matrix techniques, how innovative activities tend to 
cluster in that part of the economic space where forward and backward linkages between 
industries are the most intense. Moreover, the concentration of innovative activity usually 
exceeds that of input-output flows by quite a margin. 
 
In contrast to North (1990), who makes a clear distinction between institutions (the rules 
of the game) and organizations (the players), most of the NSI literature makes no clear 
distinction between the two. All authors stress the crucial importance of connectivity 
between institutions in a complex system such as NSI. Institutions, however, differ 
                                                     
30 Three major publications during the 1990s set the stage for NSI thinking, namely, National Systems of 
Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, edited by Lundvall (1992); National 
Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, edited by Nelson (1993); and Systems of Innovation: 
Technologies, Institutions and Organizations, edited by Edquist (1997). 
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significantly with respect to (a) focus (policy, innovation, diffusion, production), (b) 
motivation (profit, non-profit), (c) commitment to the dissemination of the knowledge 
they generate (public, private), and (d) size. In addition, the composition of the 
institutional framework can vary considerably according to the technological area in 
question. Moreover, connections are not the simple, one-way streams of knowledge 
assumed in the traditional invention-innovation-diffusion models. 
 
In practice, connectivity is achieved through a variety of mechanisms. Some are formal, 
such as collaboration agreements among firms and between firms and universities, but 
many mechanisms are informal and go easily unobserved. In recent years, increased 
attention has been devoted to these informal networks within NSI. For example, attention 
has been drawn to the significance of the informal but balanced trading of knowledge that 
takes place between engineers in different firms in the same industry, as well as to the 
knowledge exchange between user firms and their suppliers. Such informal networks are 
important routes for technology transfer and for the transfer of more tacit knowledge 
(Metcalfe 1995). Hence, networks operate at the brink of organizational integration and 
formal markets, neither of which is necessarily optimal. Networks can be considered as 
non-market devices to reduce the transaction costs of knowledge exchange. 
 
According to Edquist and Johnson (1997), institutions (more in the sense of North’s 
“rules of the game”) have the following three general functions in an NSI context: 
 
(1) To reduce uncertainty by providing information. Institutions can help to structure 
and streamline information streams and thereby reduce the genuine uncertainty of 
innovation activities. Technological service systems reduce uncertainty about 
technical solutions. Patent laws and other intellectual property rights reduce 
uncertainty about appropriation, while at the same time making the (encoded) 
details of the innovation publicly available. The emergence of English as the 
language of science par excellence is an example of how an informal institution 
can help to facilitate and speed up the exchange of information. 
(2) To manage conflict and cooperation. Another important function of institutions is 
to manage conflicts that arise from innovation. When new products and processes 
are introduced, old ones often have to give way. This leads to internal 
restructuring of firms as well as of whole industries. Old skills and knowledge 
may become obsolete, while new ones are required. The adjustment costs of 
innovation can be quite high and are often unevenly distributed. Innovations may 
therefore provoke resistance and conflict. Institutions such as job security, social 
security arrangements, re-schooling opportunities, and labor market arrangements 
can temper such conflicts. 
(3) To provide incentives. Institutions provide incentives for learning and innovation, 
such as remuneration schemes for innovators, taxes, royalty payments, and 
scientific prizes, but there is also competition and loss of status and prestige, to 
name some of the incentives that come as sticks rather than as carrots. 
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Together, these various institutions form a complex system that affects both the cohesion 
and the change of the economy. The system is relatively stable and changes are mostly 
incremental; resistance to institutional change is a lot fiercer than resistance to technical 
change. However, with the increasing specialization of economic activities, inter-
dependencies between economic actors are becoming increasingly complex and placing 
greater pressure on the rules of the game. 
 
The NSI approach stresses and focuses on the differences between the various systems 
rather than abstracting from them, as is done in neoclassical economics. They usually take 
a strong historical perspective because differences in today’s institutions and 
organizations have their origins in the economic and socio-political history of a country. 
In that sense, a unique, optimal NSI does not exist; instead, there are multiple NSIs with 
varying strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The NSI approach stands out as a very eclectic one, incorporating ideas coming from 
evolutionary theory, institutional theory, theories of learning, and systems theory. It seeks 
to provide a holistic and integrative perspective that can bring these various views on 
innovation together. Its value-added lays not so much in providing a completely new 
view, but in providing a framework that can accommodate various perspectives. This also 
means that it can mean different things to different authors from different schools of 
thought. For example, some limit NSI to the formal institutions involved in innovation, 
while others see innovation as an activity that takes place throughout the whole economy. 
In all cases, however, the emphasis is on the interaction between institutions or economic 
actors. The assumption is that the intensity and quality of this interaction defines the 
ultimate success of an innovation system as much as the size and quality of each of the 
elements of the system taken individually. How to measure system performance 
empirically, however, is unclear. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
The two questions raised at the beginning of this chapter were (a) what are the economic 
incentives to invest in agricultural R&D and (b) what are the constraints that research 
investors may find on their way? 
 
With regard to the incentive question, the simple answer of neoclassical economics is 
profit maximization. There is certainly considerable truth in it, but the profit argument 
very much abstracts from many other factors that may also play a role. As many authors 
have pointed out, a major weakness of the neoclassical (induced) innovation theory is its 
weak foundation in microeconomics. This makes it incapable of capturing the way the 
interaction between economic actors in a market affects the ultimate outcome of the 
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innovation process at the macro level.31 In addition, neoclassical (induced) innovation 
theory has a blind spot for the role of institutions. It ignores the fact that high transaction 
costs at various stages of the innovation process may slow down or even block 
technological innovation. In other words, if we want to understand why innovation rates 
differ or why investments in R&D differ over time and across industries and countries, 
institutions and market structures constitute an important part of the puzzle. This is also 
reflected in the innovation system approach. 
 
Another frequently mentioned binding constraint is that of the scientific frontier. Will 
there be an end to how far we can push our control over the material world? In the very 
long run, perhaps yes, but for the time being, it is unlikely. Nevertheless, the S&T 
literature is full of theories that stress that innovation processes sooner or later run out of 
steam and predict that returns to R&D will diminish. While for discrete innovation 
processes, this may be true, the question is whether it is also true in the aggregate. The 
contribution of the endogenous growth theory is that it has completely reversed this 
argument by assuming increasing returns to knowledge, particularly knowledge created 
through R&D. It is an idea that sits very uncomfortably with what economists (and most 
other people) usually think, but, if true, it suggests a very optimistic future. 
 
While it is easy to critique the dominant neoclassical paradigm, formulating alternatives 
is a lot more difficult. Evolutionary economics, institutional economics, and game theory 
all provide very useful insights into the innovation process, which standard neoclassical 
economics cannot provide. They do so by removing or altering one or more of the 
standard assumptions made by the neoclassical economic theory: profit maximization, 
market equilibrium, full information, and perfectly functioning markets. However, these 
insights always come with a price tag in the form of less transparency in other parts of the 
theory. Evolutionary-simulation and game-theoretic models have a critical dependence on 
assumed parameters, while, in the case of institutional economics, transaction costs are 
difficult if not impossible to measure. What is lacking is a theory that can integrate the 
various perspectives (Ruttan 1997, 2001). 
 
Theoretical insights regarding innovation incentives and constraints will reappear in part 
III of this dissertation, which will critically review the widely shared idea that there is 
underinvestment in agricultural R&D. It will attempt to do this by establishing a link 
between R&D investment and impact. First, however, part II will provide an overview of 
how much is invested in agricultural R&D worldwide and sort out the differences and 
changes in agricultural R&D investment intensities across countries and over time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), for example, show that in markets with low levels of concentration, 
industrywide R&D expenditures can exceed the socially optimal level, even though technical change (i.e., 
cost reduction) is lower than socially optimal because of excessive duplication of research efforts. 
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Part II: Trends and Patterns in Agricultural R&D Investments 
 
Knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular, is generally considered to be one of 
the major driving forces of economic growth. For this reason, the creation of new 
knowledge and technology by means of R&D stands out as an important economic 
activity. What is somewhat problematic, however, is that the direct output of the R&D 
sector can not be valued easily in economic terms because markets for ideas, scientific 
publications, patents, and plant varieties (to name just a few possible outputs) are 
nonexistent, incomplete, or imperfect. Output measures of R&D that only use output 
quantities but no values get stuck with an aggregation problem.1  In some instances, 
artificial weights are introduced for different categories of outputs, which implicitly 
means attaching a relative (but artificial and fixed) price to each category. Nevertheless, 
these output measures remain very crude and often arbitrary approximations. Instead, the 
common practice is to use a measure of R&D input (i.e., R&D expenditures or R&D 
personnel) as a proxy for R&D output. The implicit assumption, of course, being that 
R&D productivity is the same across all agencies and over time. 
 
Part II of this dissertation focuses on the questions of “How much do we invest in 
agricultural R&D?” and “What are the major trends and differences in investments in 
agricultural R&D?” The answers to these questions should ultimately provide a key to a 
better understanding of trends and differences in agricultural production and productivity, 
an issue that will be addressed later in part III. Here, however, agricultural R&D 
investments will be looked at in isolation, with the implicit assumption that the greater the 
investment in agricultural R&D, the better. This assumption is based on the widespread 
belief that there is significant (and some would argue, systemic) underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D. 
 
The trends and differences in agricultural R&D investments will be highlighted in four 
articles, taking a global (chapters 3 and 4), regional (chapter 5), and national perspective 
(chapter 6). In addition to R&D investment levels and trends, these chapters address the 
following issues in varying detail and emphasis:  
 
(a) the financing of agricultural R&D (i.e., public/private, national/donor);  
(b) the “optimal” combination of factor and intermediate inputs needed to ensure an 
efficient R&D operation (including the education profiles of research staff and 
ratios of support staff to researcher);2  
                                                     
1 This problem of valuing outputs also exists in sectors such as health, defense, and many other government 
services. 
2 In retrospect, the search for the optimal combination of factor and intermediate inputs has been something 
like searching for the Holy Grail. Extreme cases that deviate significantly from the sample average (such as 
spending more than 90% on salaries) can be identified as being sub-optimal, but any further fine tuning 
cannot be tackled without a realistic measure of R&D output. Moreover, there is no universal answer to what 
is the optimal combination of factor and intermediate inputs.  
38 
 
(c) institutional and political factors affecting the level of resources that are devoted 
to agricultural R&D. 
 
The definition and measurement of agricultural R&D statistics are discussed in annex A 
to this dissertation. 
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3. Sustaining growth in agriculture:  
A quantitative review of agricultural research investments 
 
By Jock R. Anderson, Philip G. Pardey, and Johannes Roseboom3 
 
Policy-makers are having to contend with unprecedently rapid changes in the market for 
agricultural science and technology services. In the less-developed countries, the rapid 
expansion of agricultural research capacity experienced during the 1960s and 1970s 
slowed considerably in the 1980s. Particularly in debt-ridden regions, such as sub-
Saharan Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean, investment in agricultural research 
stagnated or even declined. In addition, the level of development aid to less-developed 
countries stalled during the 1980s (OECD 1989) while the small but significant share that 
was channeled to agricultural research is threatened by other demands. A reversal of these 
trends seems unlikely in the near future and therefore resources for public agricultural 
research in less-developed countries could well tighten even further in the coming years. 
In the more-developed countries, public support for agricultural research is under close 
review and there is a strong tendency to have those who most directly benefit from 
research pick up at least part of the bill. Moreover, agricultural surpluses, declining 
agricultural prices, and a continuing decline in farm numbers in many of the more-
developed countries have led to populist calls for a moratorium on further public 
investment in agricultural research. 
 
Against this backdrop of fiscal stringencies, the demands being placed on national, and 
indeed international, research systems are intensifying. In addition to the traditional 
emphasis on stimulating productivity growth within agriculture, many of these systems 
are also being called upon to broaden their research agendas and to give greater attention 
to concerns of environmental degradation and resource management. The international 
system is also restructuring its research portfolio with regard to forestry, fisheries and 
vegetable research in addition to its traditional emphasis on basic food crops and 
livestock. These changes raise major policy issues about the appropriate division of labor 
and problem focus between the national, regional and international centers that are yet to 
be resolved. 
 
                                                     
3 This chapter is a verbatim reprint of an article published earlier in Agricultural Economics Vol. 10, No. 2 
(April 1994): pp. 107-123. Not included are the abstract, while all headings have been renumbered in order to 
match with this dissertation. References are included in the reference list of this dissertation. The research 
data reported here are largely from a study undertaken by ISNAR with assistance from the then Agriculture 
and Rural Development Department of the World Bank (Pardey, Roseboom and Anderson 1991). The 
monetary values throughout this paper have been expressed in constant 1980 PPP dollars. PPP stands for 
purchasing power parity and represents a synthetic exchange rate that attempts to reflect the purchasing 
power of a currency. Monetary values in current local currency were first deflated to base-year 1980 with a 
local (GDP) deflator and then converted into constant 1980 dollars using 1980 PPP exchange rates taken from 
Summers and Heston (1988) and, for China, Summers and Heston (1991). The authors thank Hugh Quigley 
for his assistance in preparing this paper.  
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There are large variations across countries and over time in the level of investment in 
agricultural research. As a country’s per-capita income grows, its support for agricultural 
research – as indexed by an agricultural research intensity (ARI) ratio that expresses 
research expenditures relative to agricultural output – tends also to grow. But there are 
offsetting tendencies, including one whereby agricultural research expenditures rise less 
than proportionately with agricultural output, due possibly to economies of size or 
economies of scope in research. In this paper we present a quantitative review of the 
global pattern of investment in agricultural research using a new compilation of data that 
serves to completely revise and update the data series reported by Evenson and Kislev 
(1975), Oram and Bindlish (1981) and Judd, Boyce and Evenson (1986). Our intention is 
to illustrate what is actually happening in the world of agricultural research and to help 
move the policy dialogue beyond merely qualitative impressions toward a process that is 
underpinned with a set of basic data and quantitative indicators. 
 
 
3.1 Public investments in national agricultural research 
 
3.1.1 Investment trends 
 
Differences in patterns of agricultural growth are in large part the result of national 
differences in factor and environmental endowments and in the policies adopted towards 
agriculture and, more specifically, agricultural research. For two decades, up to the mid-
1980s, global investment in public agricultural research increased substantially.4 Between 
1961-65 and 1981-85, the total number of public-sector agricultural researchers grew at 
an average annual rate of 4.2%. The number of researchers in less-developed countries 
increased by 7.2% a year, just over four times the annual rate in more-developed 
countries (table 3.1). 
 
In the period 1981-85, the less-developed countries employed 59% of the world’s 
agricultural researchers, compared with 33% in 1961-65. Annual growth rates in research 
investment in less-developed countries have slowed during the 1980s, most noticeably in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean, both of which have been 
struggling to contain soaring international debts. In fact, the 1976-80 to 1981-85 annual 
rate of growth in real research expenditures was only 0.7% for sub-Saharan Africa and 
0.9% for Latin America and Caribbean compared with a more- and less-developed 
country average of 2.9% and 4.3%, respectively. Although spending on agricultural 
research increased faster in less-developed than in more-developed countries during the 
past two decades, the less-developed countries’ share of total expenditure on research 
rose only to 48% from its 37% in 1961-65. 
 
                                                     
4 The global comparisons presented in this paper do not include the former USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, the Republic of South Africa, and a number of very small countries for which no data 
were available. 
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Table 3.1: Annual agricultural research personnel and expenditures, regional totals 
 
 
Region 
 
1961-65 
 
1971-75 
 
1981-85 
Growth  
rate (%)a 
Agricultural research personnel (full-time equivalents per year) 
     
Sub-Saharan Africa (43)b 1323 2416 4941 6.8 
China 7469 11781 36335 8.2 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (28) 6641 12439 22576 6.3 
Latin America and Caribbean (38) 2666 5840 9000 6.3 
West Asia and North Africa (20) 2157 4746 8995 7.4 
     
Less-developed countries (130) 20256 37221 81848 7.2 
More-developed countries (22) 40395 48123 56376 1.7 
     
Total (152) 60651 85344 138224 4.2 
     
Agricultural research expenditures (millions 1980 PPP dollars per year) 
     
Sub-Saharan Africa (43)b 149.5 276.9 372.3 4.7 
China 486.7 874.8 1712.7 6.5 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (28) 316.7 651.5 1159.6 6.7 
Latin America and Caribbean (38) 229.1 486.6 708.8 5.8 
West Asia and North Africa (20) 126.9 300.7 455.4 6.6 
     
Less-developed countries (130) 1308.9 2590.5 4408.7 6.3 
More-developed countries (22) 2190.7 3726.3 4812.9 4.0 
     
Total (152) 3499.6 6316.8 9221.6 5.0 
Source: Most of this table is drawn from Pardey, Roseboom and Anderson (1991a, p.200), as are most of the 
data reported in this paper. The China data are from Fan and Pardey (1992). 
Note: Totals may not add up exactly because of rounding. 
a Compound annual average growth rate between 1961-65 and 1981-85. 
b Bracketed figures indicate the number of countries in the regional totals. The appendix to Pardey, 
Roseboom and Anderson (1991a) indicates which specific countries were included in the regional aggregates. 
 
Of the less-developed regions, only in Asia and Pacific did annual growth in research 
expenditures exceed the annual increase in researchers. In more-developed countries, on 
the other hand, spending on research increased twice as fast as the number of researchers. 
 
3.1.2 Expenditures per researcher 
 
Average spending per researcher in less-developed countries has been falling since the 
early 1970s. In 1981-85, it was actually lower in real terms than in 1961-65. In more-
developed countries meanwhile, spending per researcher has been rising steadily and the 
emphasis has consistently been towards greater investment in human capital within the 
NARSs. 
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One reason for the relatively lower spending per researcher in less-developed countries is 
that, of late, the rapidly expanded university systems in these countries have produced 
many more graduates than previously. Many governments in less-developed countries 
insist that public bodies, including research systems, employ graduates, but then fail to 
provide adequate matching funds. 
 
In the Asia and Pacific region, expenditure per researcher has always been lower than in 
other less-developed regions. This is partly because relative prices for labor are lower, 
which induces a substitution of labor for other inputs in the system. But is also because 
they are dominated by larger research systems that may well be able to realize economies 
of scale and scope. 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, expenditure per researcher has for a long time been higher than in 
other regions. During the 1960s, the NARSs in this region continued to be heavily staffed 
by relatively expensive expatriates from the former colonial powers. The poor quality of 
Africa’s infrastructure and the need to import nearly all equipment also drive up the 
research costs in this region. Although still higher than in most other less-developed 
regions, spending per researcher in sub-Saharan Africa is falling, in part a reflection of 
the fact that expatriate researchers are increasingly being replaced by less expensive 
national research staff, and in part because of the above-mentioned budgetary crises. 
 
3.1.3 Human capital 
 
One of the fundamental strengths (or, too often, weaknesses) of NARSs, and a major 
factor in determining the success of agricultural research, lies in the quality, composition 
and deployment of their research staff. 
 
Developing meaningful measures of this human capital component is challenging both 
conceptually and practically. Indicators such as university qualifications and years of 
research experience may explain much of the difference in quality between research 
systems, but they are not the only factors. The composition of the research staff will 
depend, among other things, on the NARS’s size and the type of research it is conducting. 
These influences vary greatly between regions and will change within a system over time. 
For instance, a smaller NARS whose activities are focused more on capturing research 
spillovers and adapting them to local circumstances is unlikely to need a cadre of 
researchers similar to that required by a large NARS that is likely to confront an 
altogether different scale and set of research problems. Similarly, while a system 
dominated by researchers holding PhDs and 20 years of experience may be considered 
highly qualified, it is not necessarily the most appropriate labor force to confront the 
applied and site-specific problems that face many national research systems today. 
 
Data for the period 1981-85 indicate that roughly one-half of agricultural researchers, 
including expatriates, in less-developed countries held a postgraduate research degree 
(table 3.2). If expatriate researchers are excluded from the calculation, no less-developed 
region has a share of researchers with a postgraduate qualification greater than 60%. For a 
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significant number of countries it is even lower than 40%. Somewhat surprisingly, poorer 
less-developed regions have a relatively high proportion of qualified staff, although that is 
much lower if expatriate researchers are excluded from the calculation. 
 
Table 3.2: Nationality and degree status of agricultural researchers,  
1981-85 average (%) 
 
Region/country Expatriates Share of postgraduates a 
Sub-Saharan Africa a 29 45 
Asia and Pacific b 11 53 
Latin America and Caribbean 2 51 
West Asia and North Africa 18 27 
Less-developed countries 12 48 
   
Australia na 57 
New Zealand na 78 
United States na 93 
a Measures the proportion of national researchers holding a PhD or MSc degree or equivalent.  
Figures for Australia and New Zealand are for 1981, and for the United States for 1980 only. 
b Does not include China and India, the two major NARSs in the region 
 
In many less-developed countries, the early agricultural research institutes were 
established by European colonial powers and, during the first half of this century, these 
institutes were staffed with expatriate researchers. On independence, most former 
colonies moved to replace expatriates with national researchers. In some countries, this 
change took place gradually but in others it was a more abrupt process and caused major 
disruptions in agricultural research programs. At present, only the smaller countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific and the oil-rich countries of West Asia 
have relatively large proportions of expatriates on their research staffs. The share of 
expatriates is declining rapidly, however. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the share of 
expatriates in NARSs was about 90% in 1960 but had declined to some 30% in the early 
1980s. Making the plausible assumption that the numbers of expatriate researchers 
working within the Chinese and Indian systems are negligible, the percentage of 
expatriate researchers working throughout the less-developed world in 1981-85 is 
estimated to be around 3%. 
 
Although economic development can be expected to increase the supply of university 
graduates, research systems in some of the wealthier les-developed countries appear to 
have difficulty recruiting or retaining qualified staff. In part, this is because salaries and 
conditions in public agricultural research institutes are not competitive with other 
employment opportunities. In a number of countries, for example, universities employ 
large numbers of PhDs in the agricultural sciences, while the national public agricultural 
research institutes employ few or none. 
 
On the other hand, as argued earlier, a large proportion of PhDs on the research staff does 
not necessarily indicate a successful or a mature research program. The contemporary 
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systems of Australia and New Zealand, for instance, have apparently achieved significant 
successes with a high proportion of staff trained only to the BSc or MSc level, as did the 
U.S. system in earlier years. While certainly not discounting the value of training 
researchers to the PhD level, these observations would suggest that greater attention 
should be given to the research orientation and training within BSc and especially MSc 
programs at local universities rather than simply seeking a high proportion of PhDs 
through training abroad, particular when such training may be of questionable relevance. 
 
3.1.4 Commodity orientation 
 
In less-developed countries, agricultural research is directed predominantly at crops. 
Based on a sample of 83 countries, roughly two-thirds of all agricultural researchers are 
engaged in work related to crops. For the remainder, 19% are engaged in livestock 
research, 7% in forestry research, and 6% in fisheries research. 
 
There are some limited regional disparities in the share of resources devoted to a 
particular commodity orientation (table 3.3). While such disparities are inevitable, given 
regional variations in the pattern of production, it has been argued by some that less 
research is devoted to fisheries and forestry than their reported economic importance 
warrants (see Mergen et al., 1988, on forestry research). In fact, the data – as shown in 
table 3.3 – do not generally support this proposition. Research into forestry attracts more 
resources that its congruent share in agricultural output in all regions. In Asia and Pacific, 
and West Asia and North Africa, this is also true of fisheries. 
 
Table 3. 3: Regional congruence between agricultural GDP and research personnel, 
1981-85 (%) 
 
Crops and livestock Forestry Fisheries  
Region AgGDP Research AgGDP Research AgGDP Research 
Sub-Saharan Africa (22)a 88.6 87.3 4.7 7.3 6.6 5.4 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (10) 89.7 81.1 5.2 9.4 5.0 9.6 
Latin America and Caribbean (20) 94.2 92.8 2.9 5.4 2.8 1.8 
West Asia and North Africa (7) 95.9 91.6 2.4 5.7 1.7 2.7 
Less-developed countries (59) 90.7 87.0 4.6 7.3 4.6 5.7 
Note: Data may not add up exactly because of rounding. 
a Bracketed figures represent number of countries included in the regional samples on which the AgGDP 
breakdown is based. The research breakdown is based on regional samples that include a somewhat larger 
number of countries 
 
Nevertheless, the actual facilities for research into forestry and fisheries are limited, 
primarily because NARSs in less-developed countries are generally mall. The majority 
(73%) of them employ fewer than 200 researchers in total, while only small percentages 
of these are engaged in research into fisheries or forestry. 
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3.1.5 Factor shares 
 
A major challenge for managers of research systems is to make the most effective use of 
available resources. The best mix of spending on capital equipment, personnel and 
operating costs will depend to a large degree on the relative availability and cost of 
research inputs, their quality, and the type of research being conducted. Since the most 
effective combination will differ between regions and change within a system over time, 
it is unrealistic to propose standards for determining the ‘optimal’ mix of inputs in 
research. The data presented in this section should be regarded as indications of 
magnitude based on a sample of countries, not as economic optima necessarily to be 
targeted. 
 
The available data suggest that, in 1981-85, NARSs in less-developed countries on 
average devoted 19% of annual expenditures to capital investment, compared with 8% in 
the U.S. The higher share of spending on capital equipment by NARSs in less-developed 
countries supports the conclusion, also evidenced by their rapid growth, that most are in 
an expansionary phase. During this phase, not only must capital stock be replaced but 
additional capital stock must be acquired. The pattern of expenditures in the U.S., on the 
other hand, reflects that of a mature system, most of whose capital spending entails 
replacement of existing equipment. The emphasis in the U.S. system has, moreover, been 
consistently towards greater investment in human capital rather than physical capital in 
recent years. Today the system performs with around 14 cents of physical capital for each 
dollar of human capital, compared with about 27 cents 50 years ago (Pardey, Eveleens 
and Hallaway 1991). 
 
The contemporary pattern of expenditure in less-developed countries mirrors that of U.S. 
experiment stations in their early years at the turn of this century, when the share of 
capital in total expenditures rose steadily to peak at 29% in 1912, before steadily falling. 
Capital (i.e., land, buildings, equipment, etc.) has claimed the same share of overall 
spending in U.S. research stations (about 8%) for the past three decades.  
 
A second factor in the higher share of capital costs in less-developed country NARSs is 
that capital items are often relatively more expensive in less-developed countries and they 
often lack adequate repair and maintenance facilities, leading to an early write-off of 
equipment. Factor substitution, where less expensive inputs are substituted for more 
expensive, may counterbalance this effect somewhat, but it is not likely that it will 
outweigh it.  
 
Whereas salaries and operating costs in agricultural research expenditures represent 
service flows, capital expenditures represent additions to a stock. Thus, the high share of 
capital in annual spending may also exaggerate the actual share of capital in the services 
used to perform research. Capital equipment can last for many years, and a measure of 
service flow, rather than of expenditure, would probably reduce the share of capital 
actually used by a research system in any given year, particularly if such a system 
expands rapidly.  
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The recurrent costs of NARSs can be divided between salaries and operating costs. In 
less-developed countries, salaries tend to be lower and operating costs higher than in 
more-developed countries. In 1981-85, a sample of 43 less-developed countries spent an 
average of $48,100 in constant 1980 dollars per researcher, compared with $91,200 per 
researcher in the U.S. The contemporary level of spending per researcher in less-
developed countries again appears to reflect the situation in the early years of the U.S. 
experiment stations. In fact, in the U.S., total spending per researcher fell steadily in the 
early years as the recruitment of researchers outpaced rises in research expenditures. In 
the first 30 years, real operating expenditures per researcher fell to roughly one-third of 
original levels and did not recover until the 1970s – some 60 years later! 
 
One of the major difficulties in making plausible cross-country comparisons of factor 
shares is that cross-country differences in price levels, which are not consistent across 
different expenditure items, act to confound the comparisons. Thus, if spending on 
operating costs and salaries is adjusted to take account of price differences between 
countries, research in less-developed countries is seen to be more labor-intensive relative 
to the U.S. Looked at this way, the share of operating costs in recurrent expenditures in 
1981-85 averaged 15% in less-developed countries. 
 
After adjusting for cross-country price differentials, operating expenditures per researcher 
are also much smaller in less-developed regions than in the U.S. Agricultural researchers 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and West Asia 
and North Africa work with only 50%, 43%, 74% and 22%, respectively, of the operating 
resources provided to a U.S. researcher. However, the salary component of recurrent 
expenditures (including the salaries of both scientific and support staff) in the less-
developed regions is much closer to the U.S. level. And in sub-Saharan Africa it is even 
higher. This may be accounted for by the relatively high numbers of expatriates still 
working in African NARSs and the fact that the employment policies of many 
governments in less-developed countries result in NARSs employing large numbers of 
support staff. 
 
3.1.6 Size, scope, and spillovers 
 
Since 1961-65, the average size of NARSs has more than doubled, from around 400 to 
910 researchers, as has average expenditure per system. In less-developed countries the 
average size of NARSs has increased from 155 to 630 full-time equivalent researchers. 
Nevertheless, 95 of the considered 130 NARSs in less-developed countries still employ 
fewer than 200 researchers, while 39 systems employ fewer than 25 researchers. Only 14 
employ more than 1000, illustrating that the growth and development of NARSs in the 
past two decades has diverged significantly.  
 
When analyzing the cost structures and effectiveness of a NARS, one needs to consider 
both the overall size and diversity of its operations and the agricultural system it serves. 
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The evidence on whether or not research operations are subject to economies of size is 
limited and far from definitive. In the case of a NARS, considerations of economies of 
size are confounded by the fact that these systems generate a wide diversity of products 
and services that vary in their commodity, technology, and agroecological specificity. For 
example, certain activities can relate to improving crops or to developing new breeds of 
plants suitable for specific agroecological zones within a country. Alternatively, research 
can be devoted to developing improved crop and soil management practices that will 
allow farmers across a range of agroecological zones to increase yields or improve pest 
and disease control. 
 
Even in the absence of size economies with regard to any particular line of research (e.g., 
a particular commodity research program), a system may well be able to generate 
economies of scope through a judicious choice in its portfolio of research activities. Such 
scope economies arise when a system can undertake a whole range of research endeavors 
more cheaply than if these endeavors were undertaken by separate research entities. 
These economies can be achieved, for example, by sharing staff, equipment, information, 
or know-how between different lines of research. 
 
An important implication is that, when a system can create sufficiently strong economies 
of scope, these can, in turn, lead to economies of size across the whole range of its 
activities, even if such economies of size do not arise for some individual research 
programs (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1988). Of course, there can also arise diseconomies 
of scope, particularly among small systems that spread their limited resources across 
numerous research areas. Thus, small NARSs will be unable to conduct research in all 
areas that may warrant attention in the agricultural systems they serve. They will have to 
make choices between areas of study and this, in turn, requires some specialization and 
flexibility in response to opportunities as circumstances change. 
 
The efficiency of a research system can also be increased by adapting research conducted 
elsewhere to local circumstances. The ability to capture research spillovers is particularly 
important for small NARSs with the capacity to do little more than search and screening 
for suitable technologies. The best source of spillover would seem to be neighboring 
countries with similar agricultural systems and agro-ecological features. This strategy 
would require a policy of hiring staff for their ability to adapt research to local situations 
rather than necessarily to carry out original research. It also requires flexibility in the 
research system to identify and act upon opportunities arising from developments else-
where. 
 
There is some disturbing evidence that many smaller NARSs are unable to take up 
information quickly enough and that the knowledge they work with is increasingly out-
of-date. In a world of growing international interconnectedness, adapting spillovers from 
other research systems is most effective if they can be adapted to local circumstances in a 
timely manner. Using out-of-date information only undermines a country’s relative 
technological capacity and therefore its competitiveness. 
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3.1.7 Research and productivity 
 
Research is best seen as an investment activity. The research process itself takes time, and 
a further period elapses before the results of research are taken up. Recent evidence 
suggests, furthermore, that the benefits of research can still have an effect in increasing 
output for as long as 30 years after the research was initiated. To consider gains in 
agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) as a measure of the impact of 
contemporaneous research expenditure could thus be misleading. Differences in the 
quality of land and labor, and in the intensity of use of other inputs such as fertilizers and 
machinery, will influence output and so distort international comparisons of output that 
are measured only in terms of research. 
 
In fact, all the more- and less-developed regions steadily increased their research 
intensities during that period (table 3.4). In 1981-85, less-developed countries spent an 
average of nearly $4 per agricultural worker on research, 2.5 times the amount spent two 
decades before. In more-developed countries, spending on research increased 4.4 times 
over the same period, to $214 for every agricultural worker.  
 
A final factor urging caution in assessing the benefits of research in terms of increasing 
AgGDP is that a large share of agricultural research may be directed towards maintaining 
gains from earlier research rather than enhancing output levels per se. Recent estimates 
suggest that, in the U.S., around one-third of research expenditures are spent on 
maintenance, and it is probable that many less-developed countries devote at least as 
much proportional effort to such work (Adusei and Norton 1990). 
 
 
3.2 International investments in agricultural research 
 
Contrary to the situation in many areas of scientific research, there has always been an 
important element of international cooperation in agricultural research. Much of this is 
due to the legacy of the colonial relationships that existed at the time institutionalized 
agricultural research was developing. 
 
One of the leading international organizations in the field is the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), an umbrella body of around 40 donor 
countries and international agencies that foster the activities of some dozen supranational 
research centers. (Recently the number was enlarged to 18 but our discussion here refers 
to the original 13.) Ten of these centers have their headquarters in less-developed 
countries. Most are engaged in research into either food commodities or agricultural 
production problems in a particular tropical region, and three undertake worldwide 
research into specific commodities. 
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Table 3.4: Agricultural research factor-intensity ratios 
 
Region 1961-65 1971-75 1981-85 
Agricultural research expenditures per economically active person in agriculture 
    
Sub-Saharan (37) a 1.7 2.7 3.1 
China 1.7 2.5 4.1 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (15) 1.2 2.2 3.4 
Latin America and Caribbean (26) 6.5 12.8 17.7 
West Asia and North Africa (13) 4.5 10.5 14.3 
    
Less-developed countries (92) 1.8 3.2 4.6 
More-developed countries (18) 48.6 119.1 213.5 
    
Total (110) 4.7 7.5 9.5 
    
Agricultural research expenditures per hectare of agricultural land 
    
Sub-Saharan (37) 0.2 0.4 0.6 
China 1.2 2.1 4.1 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (15) 1.0 2.1 3.6 
Latin America and Caribbean (26) 0.4 0.7 1.0 
West Asia and North Africa (13) 0.4 1.0 1.4 
    
Less-developed countries (92) 0.6 1.1 1.8 
More-developed countries (18) 1.8 3.1 4.0 
    
Total (110) 1.0 1.8 2.5 
Note: All expenditures are in constant 1980 PPP dollars. 
a Bracketed figures indicate the number of countries in regional totals. 
 
Established in 1971, the stated objective of the CGIAR (CG for short) was to assist 
efforts to increase food production in the less-developed world. The goals were extended 
in 1990, in recognition of agriculture’s broader role in economic development, to helping 
less-developed countries achieve self-reliance in food. Self-reliance is taken to mean the 
capacity of a country to provide sufficient food for its population, either directly through 
local food production or indirectly by generating agricultural exports that will allow food 
to be imported. 
 
In 1981-85, the CG accounted for only 1.8% of global public-sector spending on 
agricultural research, 4.3% if related to spending by and for less-developed countries. Its 
budget rose, in nominal terms, from $20 million contributed by 20 donors in 1971, to 
$280 million from 40 donors in 1990. If corrected for inflation, the CG expenditures 
show clearly different phases of growth: rapid expansion during the 1970s, slower growth 
during the 1980s, and apparent stagnation or even decline in the past few years. 
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The U.S. was the largest single donor to the CG, although both Europe and Japan 
increased their share of contributions during the 1980s. The World Bank acted as a 
balancing “donor of last resort,” allocating its funds after other donor intentions were 
known. It lately has contributed around 15% of the system’s total budget each year. 
 
During the 1980s, although the CG was established partly in response to the high levels 
of poverty and hunger in Asia, the emphasis in the allocation of funds has shifted to sub-
Saharan Africa. Between 1986 and 1988, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 39% of the 
CG’s core expenditures, compared with 26% to Asia, 21% to Latin America and 
Caribbean, and 14% to West Asia and North Africa. 
 
The “appropriate” regional allocation of funds is just one of the policy issues facing the 
CG. Although much of the increase in funding to sub-Saharan Africa has been for special 
projects, it is arguable that the concentration of resources has swung too much towards 
that region at the ultimate expense of Asia, which has several-fold more poor than sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
The commodity orientation of the system has been subject to change over time. As the 
system expanded, the share allocated to cereals research declined steadily to about 40%, 
of which rice research still accounts for the largest share at 17% of the system’s total. 
Food crops, such as potatoes, other roots and tubers, and legumes, account for 24% of the 
total, while livestock research accounts for around 20%. The remaining resources are 
allocated to noncommodity programs, including farming systems, food policy, genetic 
resources, and NARS capacity building. The recent expansion of the system has 
broadened the commodity coverage to include fisheries, agroforestry and forestry, and 
bananas and plantains. It may also eventually include horticultural commodities. 
 
The recent reorientation of CG objectives to emphasize self-reliance instead of self-
sufficiency in food was a recognition of the fact that increasing food production is not, in 
itself, a solution to the hunger problem. Future policies must reflect the role of 
agricultural growth as a means of generating additional on-farm and off-farm income and 
employment, and the need to sustain the natural-resource base on which continued gains 
in agricultural productivity depend. 
 
The CG’s initial efforts were largely targeted toward more favorable production environ-
ments. Technology packages were developed that involved higher rates of fertilizer 
application, improved water management and cultural practices, along with new crop 
cultivars that were particularly responsive to more intensified production regimes. While 
the dramatic contribution of these technology packages to increasing global food supplies 
is unquestioned (Anderson, Herdt and Scobie 1988), by the mid-1970s the CG had also 
begun to address production constraints in the more marginal environments of the semi-
arid and (sub-)humid topics. 
 
At present, about 30% of CG funding is targeted towards technology for marginal lands, 
which is roughly equal to the percentage of the poor population in less-developed 
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countries that live in these areas. The issue of the relative merits of seeking to improve or 
maintain productivity of favorable versus marginal lands will continue to be an important 
one for the CG, particularly with respect to the potential opportunity costs (in terms of 
productivity gains foregone) of diverting scarce research resources away from more 
responsive areas towards the more marginal ones. Analyses of the type reported by 
Byerlee and Morris (1993) will be needed for guiding future investment policy in this 
regard. 
 
Research on resource management will become more important as the need for continued 
increases in food production places an ever greater strain on the world’s natural 
resources. The CG has taken the first step in this direction. Strategies on how best to 
include agroforestry and resource management concerns into its research program are 
currently being implemented. This is being done by expanding the system and redesign-
ing its approach in order to incorporate institutional entities that specifically address 
research concerns within an agroecological perspective. Aware of the fact that socio-
economic – not just natural – conditions constrain the effectiveness and spillover 
potential of the system’s research, this agroecological aspect is being overlaid on a 
geopolitical or regional dimension to generate a so-called “ecoregional” perspective 
(TAC/Center Directors Working Group 1993). 
 
 
3.3 Private investment in agricultural research 
 
Any formulation of future public-sector research policy must take into account the level 
of activity and changing role of the private sector in agricultural research. As farmers use 
more purchased inputs and the value-added in agriculture increasingly moves off-farm to 
the marketing and processing sectors, it is likely that the incentives for private-sector 
investment in research will grow. While there is a general perception that the private-
sector has increased its participation in and funding of agricultural research, there are no 
available data to give an accurate quantitative or even qualitative perspective of these 
developments at the global, regional, and, in many instances, even country-level. 
 
There are various reasons why these data are not readily available. Firms may feel their 
competitive interests are not well served by a full and frank disclosure of their R&D 
activities and so may be less than forthcoming in this regard. Even when such data are 
reported, there are genuine difficulties in identifying the R&D component that relates 
specifically to agriculture. This is particularly a problem for multiproduct firms in the 
chemical, pharmaceutical, biological and mechanical industries that pursue economies of 
scope by sharing research resources across a number of lines of research. Apportioning 
these R&D expenditures to a particular country in any meaningful way is also 
problematic, especially when dealing with multinational firms that centralize various 
aspects of their global or regional R&D operations. 
 
Recent estimates by Pray and Neumeyer (1989) for the U.S. and Thirtle et al. (1991) for 
the UK suggest that private-sector investments in agricultural and food (i.e., largely post-
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harvest) R&D are substantial and at least as great as the public effort. Reliable global 
estimates of private expenditures on agricultural R&D are simply unavailable. Persley 
(1990, p. 48) reports that about 540 million dollars were spent worldwide by the private 
sector on agricultural biotechnology research in 1985, accounting for roughly 60% of the 
900 million dollars spent on modern biotechnology research for agriculture in that year. 
This private-sector R&D figure is significantly larger than the 36 million dollars Pray and 
Echeverría (1991) estimate was spent annually by multinational companies on all types of 
agricultural (including post-harvest) R&D in less-developed countries during the latter 
half of the 1980s. Taken together these figures suggest that an overwhelmingly large 
share of private-sector spending on agricultural R&D occurs in the more-developed 
countries. 
 
The data reported by Pray and Echeverría (1991) support this view. During the mid-
1980s, spending by U.S. firms on R&D in the food and agricultural sectors was around 
2.4 billion dollars per annum (with about 58% of this total going to agriculture). 
Comparable figures for the UK and France are 530 million and 270 million dollars, 
respectively. Much of the privately sourced funds for agricultural R&D in the less-
developed regions of the world comes form Latin America and Asia and, according to 
Pray and Echeverría (1991), it is concentrated in a few large countries such as Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina and India. 
 
Our understanding of the scale and scope of these private-sector efforts is, unfortunately, 
woefully inadequate. The recent and careful efforts by Falconi (1992, 1993) to compile 
time-series data on private-sector, agricultural R&D expenditures in Ecuador and 
Colombia are quite revealing in this respect. These new data show that, in both countries, 
private-sector spending on agricultural R&D grew much more rapidly than publicly 
sourced expenditures during the 1980s. By 1991, the private sector accounted for 37% of 
total agricultural R&D expenditures in Colombia (compared with 22% in 1970) and in 
Ecuador the private-sector share is now 27% (up from 19% in 1986). To the extent these 
developments are representative of the situation in other Latin American (and perhaps 
some Asian) countries, they call for a radical rethink of the roles of the public-sector 
research agencies in these regions. 
 
Having said this, however, there are still many countries, especially in Africa, where the 
low level of purchased inputs in agriculture limits the size of the derived market for 
privately produced agricultural technologies. This situation is likely to continue for some 
time to come. Nevertheless, governments have a number of policy instruments with 
which to influence private R&D. Public-sector research can foster private-sector research 
by providing (or selling) research results and by training the personnel needed by private 
companies to conduct research. Patents and plant-variety protection laws, if they are well 
designed and enforced, can create the necessary incentives for private companies to invest 
in R&D. Technology imports can stimulate local R&D, so more liberalized technological 
trade could also increase local private-sector R&D activities. 
Innovative institutional arrangements can also help foster those complementarities that 
exist when the generally more upstream or “pretechnology” types of research best suited 
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to the public domain are married with the more applied, technology-generating types of 
research best suited to the private domain. For instance, joint-venture research endeavors, 
where both public and private agencies jointly undertake and/or cofinance a program of 
research are becoming more frequent. Fee-for-service or contract research is also 
increasingly being used to privatize the financing of research being performed by public-
sector research institutions. 
 
Private, for-profit research should not be seen as something intrinsically detrimental to 
the public good, but neither is it likely that an unfettered private sector has the incentives 
to invest sufficiently in researching those problems that will optimize social welfare. 
Public-policy formulators will need to become increasingly sensitive to a rapidly 
changing technological and institutional environment in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities that exist to mobilize both private and public research resources in a 
socially desirable manner. 
 
 
3.4 Political and financial support for agricultural research 
 
A fundamental task facing NARSs is to win public support for research and translate it to 
financial support. This must be done in the context of a public sector subject to competing 
claims on its scarce resources from various interest groups in society, be they producers, 
consumers, or taxpayers. 
 
From this perspective, governments give differential preference to various programs both 
within and between sectors of the economy in response to such pressures. Thus, 
agricultural expenditures are committed to such programs as rural infrastructure, 
education and credit as well as to the generation and dissemination of new agricultural 
technologies. In addition, many poor countries implement distortionary pricing and 
marketing policies in the (short-run) pursuit of cheap-food policies and the like, that 
ultimately tax agriculture and accelerate the transfer of resources from the sector. These 
same policies, in part by undervaluing the sector-specific assets in agriculture (e.g., land, 
irrigation facilities, etc.), can also lead to an underinvestment in agricultural research and 
the level of effort invested by farmers in searching for, evaluating, and adapting new 
agricultural technologies and practices. 
 
To gain a full understanding of the observed disparities in the nature and level of support 
for agricultural research (and the ultimate productivity effects that flow therefrom) would 
require detailed consideration of these “political economy” forces – an exercise that 
would take us well beyond our present brief (Gardner 1990; Roe and Pardey 1993; Alston 
and Pardey 1994). Rather, the aim here is to present some comparative evidence on the 
level of support for public agricultural research, and to place publicly funded research in 
the context of the overall level of support for agriculture.5 
 
                                                     
5 For an earlier version of these data, see Pardey, Kang and Elliott (1989). 
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A traditional measure of the level of support for agricultural research is the agricultural 
research-intensity ratio that expresses levels of research spending as a percentage of 
agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP). Although the majority of the less-
developed countries spent well above 0.5% of AgGDP on agricultural research in 1981-
85, the weighted average was only 0.4% (table 3.5). This apparent difference between 
simple and weighted average is caused by the fact that the smaller less-developed 
countries tend to have substantially higher agricultural research-intensity ratios that the 
large less-developed countries. The weighted average of the more-developed countries 
barely reached 2% in 1981-85. The Southern European countries lagged significantly 
behind the other more-developed countries. When calculated by income group, a (not so 
surprising) strong correlation appears between per-capita income and the agricultural 
research intensity ratio. 
 
Table 3.5: Agricultural research-intensity ratios by region and income group, 
total weighted average percentages (%) 
 
Region/income group a 1961-65 1971-75 1981-85 
Sub-Saharan Africa (37) b 0.26 0.42 0.49 
China 0.42 0.40 0.41 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (15) 0.14 0.22 0.32 
Latin America and Caribbean (26) 0.30 0.46 0.58 
West Asia and North Africa (13) 0.28 0.50 0.52 
    
Less-developed countries (92) 0.26 0.34 0.41 
More-developed countries (18) 0.96 1.41 2.03 
    
Low (30) 0.25 0.30 0.37 
Lower-middle (28) 0.24 0.35 0.40 
Middle (18) 0.25 0.46 0.57 
Upper-middle (18) 0.27 0.44 0.55 
High (16) 1.08 1.57 2.23 
    
Total sample (110) 0.48 0.63 0.71 
a Countries assigned to income classes based on 1971-75 per-capita GDP averages where  
low is < $600; lower middle is $600-1499; middle is $1500-2999; upper middle is $3000-5999; 
 and high is ≥ $6000. 
b Bracketed figures represent number of countries in each region or income class. 
 
Although agricultural research-intensity ratios approximately doubled in both more- and 
less-developed countries between 1961-65 and 1981-85, they declined in the latter half of 
that period in 37% of the less-developed countries, one-half of which were in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Research investment has traditionally produced high levels of return compared with 
investments in other areas, up to and exceeding 35% in some instances (Echeverría 1990). 
This fact, and the gap in investment compared with more-developed countries, has led 
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some authorities to conclude that many less-developed countries underinvest in 
agricultural research. It has also led to calls from the World Bank, for example, to set a 
research investment target of 2% of AgGDP (World Bank 1981).  
 
Research-intensity ratios are useful to policymakers because they indicate the importance 
other countries attach to agricultural research. But they may be an unreliable indicator of 
the appropriateness of a nation’s research investment because the efficacy of a country’s 
research endeavor differs between regions and over time. It could, therefore, be more 
helpful, instead of setting arbitrary targets for research investment, to fix a desired rate of 
return from the investment made – to set targets that would push rates of return to below 
20%, for example. 
 
The data presented in table 3.6 show that low-income countries spend a considerably 
greater share of overall public expenditures on agriculture and agricultural research than 
high-income countries, around 11% on agriculture and 0.7% on agricultural research, 
compared with 2.7% and 0.2%, respectively, in high-income countries. Moreover, the 
share of public expenditures on agriculture directed specifically to research remains 
surprisingly constant, at around 8% in 1981-85, for both poor and rich countries alike. 
 
Table 3.6: Agricultural and agricultural research shares in public-sector expenditures 
 
Income group a 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 
Percentage of agricultural expenditures in total government expenditures 
    
Low (13) b 10.5 11.7 11.2 
Lower-middle (18) 7.5 8.1 9.3 
Middle (12) 6.5 5.7 5.2 
Upper-middle (12) 6.7 4.7 4.3 
High (15) 3.0 2.7 2.5 
    
Total sample (70) 7.1 6.9 6.8 
    
Percentage of agricultural research expenditures in total government expenditures 
    
Low (13) 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Lower-middle (18) 0.7 0.5 0.6 
Middle (12) 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Upper-middle (12) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
High (12) 0.3 0.2 0.2 
    
Total sample (70) 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Note: All data represent simple averages across all countries in each income class. 
a Countries assigned to income classes based on 1971-75 per-capita GDP averages where low  
is <$600; lower middle is $600-1499; middle is $1500-2999; upper-middle is $3000-5999; and  
high is ≥ $6000. 
b Bracketed figures represent number of countries in each income class. 
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To understand why this is so would involve, at a minimum, a detailed consideration of the 
decision-making processes whereby public research investments, pricing policies and the 
like are jointly determined. Particular attention would need to be given to the relative 
incidence of research benefits and costs (across producers, consumers and taxpayers) in 
relation to alternative policy instruments, be they investing in rural public goods such as 
agricultural research versus taxes, subsidies and production quotas (Alston and Pardey 
1994). In the absence of available case-by-case data, the macro-level figures in table 3.7 
are suggestive of some of the political economy forces at work here. 
 
Table 3.7: Public spending per capita on agriculture and agricultural research 
 
Income groupa Government expenditure on 
agriculture 
 Agricultural research 
expenditures 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85  1971-75 1976-90 1981-85 
Per head of agricultural population 
        
Low (13)b 14.0 18.9 21.1  0.9 1.1 1.3 
Lower-middle (18) 44.0 69.5 102.1  3.7 4.0 5.3 
Middle (12) 77.8 94.8 119.2  5.5 6.1 7.6 
Upper-middle (12) 218.8 358.7 552.3  12.4 19.8 26.5 
High (15) 1338.2 1423.1 1801.0  91.8 113.2 140.6 
        
Total (70) 362.4 404.1 531.2  23.9 29.9 37.6 
        
Per head of total population 
        
Low (13) 10.0 13.4 14.1  0.7 0.8 0.9 
Lower-middle (18) 20.9 29.6 38.7  1.5 1.8 2.3 
Middle (12) 31.6 35.3 38.1  2.4 2.3 2.6 
Upper-middle (12) 66.0 62.1 93.0  2.2 2.5 2.7 
High (15) 111.5 112.4 115.0  7.3 8.1 8.5 
        
Total (70) 47.9 50.9 56.3  2.9 3.2 3.5 
Note: All data represent simple averages across all countries in each income class and are expressed in 
constant 1980 PPP dollars. 
a Countries assigned to income classes based on 1971-75 per-capita GDP average where low is <$600; lower-
middle is $600-1499; middle is $1500-2999; upper-middle is $3000-5999; and high is  ≥ $6000. 
b Bracketed figures represent number of countries in each income class. 
 
While total government spending on agriculture, indexed over the agricultural population, 
increases dramatically by a factor of 85 times, from around $21 per capita in the low-
income countries to $1800 per capita in the high-income countries, there is only a 
corresponding 8-fold increase in agricultural spending indexed over the total population. 
Per-capita spending on agricultural research follows a similar pattern. Thus, as one moves 
from low- to high-income countries, the level of per-capita “benefits” or transfers 
accruing to rural-based coalitions may well increase at a disproportionately larger rate 
than the per-capita incidence of “costs” associated with such programs. If this were the 
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case, the willingness of rural-based coalitions to lobby governments in support of 
agricultural research (and other forms of interventions that transfer resources to 
agriculture rather than the nonagricultural sector) may, in turn, be positively associated 
with per-capita income. Modeling and quantifying governments’ incentives to invest in 
rural public goods such as research is necessary but far from sufficient to develop policies 
that help sustain support to public-sector agricultural research. 
 
Donor support. While funding for agricultural research is only a small part of inter-
national development aid programs, it constitutes a significant contribution to the 
financing of numerous less-developed NARSs. Aid from donor countries or organizations 
is particularly vital for countries where high levels of international debt and an inadequate 
tax base make it virtually impossible for the national government to adequately support a 
viable agricultural research program. 
 
There is a serious lack of data available on precise levels of donor support to NARSs. 
What available data there are, are difficult to standardize given the disparate reporting 
methods used by NARSs as well as donors. Figures from donor countries and 
organizations for the period 1981-85 put contributions to agricultural research at an 
average of $658 million a year, which amounts to a very modest 1.9% of total official 
development assistance to less-developed countries. Based on data from the NARSs, 
donor contributions in that period amounted to only about $355 million a year. This 
discrepancy can probably be explained by the fact that NARSs commonly underestimate 
the full extent of contributions they receive. In estimating donor support, NARSs, quite 
understandably, often exclude payments in kind, such as the salaries and expenses of 
expatriates working for them, which can be a substantial element of aid contributions. It 
is also difficult to compile accurate figures on the amount of aid to a research system 
when it is given as part of a wider package of aid that is distributed through the country’s 
national government. 
 
The available data suggest that, in real terms, donor aid to NARSs has fallen since 1980 
as overall levels of development aid have stood still. The World Bank accounts for 
around 25% of donor funds applied to agricultural research in the less-developed world, 
but the Bank’s support for individual national research endeavors declined during the 
1980s. Moreover, this support is concentrated in just a few NARSs. Of the $817 million it 
allocated to strengthen less-developed NARSs during the period 1981-87, two-thirds went 
to only six projects. 
 
The levels of external funding to national systems vary enormously, from none in 
Venezuela and South Korea to 85% in Tuvalu. Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of 
donor funding, receiving on average 35% of its expenditures from donors. NARSs in the 
Asia and Pacific region received an average of 26% of their funding from donors. The 
levels of donor support to NARSs in Latin America and Caribbean, and West Asia and 
North Africa were much lower, 7% and 11%, respectively. 
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3.5 Concluding observations 
 
While the past contributions of agricultural research to productivity gains and the 
improvements in living standards that followed have been impressive, the challenges that 
lie ahead are considerable indeed. There will be unprecedented increases in the demand 
for additional food and fibre production while the threats to even achieving, let alone 
sustaining, such levels of output in the face of a degrading natural resource base for 
agriculture loom large. Such threats appear as real for the more-favored, intensively 
cultivated production environments as they are for the more marginal areas (Pingali 
1994). 
 
There are unlikely to be any quick technological “fixes” to addressing these concerns. In 
fact, for the more immediate term at least, maintaining as well as enhancing past 
productivity increases is likely to come from the incremental gains arising from a whole 
array of new technologies and management practices (Byerlee 1994). While individually 
less “newsworthy” than the Green-Revolution technologies of the past, these sources of 
growth, when taken as a group, will nevertheless be just as real. 
 
But to realize these output gains in a manner that preserves the environment will require a 
sustained commitment to national and international research endeavors. While many 
countries experienced a substantial growth in their research capacity in the 1960s and 
1970s, a considerable number saw an erosion of their public-sector research capacity in 
the 1980s. Although privately sponsored research endeavors are sure to grow in the 
future, the corollary is not necessarily to cut back on public-sector investments. In fact, 
the substantial growth in privately sponsored research in the U.S. over the past several 
decades occurred in conjunction with a continued, albeit slower, growth in public-sector 
research investments. 
 
To fully harness the potential complementarities and synergy between public and private 
research endeavors will require that more attention be given to each sector’s comparative 
research advantage. In particular, the gains to researching improved agricultural 
management and production practices – those that will play a large role in realizing 
sustainable improvements in agricultural output – are generally difficult to appropriate 
and likely to remain the domain of the public sector. So too are the more basic, 
pretechnology types of research that, in turn, lay the foundations for the privately-
sponsored applied and adaptive research programs of tomorrow. Failure to support and 
nurture today’s research endeavors may well reap many unfortunate and undesired 
consequences in the not-too-distant future. 
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4. Financing agricultural research:  
International investment patterns and policy perspectives  
 
By Julian M. Alston, Philip G. Pardey, and Johannes Roseboom1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Public agricultural research funds have become tighter in recent years, and in some places 
funding has fallen in nominal as well as real terms. This reversal of funding trends, 
following a long period of sustained growth, has been shared in national and international 
agricultural research programs, in rich and poor countries alike. Paradoxically, reduced 
support for agricultural research appears to have coincided with a new wave of concerns 
over the world’s future capacity to feed itself while sustaining the natural resource base. 
 
Tighter funding for agricultural science has been associated with a general tightening of 
government budgets for all purposes, and for all science in particular, perhaps reflecting a 
reduced faith in the capacity of science to do good. In addition to these general forces, 
some influences relate more specifically to agricultural science. In many places, 
especially in the more developed countries, agriculture has a shrinking constituency, and 
diminishing influence on policy. Some have questioned the value of investing in 
productivity-enhancing research and development (R&D) in an era of chronic surpluses 
driven by government subsidies, where research would exacerbate the subsidy drain on 
the public purse, at least in a developed-country context – an attitude that reflects an 
incomplete appreciation of the distinction between productivity and production, and the 
determinants of research benefits. Concerns over the environment have also become 
intertwined with agriculture. Taking an international perspective, some evidence of donor 
fatigue is apparent, reflecting a reduced humanitarian resolve to alleviate the plight of the 
world’s poor, and notions that helping Third World agriculture through R&D is against 
the commercial and economic interests of First World farmers. 
 
What seems not to be fully appreciated is that the rationale for government intervention to 
overcome an underinvestment in agricultural research remains no less relevant today than 
it was in the recent past. Recent developments in the technology of science itself, 
including modern biotechnology and information technologies, mean that the potential 
remains for substantial achievements in agricultural science, with profound potential to 
alleviate world poverty – possibly on the scale of the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 
                                                     
1 This chapter is a verbatim reproduction of an article published earlier in World Development Vol. 26, No. 6 
(June 1998): pp. 1057-1071. Not included are the summary and keywords. All headings and footnotes have 
been renumbered in order to fit with this dissertation. References have been included in the reference list to 
this dissertation. The authors wish to thank Nienke Beintema for her excellent research assistance and Peter 
Hazell and two anonymous referees for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper which was 
presented at the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE) conference held at Sacramento, 
California, in August 1997. Partial support for this work was provided by the University of California, Pacific 
Rim Project. Final revision accepted: 4 November 1997. 
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1970s – as well as enormous benefits for rich country producers and consumers of food 
and fiber. But in spite of changes in intellectual property protection, incentive problems 
persist. Unfortunately, the long lags between investment in research and its impacts mean 
that serious consequences of reduced funding today will not be visible for many years, 
and could persist for a long time into the future. 
 
The purpose of this article is to defend global investments in public agricultural research, 
and to propose institutional changes to support more effective ways of generating 
agricultural R&D funds and allocating them. In the first part of the paper, we lay out the 
economic principles supporting government intervention in agricultural research, 
including a discussion of the alternative forms that such intervention may take, and their 
relevance for multinational government intervention to deal with global underinvestments 
in certain types of research. These in-principle arguments are supported with some 
empirical evidence on the past successes in public agricultural research policy in practice. 
In the second part we present new, detailed data on global patterns of investment in R&D. 
We contrast public- and private-sector investment patterns, and richer and poorer 
countries, as well as the international research investment patterns. In the conclusion of 
the paper we discuss the nature of the persistent market failures in agricultural research, 
especially in relation to international research spillovers, a context in which the 
institutional arrangements for correcting market failures are especially inadequate. 
 
 
4.2 Economic principles for government intervention in research2  
 
4.2.1 Rationales for government intervention 
 
Market failure in agricultural R&D seems to be widely taken for granted. The main 
reason is inappropriability of benefits. Often, those who invest in R&D cannot capture all 
of the benefits – others can “free-ride” on an investment in research, using the results and 
sharing in the benefits without sharing in the costs. Hence, private benefits to an investor 
(or group of investors) are less than the social benefits of the investment and, as a result, 
some socially profitable investment opportunities remain unexploited. 
 
Specifically, in the absence of government intervention, the investment in agricultural 
research is likely to be too little, for several related reasons. First, the nature of research 
activity, which is usually long-term, large-scale, and risky, means that the typical firm in 
agriculture is not able to carry out effective research (although it can help to fund it). 
Hence, institutions may need to be set up on a collective basis to fund or carry out 
research.3 Second, the returns to new technologies or processes are often high, but the 
firm responsible for developing a technology may not be able to appropriate all the 
                                                     
2 Many of the ideas sketched in this section and the next are developed in greater detail in Alston and Pardey 
(1996), Alston and Pardey (1998). 
3 There are exceptions to the typical situation, but even when firms are large enough to find it profitable to 
carry out some research there is still likely to be too little research for the other reasons (appropriability and 
externalities).  
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benefits accruing to the innovation, often because fully effective intellectual property 
protection (e.g. patenting or secrecy) is not possible.4 Third, some research benefits (or 
costs) accrue to people other than those who use the results. In particular, agricultural 
R&D is characterized by very long lags between research investments and impacts, which 
means that benefits from today’s research investments may accrue primarily to some 
future generation of producers and consumers. These reasons for private-sector 
underinvestment in agricultural R&D also help explain the empirical finding that 
agricultural R&D has been, on average, a highly profitable investment from society’s 
point of view. 
 
Other reasons for government intervention in agricultural R&D relate to more general 
market failures, including distortions arising from externalities.5 The existence of 
externalities means that marginal private costs (or benefits) from economic activities 
differ from the corresponding marginal social costs (or benefits) and, as a result, private 
decisions will not be socially optimal: a market failure. Hence, in the absence of 
government intervention, commercial decisions will tend to produce too much pollution 
and preserve too little pristine wilderness. Agricultural R&D can affect the balance by 
generating technologies that are both privately profitable and, say, environmentally 
friendly, relative to the current technology. But the very nature of (negative) externalities 
means that it does not pay private investors to make an effort to reduce them, either in the 
choice of production practices with given technology, or in the choice of the direction of 
technology to evolve through research, development, and adoption decision. 
 
Similar arguments apply to the development and adoption of technologies that consume 
stocks of unpriced or underpriced natural resources. Hence, private incentives are liable 
to lead in the direction of the development and adoption of excessively consumptive 
technologies unless government acts to modify the incentives and “internalize” the 
externalities. These arguments mean that, even in the absence of market failures 
associated with the atomistic nature of agricultural production, there will be distortions in 
incentives so that the direction of research will be biased against externality-mitigating 
technologies in favor of externality-exacerbating technologies. There is too little R&D 
due to inappropriability; the mix of R&D is biased due to externality effects (Alston et al. 
1995). 
 
These conclusions from in-principle arguments are backed up by empirical evidence on 
the payoff to past investments in agricultural R&D across different commodities and 
different countries. For example, Echeverría (1990) and Alston et al. (1997) document the 
results of a large number of studies of rates of return to agricultural research. Notwith-
                                                     
4 This appropriability problem extends beyond relations among single individuals to relations among 
collectives such as one producer cooperative or industry group versus another, and among states and even 
countries. 
5 Externalities arise when one individual’s production or consumption activities involve spillover effects on 
other individuals who are not compensated through markets. Groundwater pollution with agricultural 
chemicals is an example of a negative externality. Free-riding by others on an individual’s research results, as 
discussed above, is a type of externality, too – a positive externality, having favorable spillover effects. 
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standing concerns that the rate of return evidence has on balance been biased upward, the 
general conclusion is that rates of return to agricultural research have been comparatively 
high; certainly high enough to justify past investments, and, as many have argued, to 
warrant increased public investment or other forms of government interventions designed 
to increase overall investment. 
 
4.2.2 International market failures 
 
There is no particular reason to expect the fundamental forces giving rise to market 
failures in agricultural research to pay much attention to national borders. Indeed, 
national borders may well exacerbate market failures in research by adding to the costs of 
organizing institutional arrangements for collective action by producers where research is 
applicable on both sides of a border. In other words, when research undertaken by 
producers or the government in one country is applicable in another country, the inter-
national spillovers of technology (and the price effects of the technology) give rise to a 
market failure since the benefits from research by one country are not fully appropriable. 
There is no difference from spillover problems arising within a country (say among 
different states), except that there is no encompassing global government that can play the 
role that the national government would play in resolving within-country market failures. 
International spillovers must be dealt with by cooperative action among national 
governments. It would be easy to understate this issue. 
 
Past efforts in developing collaborative international research programs were not 
instigated by the impulses of national governments to cooperate and raise research 
efficiency globally. Rather, it was the actions of private benevolent foundations (Ford and 
Rockefeller), more clearly pursuing a humanitarian aid objective than any other, that led 
the way to the development of the current system of international centers known as the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, or CG for short). 
Over time, the relative importance of the private foundations in the CG system has 
weakened, and support from some national governments, notably in North America, has 
slipped as well. This phenomenon should not be surprising. It is the essence of market 
failure that cooperative solutions among self-interested groups are hard to sustain when 
free-riding on the efforts of others appears to be a viable alternative. By the same token, 
financial support from the less-developed countries – targeted as the primary beneficiaries 
from the CG system – has never been strong. And private research organizations have 
also provided minimal financial support for a system from which they clearly benefit 
directly. Market, political, and institutional failure is pervasive in international 
agricultural research. 
 
International research remains a relatively small part of the global agricultural research 
business, at least in terms of the annual investments in R&D, if not in terms of their 
impacts on agricultural technology. Recent research has shown, however, that the past 
and future potential returns to international agricultural research are very high. For 
instance, Maredia and Byerlee (1997) have shown that most countries cannot operate a 
wheat-breeding program of sufficient size to take full economic advantage of the 
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available economies of size and scope. In addition, several studies (e.g. Brennan and Fox 
1995; Pardey et al. 1996) have documented evidence that benefits from wheat and rice 
research conducted in international centers have yielded major payoffs in Australia and 
the United Stated (which are more often viewed as donor countries rather than recipients 
of benefits from the CG system) as well as in less-developed countries. These studies 
have shown huge rates of return to this investment, from both a global perspective and 
from the perspective of donors who have been “doing well, by doing good” (Tribe 
1991).6 The confounding of self-interest of donors in the technologies to be generated, 
with the humanitarian objective in giving research aid, exemplifies the complexity of the 
economic efficiency and distribution issues that arise in designing institutions for 
international research. 
 
4.2.3 Forms of government intervention 
 
It is one thing to establish a case of market failure. It is another to determine the best 
action for government to take to reduce the social costs of the market failure. Indeed, 
taking no action may sometimes by the optimal policy. Many interventions are used in 
relation to agricultural R&D. They include the definition of private property rights (e.g. 
recent changes in intellectual property protection involving plant variety protection 
certificates or utility patents for plants), enhanced incentives for private R&D (e.g. 
through the provision of tax breaks, direct subsidies, or other incentives), the provision of 
public funds for publicly or privately executed R&D through competitive grants, or the 
creation of public- or private-sector R&D institutions (e.g. legal arrangements under 
which an industry funds research cooperatively). The dominant strategy around the world 
has been to use government revenues to finance public- or private sector R&D. This 
includes the provision of tax concessions and other financial incentives for private R&D, 
which involves a loss of government revenues, as well as the direct use of government 
funds both to finance private R&D, through grants and contracts, and to finance the 
production of knowledge in a variety of publicly administered R&D organizations. 
 
These alternatives may all differ in terms of their incentive effects, and in their 
implications for the net social (deadweight) cost of distortions in the quantity and mix of 
research, and the total social cost of financing R&D. An intervention is justified only if it 
improves the situation by reducing the social costs of market failure – the benefits of the 
intervention must be greater than the costs. Different interventions will be more or less 
effective at correcting different types of market failures; they will also have different 
distributional (or equity) consequences. 
 
                                                     
6 For instance, Pardey et al. (1996) showed that by the early 1990s, about one-fifth of the total US wheat 
acreage was sown to varieties with CIMMYT ancestry, and around 73% of the total US rice acreage was 
sown to varieties with IRRI ancestry. This meant, for example, that US wheat producers gained at least $3.4 
billion over 1970-93 from CIMMYT wheat variety improvements, which implies a ratio of benefits to costs 
borne by the United States of at least 40:1. The same study found that California alone could have profitably 
financed the entire CIMMYT research program, given the benefits flowing to California’s wheat producers. 
64 
 
4.3 Financing research: principles and practices 
 
The economic justification for government intervention in agricultural R&D is that 
economic efficiency will improve as a result. In this context, economic efficiency is an 
inclusive concept that refers to the achievement of the greatest net benefits for the society 
as a whole, taking a broad view of net benefits. For instance, it includes benefits such as 
sustainability (to the extent that there are net benefits from the development and adoption 
of more sustainable resource-use patterns), environmental objectives (e.g. where R&D 
can lead, economically, to a reduction in pollution), and nutritional objectives (to the 
extent that there are net benefits from R&D directed towards improving dietary quality 
and health). Such non-pecuniary benefits are included along with pecuniary benefits, in a 
broad concept of net national benefits. The idea of economic efficiency is to make those 
net national benefits as great as possible. 
 
Agricultural R&D is generally a blunt and ineffective instrument for objectives other than 
economic efficiency. Hence, distorting the agricultural R&D portfolio away from 
economic efficiency in the pursuit of non-efficiency objectives is likely to involve a high 
social opportunity cost. However, while the research program may be designed primarily 
to increase the size of the total economic pie, inevitably the shape of the pie and the way 
it is sliced among groups will be affected to some extent by the choice of research 
priorities. Unless other policies are in place that can correct fully for any unintended side-
effects of agricultural research on other objectives, it may be necessary to trade off 
efficiency gains from research for other objectives such as equity or security. In our view, 
such trade-offs should be limited, and it is appropriate to focus largely, if not exclusively, 
on economic efficiency considerations when choosing how to finance, organize and 
manage public-sector agricultural R&D.7  
 
Whether the potential improvements in economic efficiency are realized will also depend 
on how the public-sector R&D is financed – whether by patents, federal or state 
government revenues, industry levies, sales of services or products, or gifts. The 
economic gains achieved by intervening to provide government-produced R&D also 
depend on the details of the institutional arrangements affecting the organization of 
research and management of research resources (in terms of incentives and procedures for 
allocating resources). Hence, these administrative aspects, too, are the subjects of policy. 
 
4.3.1 Financing strategies 
 
A mix of private and public funding is used to support national and international 
agricultural research, and in many countries national and provincial governments conduct 
separately administered programs of research. The primary source of funding for these 
                                                     
7 One possible exception to this general position is that it may be economically efficient to use agricultural 
R&D rather than existing farm programs if the objective of the farm programs is to transfer income from 
taxpayers to farmers. While raising net income to society as a whole, agricultural research also raises farm 
incomes, an outcome that is clearly superior to making society as a whole worse off in order to transfer 
income to farmers. 
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expenditures is general tax revenues, an expensive source of revenues. Recent studies in 
the United States and Australia, for instance, have shown that it costs society well over a 
dollar to provide a dollar of general taxpayer revenues to finance public expenditure; in 
less-developed countries, the taxation systems are likely to be less efficient and the 
marginal opportunity cost of government spending is likely to be even higher than in the 
developed countries.8 Alternative sources of revenue may be less expensive, fairer, and 
politically more sustainable, when used to finance certain types of research and achieve 
an expanded total public-sector R&D budget. 
 
Different agricultural R&D programs and projects call for different funding arrange-
ments. Agricultural R&D may be a public good in the sense of (at least partial) non-
excludability and non-rivalness, but this does not mean that everybody in a country, or 
the world, benefits and it does not mean that everybody should pay. Both fairness and 
efficiency are promoted by funding research so that, as much as possible, the costs are 
borne in proportion to the benefits. This can be promoted by choosing funding 
arrangements that reflect the geographic focus and the commodity orientation of the 
research, which implies a greater use of both subnational and multinational, regional, or 
commodity R&D programs. 
 
In addition, following Alston and Pardey (1996), a greater use of commodity levy funding 
(i.e. levy per unit of commodity output of value) is suggested for three reasons. First, 
industry funding is a potential complement to other sources of funds which, as a practical 
matter, are likely to continue to leave total funding inadequate. Second, commodity levies 
are likely to be a relatively efficient (and fair) tax base.9 Third, industry funding 
arrangements can be organized to provide incentives for efficient use of both the levy 
funds and other research resources. 
 
                                                     
8 Fullerton (1991) and Ballard and Fullerton (1992) provide a general discussion of the marginal excess 
burden of taxation in the United States. Findlay and Jones (1982) provide estimates for Australia. See also 
Chambers (1995) and Corden (1974). Fox (1985) and Dalrymple (1990) discuss the implications of the 
deadweight costs of taxation for the measures of benefits and costs of research. Alston and Pardey (1996) 
summarize much of this discussion and its relevance for financing agricultural R&D. 
9 One can take issue with this position. In an ideal world, with efficient general taxation measures (e.g. 
income taxes), general taxation revenue would be obtained in the least-cost way, and general taxation would 
be at least as cheap as a specific commodity tax to fund agricultural research. In such a world, arguments for 
earmarked commodity taxes to fund specific research programs would have to follow the general form of 
arguments for earmarked taxes. In reality, however, least-cost taxation measures seem not to be applied. This 
issue then is whether, in a general equilibrium setting, at the margin a commodity tax would be a cheaper 
source of funds for research than the general taxation measures already being applied. In most developed-
country settings, in which agriculture is relatively effectively subsidized, it could more easily be presumed 
that a small tax on agricultural commodity production would be more likely to reduce, rather than exacerbate, 
the social costs of existing distortions. More generally, a view about the particulars of the situation may be 
required before a judgment can be made about whether commodity levies are efficient sources of funds for 
research. Chambers (1995) provides a general equilibrium model of the incidence of agricultural policies. 
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Levy funding is clearly applicable to research on a particular commodity. By definition, 
this is not basic research involving the acquisition of knowledge with no particular 
application or use in view (OECD 1994). Levies are also more applicable for 
commodities that are traded through markets in developed industries and less applicable 
to, say, subsistence crops or commodities for which markets are not well developed and 
where, in consequence, the costs of raising levy funds would be prohibitively expensive. 
Similarly, levy schemes tend to be less applicable to research that affects multiple 
commodities and research that applies to particular factors of production or that has an 
environmental focus. However, these issues notwithstanding, commodity levies could be 
used more extensively to support the significant proportion of research that can be 
identified with a well-defined commodity (or other) interest group. Around the world, 
such mechanisms are relatively underutilized in the sense that only a small fraction of 
total R&D resources are generated in this fashion. 
 
4.3.2 Research organization 
 
The appropriate regional and institutional structure for organizing research programs 
ought to vary according to the nature of the research. Some issues are clearly national 
issues and are appropriately addressed by national programs. But a national government 
can choose whether to address an issue using national funds in national research 
institutes, or in sub-national or international public organizations (or, for that matter, in 
private organizations), or by using incentives to encourage other organizations to take 
joint action. Some other issues (such as the development of new crop varieties or the 
preservation of germplasm stocks) clearly have multinational aspects, calling for 
international approaches. Unfortunately, in many cases the R&D jurisdictions of states 
and nations overlap in complicated ways, and the solution is not clear – or, if it is, the 
appropriate institutional arrangements are absent. Moreover, for some of these policy 
problems the relevant economic framework has not yet been fully developed. 
 
4.3.3 Research management 
 
Some of the potential benefits from the agricultural research enterprise may have been 
wasted in inefficient resource allocation. In many countries, the current set of institutional 
arrangements apportions research funds among alternative research-executing agencies in 
ways that make little use of economic concepts. Buzzwords and fads seem to increasingly 
dominate the evolving research agenda in a good many places. Having a well-defined and 
appropriate set of objectives is a necessary first step to making informed policy and 
resource allocation choices. With a single objective, decision making is relatively easy.10 
 
Any research resource allocation mechanism nevertheless involves costs, including (i) 
information costs, (ii) transactions costs, and (iii) costs of resource misallocation. 
Different processes involve different amounts of these different types of costs. Those who 
                                                     
10 We argue for economic efficiency (broadly conceived) as the primary and sole objective, but not everyone 
agrees with that position (Alston et al. 1995; Alston and Pardey 1996). 
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favor block grants or funding by formula, because they save wasteful expenditure on 
competitive processes or rent-seeking, must consider that these costs are more important 
than the potential inefficiencies in research resource allocation that arise from not 
allowing others to compete for the funds allocated according to the formula. Moreover, 
for a competitive grant scheme to dominate other processes, the costs of additional 
paperwork, submission of grant applications, and reporting procedures, must be seen to 
be less than the benefits from improved information and efficiency of allocation of 
research resources. It seems likely that different types, or combinations of types, of 
research resource-allocation procedures may be warranted depending on the nature of the 
research institution, and the research itself, being undertaken. Over time, resource 
misallocation costs are likely to become relatively large in a formula funding context; on 
the other hand, too frequent accounting in a competitive grant context is wasteful and 
uninformative. But even if funds are allocated primarily by formula, there will be benefits 
to be gained from the introduction of an economic way of thinking, and a view towards 
maximizing total net benefits, as an element of research management, as advocated by 
Alston et al. (1995) 
 
 
4.4 Agricultural research investment patterns11 
 
As we near the end of the twentieth century there are notable, and seemingly accelerating, 
changes in the amount and sources of support for agricultural R&D, the national and 
international roles in research, and the respective roles of the private and public sectors 
too. This section presents new, updated data on investments in agricultural R&D that 
provides a quantitative perspective on some of these developments. 
 
4.4.1 Measurement issues 
 
Measuring agricultural R&D investments is becoming increasingly difficult as the 
institutions involved in funding, managing, and performing agricultural R&D evolve and 
become more complex. Publicly managed research providers are increasingly spending 
private funds (e.g. farmer levies or corporate funds), while privately managed agencies 
are spending more public dollars (either directly or via tax concessions), and we see a 
growing number of joint public and private arrangements. Distinguishing between those 
who fund agricultural R&D (and, perhaps, manage the funds) and those who perform the 
research provides a clearer picture of changing institutional roles within programs of 
national agricultural research.12 
 
                                                     
11 Some parts of this section draw heavily on data presented in Pardey et al. (1997) although some new, 
additional data are introduced an discussed here for the first time. 
12 Another, economically important, distinction is to identify who benefits from particular investments in or 
uses of agricultural R&D. Those who benefit from R&D can be quite distinct from those who bear the costs 
of the research, or those who adopt the results. 
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Another aspect that confounds international comparisons concerns differences in the 
meaning given to the term “agriculture.” Readily available statistics often fail to 
distinguish between, farm-focused R&D and R&D directed toward the input supply, and 
food- and fibre-processing sectors. In addition, as the environmental emphasis given to 
agricultural R&D has increased, non-traditional agencies have begun to carry out research 
of relevance to agriculture, while some agricultural research spills over to sectors beyond 
commercial agriculture (e.g. pest and weed control methods from agriculture are used in 
urban gardens and golf courses).  
 
The agricultural research expenditure series reported here are separated where possible 
into public and private categories, primarily on the basis of research performers rather 
than funders. In compiling these data, care was taken to maintain a consistent institutional 
coverage over time, and to make the data comparable across countries.13 Although some 
unavoidable differences in data quality remain, these figures provide a reasonable and 
informative basis for making broad international comparisons. 
 
4.4.2 Global investment trends in public agricultural research 
 
Worldwide, investments by national governments in public agricultural research almost 
doubled in real terms over the past two decades; from $7.3 billion (1985 international 
dollars) in 1971 to nearly $15 billion in 1991 (table 4.1).14 Expenditures on publicly 
performed agricultural research in developing countries grew by 5.1% per annum from $3 
billion (1985 international dollars) in 1971 to $8 billion in 1991. Across the developed 
countries, public agricultural spending grew by 2.3% per annum from $4.3 billion (1985 
international dollars) in 1971 to $6.9 billion in 1991 and $ 7.1 billion by 1993. 
 
For all regions of the world, however, real R&D spending grew at a much slower pace 
during the 1980s than in the 1970s. In 1971, as a group, developing countries, accounted 
or 41% of the spending. By 1991 the situation had changed markedly. Developing-
country R&D spending had grown to more than half (about 54%) of public-sector R&D 
spending worldwide. In 1991, Asian countries accounted for 62% of the developing 
world’s publicly performed agricultural-research expenditures (19% for China alone), the 
Latin America and Caribbean as well as sub-Saharan African regions (including South 
Africa) each accounted for 12%, and 14% of the expenditures occurred in West Asia and 
North Africa. 
 
                                                     
13Agricultural research is taken here to include crop, livestock, forestry, and fisheries research. See OECD 
(1994) for additional, definitional details related to the compilation of science indicators.  
14 These “global” totals are preliminary estimates that exclude Eastern European and former Soviet Union 
countries. The principal data source for 1961-85 is Pardey et al. (1991). These data were revised and updated 
for African countries using various ISNAR Statistical Briefs; for most of the principal Asian countries 
(including China and India) with data from Pardey et al. (1996); and for the developed countries from Pardey 
et al. (1997). Semiprocessed data from numerous other sources were obtained for most of the mid-to-larger-
sized NARS and a number of smaller systems. The less-developed countries for which we have direct 
estimates account for approximately 85% of the less-developed-country total. 
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Table 4.1: Public agricultural research expenditures in developed and  
developing countries, 1971-91 
 
 1971 1981 1991 
 (millions of 1985 international dollars)a 
Expenditures    
Developing countries (131)b 2,984 5,503 8,009 
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 699 927 968 
China 457 939 1,494 
Asia and Pacific, excl. China (28) 861 1,922 3,502 
Latin America and Caribbean (38) 507 981 944 
West Asia and North Africa (20) 459 733 1,100 
Developed countries (22) 4,298 5,713 6,941 
Global total (153) 7,282 11,217 14,951 
    
 1971-81 1981-91 1971-91 
 (percentage) 
Average annual growth rates    
Developing countries 6.4 3.9 5.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 0.8 1.6 
China 7.7 4.7 6.3 
Asia and Pacific (excl. China) 8.7 6.2 7.3 
Latin America and Caribbean 7.0 -0.5 2.7 
West Asia and North Africa 4.3 4.1 4.8 
Developed countries 2.7 1.7 2.3 
Global total  4.3 2.9 3.6 
Source: Pardey et al. (1997). 
Note: The 153 countries included in these totals correspond to the coverage reported in the  
appendix tables in Pardey et al. (1991). Notably, countries from the former Soviet Union and  
Eastern Europe are excluded, but here we include South Africa.  
a Research expenditures denominated in current local currency units are first deflated to 1985  
prices using local implicit GDP deflators taken from World Bank (1995a) and then converted  
to international dollars (where one international dollar is set equal to one US dollar) using the  
purchasing power parities taken from Heston et al. (1995). 
b Figures in parentheses indicate the number of countries in the respective totals. 
 
An alternative perspective on agricultural R&D spending is provided by the agricultural 
research intensity (ARI) ratio presented in table 4.2. The most commonly constructed 
ARI ratios express agricultural research expenditures as percentages of agricultural 
GDP.15 In 1991, as a group, developed countries spent $2.39 on public agricultural R&D 
                                                     
15 Agricultural GDP is a “value-added” measure of agricultural output that represents the gross value of 
output minus the value of purchased inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery. Hence, these 
70 
 
for every $100 of agricultural GDP; a sizable increase over the $1.38 they spent per $100 
of output two decades earlier. Developing countries, as a group, have much lower ARI 
ratios. In the early 1970s their ARI ratio averaged 38 cents per $100 of output, growing to 
only 50 cents by 1991. 
 
Table 4.2: Agricultural research intensity ratios (percentage) 
 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991 
Developing countries 0.38 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.78 0.84 0.86 0.74 0.70 
China 0.40 0.48 0.41 0.38 0.36 
Asia and Pacific 0.26 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.55 
Latin America 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.49 0.54 
West Asia and North Africa 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.52a 0.52a 
Developed countries 1.38 1.60 1.98 2.18 2.39 
Global total  0.67 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.81 
Source: Pardey et al. (1997). 
Note: See table 4.1 for country coverage. Agricultural research intensity measures agricultural research 
spending relative to agricultural GDP. 
a Extrapolated data. 
 
Hence, it is still the case that richer countries invest public funds in agricultural R&D 
more intensively than poorer countries do. Using data on 64 developed and developing 
countries for 1991, figure 4.1 suggests an overall positive relationship between public 
agricultural research intensity and per capita income. Nevertheless, many low-income 
countries invest more intensively in agricultural research than a consideration of income 
alone would suggest. Figure 4.2 provides part of the explanation for this unexpected 
variation in research intensity: it indicates a negative relationship between a measure of 
the importance of agriculture in the domestic economy (agricultural GDP as a share of 
GDP) and agricultural research. So some low-income countries with comparatively small 
agricultural sectors invest relatively intensively in agricultural R&D (e.g. Botswana, 
Lesotho, and South Africa). Remaining differences in ARI ratios are attributable to a host 
of other factors, including the preferences of international donors, the policy stance each 
country takes in public support of its agricultural sector, and economies of scale and 
scope in agricultural R&D programs.16 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
research intensity ratios are higher than, and not directly comparable with, other research intensity ratios that 
dived agricultural research spending by the gross value of output.  
16 See Alston and Pardey (1994) for a discussion of these issues in this context. 
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Figure 4.1: Agricultural research intensities and per capita income, 1991 
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Figure 4.2: Agricultural research intensities and the share of agriculture in GDP, 1991 
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Other research intensity or spending ratios can be calculated, and two of these are 
reported in table 4.3. One measures agricultural R&D spending relative to the size of the 
economically active agricultural population; the other, relative to total population. In 
1991, developed countries spent about $354 (1985 international dollars) per agricultural 
worker, approximately 2.5 times the corresponding 1971 figure. In 1991, developing 
countries spent $7 per agricultural worker, nearly two times the spending per agricultural 
worker in 1971. These differences between more- and less-developed countries are not 
too surprising, given the substantially higher proportion of developing-country workers 
employed in agriculture, and the more rapid contraction in the agricultural labor force in 
the developed countries over the past several decades. Research spending per capita has 
risen too, by an average of 40% for developed countries (from $6.30 per capita in 1971 to 
$8.84 in 1991), and by an average of 79% in developing countries (from $1.10 per capita 
in 1971 to $1.97 in 1991).17 
 
Table 4.3: Agricultural research spending ratios 
 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991 
 (1985 international dollars per year) 
Research spending per economically active agricultural population 
Developing countries 3.81 4.83 5.75 6.45 6.99 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.67 9.20 8.76 7.98 7.60 
China 1.62 2.14 2.71 3.07 2.98 
Asia and Pacific 3.05 4.36 5.58 7.21 8.55 
Latin America 13.04 17.81 20.13 19.36 21.80 
West Asia and North Africa 13.08 15.46 20.43 24.22 27.05 
Developed countries 144.0 190.64 250.03 304.10 354.25 
Global total 9.29 10.69 11.92 12.65 13.44 
      
Research spending per capita  
Developing countries 1.18 1.46 1.69 1.85 1.97 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.66 2.66 2.39 2.07 1.19 
China 0.65 0.87 1.12 1.30 1.28 
Asia and Pacific 0.91 1.24 1.53 1.88 2.17 
Latin America 1.85 2.28 2.35 2.02 2.11 
West Asia and North Africa 2.62 2.73 3.23 3.38 3.53 
Developed countries 6.60 7.26 7.95 8.35 8.84 
Global total 2.36 2.65 2.90 3.03 3.18 
Source: Calculated by authors using R&D data from Pardey et al. (1997) and agricultural labor data from 
FAO (1995). 
Note: See table 4.1 for country coverage. 
 
                                                     
17 Alston and Pardey (1994) report comparable measures for developing countries and use these indicators to 
discuss the political economy aspects of public investment in agricultural R&D. 
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4.4.3 Investments in private agricultural research 
 
A common perception is that agricultural research is primarily the domain of the public 
sector, while research in other sectors of the economy is the province of the private 
sector. But the new data presented in table 4.4 reveal that privately performed R&D is a 
prominent feature of contemporary agricultural R&D in rich countries. Indeed, the private 
share has trended up significantly since 1981 and now almost half the OECD’s 
agricultural R&D is performed by the business sector. Privately performed agricultural 
R&D totaled $7 billion in 1993 compared with $4 billion in 1981; an annual rate of 
growth of 5.1% compared with 1.8% for publicly performed agricultural R&D, and 4.3% 
for private research in all (agricultural and non-agricultural) sectors in the OECD. 
 
Table 4.4: Privately performed agricultural R&D in OECD countries 
 
  
 
1981 
 
 
1986 
 
 
1991 
 
 
1993 
Annual rate of 
growth 
1981-93 
 (millions of 1985 international dollars) (%) 
Expenditures 
United States 1,417 1,964 2,256 2,381 4.3 
Japan 791 1,146 1,577 1,660 6.7 
United Kingdom 404 474 593 614 5.0 
France 256 390 504 565 7.2 
Germany 426 492 520 459 1.3 
Other OECD 701 955 1,199 1,351 5.7 
OECD total a 3,995 5,420 6,649 7,030 5.1 
      
 (percentage)  
Private share of total national agricultural R&D 
United States 46.6 52.1 52.7 53.7b - 
Japan 39.4 47.5 51.4 51.4 - 
United Kingdom 52.1 55.8 62.0 62.4 - 
France 38.4 47.4 52.5 52.9 - 
Germany 58.7 61.8 61.6 58.0 - 
Other OECD 28.1 31.0 34.4 37.0 - 
OECD total a 41.1 46.2 48.9 49.6 - 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from Pardey et al. (1997). 
Note: Data does not include expenditures on agricultural machinery research. 
a Includes 22 OECD countries. 
b 1992 figure. 
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The relative importance of private R&D in total agricultural R&D varies across the 
OECD countries. In Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, the business sector 
performs over 60% of the agricultural research, and in Germany and the Netherlands the 
private share is now in excess of 55%. The United States and Japan, two countries that 
collectively account for over one-half of all privately performed agricultural research 
throughout the OECD, now also spend more on private than public R&D. The private 
share in the remaining OECD countries is smaller (about one-third in 1993), but the 
private orientation of agricultural research in these countries has been growing quite 
rapidly too. Private sector R&D in developing countries typically accounts for 10-15% of 
total agricultural R&D.18 
 
Private and public agencies do different types of R&D. Around 12% of private research 
focuses on farm-level technologies whereas over 80% of public research has that 
orientation. Food-processing and other post-harvest research accounts for 30 to 90% of 
private agricultural R&D, and in countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the 
Netherlands it is the dominant focus of privately performed research related to 
agriculture. Chemical research (including agriculturally related pharmaceutical research) 
is of comparatively minor importance in Australia and New Zealand, but accounts for 
more than 40% of private research in the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
nearly three-quarters of private agricultural research in Germany. There is a clear 
concentration of particular lines of private R&D in particular countries. Japan, the United 
States, and France account for 33, 27, and 8%, respectively, of all food-processing 
research carried out by the private sector in the OECD. Chemical research related to 
agriculture is even more concentrated; the United States, Japan and Germany represent 
41, 20, and 10% of all reported private-sector research.19 This pattern of concentration of 
private agricultural research is unlikely to be altered significantly if counterpart research 
in developing countries was also considered. 
 
4.4.4 Investments in international agricultural research 
 
Internationally conceived and funded agricultural R&D is a relatively recent institutional 
innovation. Beginning in the mid-1940s, and at an accelerating pace through the 1950s, 
the Ford and Rockefeller foundations placed agricultural staff in less-developed countries 
to work alongside scientists in national research organizations on joint-venture projects. 
These efforts became the model for many of the subsequent programs in international 
agricultural research, and later evolved into the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) at Los Baños, the Philippines, in 1960 and the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) et El Batan, Mexico, in 1967. Soon after, other inter-
                                                     
18 Pray and Umali-Deininger (1998) estimate that in 1995 private spending on agricultural R&D in countries 
like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela was less than 10% of total agricultural R&D 
spending. Beynon (1996) reports corresponding, contemporary (exact year not documented) private sector 
shares of at least 15% and 30% for Kenya and Zimbabwe, respectively. 
19 These data exclude Switzerland, whose share of agricultural chemical R&D is likely to be substantial but 
unlikely to place it among the top three performers. 
75 
 
national centers were established at Ibadan, Nigeria (IITA), in 1967 and at Cali, 
Colombia (CIAT), in 1968. 
 
The further development of international agricultural research centers took place largely 
under the auspices of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR), which was established in 1971.20 The CG system began modestly. During 
1960-64, of the institutes that would become the CG only IRI was operating as such. 
After an initial funding of $7.4 million (nominal US currency) – mainly spent on capital 
to establish IRRI – in 1960, annual expenditures were quite small. Total funding had risen 
to only $0.6 million per year in 1964. But by 1970, the four founding centers were 
allocated a total of $14.8 million annually. During the next decade, the progressive 
expansion of the total number of centers, and the funding per center, involved a tenfold 
increase in nominal funding, to $142 million in 1980. During the 1980s, funding 
continued to grow, more than doubling in nominal terms to reach $288 million in 1990. 
The rate of growth had slowed but was still impressive. In the 1990s, however, although 
the number of centers grew – from 13 to 18 at once point, but now 16 – funding did not 
grow enough to maintain the funding per center, let alone the growth rates. 
 
While the CG system has captured the attention of the international agricultural R&D and 
aid communities, through the impact of its scientific achievements, and through its 
pivotal role in the Green Revolution, it has spent only a small fraction of the global 
agricultural R&D investment. In 1991, the CG represented 1.8% of the nearly $15 billion 
in public-sector agricultural R&D. 
 
Over time, the number of donors grew, and the pattern of support varied. In 1995, 44 
donors provided a total of $328.1 million to the CG. In the beginning (using 1972 
figures), the private foundations provided 50.9% of the total; Europeans as a group 
provided 12.6%; the United States, 18.8%; and the World Bank, 6.3%. 
 
The picture is now very different (table 4.5). If providing seed money and being 
eventually displaced was their vision, the private foundations were successful. Their 
funding support has fallen in nominal terms and now constitutes less than 2% of the total. 
In 1995, European countries as a group (excluding multilateral support through the EU) 
provided 113.1 million nominal US dollars – 34.9% of the total. In the same year, the 
World Bank provided $50 million (15.2%); the United States provided $40.5 million 
(12.4%), and Japan provided $37.3 million (11.4%). 
 
                                                     
20 For more details on institutional developments related to the CGIAR see Baum (1986), Gryseels and 
Anderson (1991), Pardey et al. (1997), and Anderson (1998). 
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Table 4.5: Funding support to the CGIAR 
 
 1972-75 1981-85 1991-94 1995 
 (millions of 1993 dollars per year) 
United States 18.3 69.0 57.4 39.1 
Japan 0.9 13.3 31.9 36.0 
Europe 19.2 53.7 98.6 109.0 
Other countries 9.6 20.5 27.7 21.6 
Total from developed countries 48.0 156.5 215.6 205.7 
     
World Bank 6.7 28.9 41.2 48.2 
Foundations 22.8 4.3 6.2 6.4 
Others 10.1 54.5 50.6 56.1 
Total 87.6 244.2 313.5 316.5 
Source: Taken from Pardey et al. (1996) and based on financial reports of the CGIAR Secretariat. 
 
The rise of support from Japan and the World Bank has been an important factor in the 
overall support for the system in recent years. Through institutional and government aid 
programs, the developed countries as a group contributed $326.1 million in 1995; 98% of 
the total allocation. Some developing countries who host CGIAR centers, and those who 
engage in collaborative programs of research with the international centers, have made 
substantial in-kind contributions to the CGIAR, but developing countries as a group have 
provided comparatively little funding to the CGIAR. In 1995 a group of 10 developing 
countries provided $5.8 million – a small (2%), but of late increasing, share of CG 
funding. Colombia, India, and Iran were the largest of the less-developed country donors, 
each contributing about $1.2 million. 
 
Developed- and developing-country farmers alike have also provided little funding for the 
CGIAR, although some agencies such as Australia’s Grains Research and Development 
Corporation (which is partially supported through commodity levies) have funded small 
amounts of international research in recent years. Funding for CG research from other, 
private sources has also been sparse. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The main messages in this paper are relatively simple ones. There is scope for a more 
economic approach to financing, organizing and managing public-sector agricultural 
R&D in national systems and in the international research system. Financing can be made 
more efficient – in terms of a more efficient total quantity of research resources, a lower 
cost of raising the revenues, and greater allocative efficiency – by using more industry 
levy funds. The organization of research could be made more efficient by the 
development of alternative institutions, to bridge the gap between state, national, and 
multinational jurisdictions, and the greater use of economic efficiency criteria to 
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determine the balance between different types of R&D organizations. Finally, the 
management of R&D can be improved by substituting economic incentives for central 
directions, by applying economic efficiency as the objective of research, and by using 
more competition rather than committees to allocate resources. 
 
The past 25 years have witnessed an overall rapid growth in real support for agricultural 
R&D in rich and poor nations, and in the international centers. The world’s poorest 
countries have increased their share of global public agricultural research investments 
during this era. This is not an inappropriate shift, given that most less-developed countries 
are still investing little relative to the size of their agricultural sectors, and still seemingly 
underinvesting. International research aid may be good for global economic efficiency, 
but continues to be motivated largely on humanitarian grounds. It is only because less-
developed countries grossly underinvest in research, that donor support for less-
developed country NARSs (National Agricultural Research Systems) is a good form of 
aid for these countries. It is in the interest of every country (although not necessarily 
every person in every country) to do more to reduce its own persistent underinvestment in 
research. By the same token, it is in the immediate self-interest of many more- and less-
developed countries alike to see greater support for the international centers conducting 
research that has important spillover effects. International research may be sustainable 
even if individual nations were not underinvesting in their own NARSs, and donor 
support for such research may be an efficient and effective form of aid when international 
transaction costs mean that the international centers are undersupported. 
 
The past five years or so have been characterized by a break in the trends of the previous 
20 years, with weakening government support for national and international research. 
Such a withdrawal of support for domestic and international agricultural research does 
not seem to be justified by the available evidence on the past returns to like investments. 
The implication is that political and institutional failure has taken over from market 
failure as a factor in the chronic global underfunding of agricultural research. 
 
Institutional failure arising from spillover technology is nowhere more clearly apparent 
than in the international context. There is no global government with the capacity to 
impose Pigovian taxes and finance an economically optimal, international research 
system. Yet many technologies know no national boundaries, and emerging evidence 
suggests that all but the few very largest NARSs are too small to achieve economies of 
scale and scope in certain fields of research, and intellectual property rights provide 
inadequate protection for the inventor. Even if we can persuade ourselves that within-
country institutions are adequate, say, within the richest countries, to provide efficiently 
and effectively an appropriate total R&D effort, and an appropriate research mix, we 
cannot deny the political and market failure in international agricultural research. 
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5. Investments in African agricultural research 
 
By Philip G. Pardey, Johannes Roseboom, and Nienke Beintema1 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 2 
 
There is a perception the world over that public agricultural research systems need to be 
revamped and revitalized. This perception is particularly prevalent regarding African 
agricultural research systems. After significant increases in investments in public sector 
agricultural research and development (R&D) throughout much of Africa in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the 1980s saw a reversal of this trend. Growing levels of international 
indebtedness and programs of structural adjustment spurred government austerity 
programs that curtailed public sector spending in general and scaled down public 
investments in agricultural research. Bilateral and multilateral grants and loans made up 
for some of the shortfall although many national systems experienced stagnant or 
declining funding support over recent years.  
 
Consequently, renewed attention is being paid to the policy options for public 
agricultural research in Africa and elsewhere. To think meaningfully through these 
options requires a good grasp of the current situation regarding African agricultural R&D 
and some understanding of the history behind the present policies and institutional 
arrangements. In this paper we present and summarize an entirely new set of data that 
represents the first attempt to give a comprehensive, quantitative account of the evolution 
and current status of national agricultural research systems throughout Africa.3 Some 
preliminary, and necessarily partial, reflections on the policy implications of these data 
are also provided. In presenting and commenting on investments in public research we 
note the growing awareness that simply seeking more dollars is not the answer. The 
financing, organization, and management of public R&D will have to be dealt with in an 
integrated way (Alston and Pardey 1996). 
                                                     
1 This chapter is a verbatim reproduction of an article published earlier in World Development Vol. 25, No. 3 
(1997): pp. 409-423. Not included are the summary and keywords, while headings and footnotes have been 
renumbered to match with the rest of this dissertation.  References are included in the references to this 
dissertation. The work reported here was jointly financed by the Danish International Development Agency, 
the United States Agency for International Development, and the Special Program for African Agricultural 
Research of the World Bank. The authors are grateful for the comments they received from three anonymous 
reviewers. Final version accepted: October 16, 1996. 
2 Previous accounts of the development of African agricultural R&D are given by Lipton (1988), Lele, 
Kinsey, and Obeya (1989), Eicher (1990), Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson (1991b), Anderson, Pardey, and 
Roseboom (1994), Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema (1995), Weijenberg et al. (1995), and Taylor et al. 
(1996). 
3 The data and institutional details summarized here are reported in greater detail in a series of 24 country 
statistical briefs available from the authors on request. These briefs provide an historical perspective of the 
past and present institutional structure for agricultural research in each country, and for many variables report 
time series from 1961 disaggregated to the level of a specific institute. These data were compiled in close 
collaboration with knowledgeable individuals and institutions in each country using the Frascati manual 
(OECD 1981) guidelines for developing science and technology indicators. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief historical review of 
institutional developments regarding national agricultural research systems (NARSs) in 
sub-Saharan Africa (referred to as Africa hereafter). Next we describe the pattern of 
growth of R&D personnel and then present parallel data on R&D expenditures, 
highlighting institutional differences in spending per scientist and cost structures more 
generally. In section 5.5 we give more details on the financing of agricultural R&D in 
Africa, paying particular attention to the marked differences in sources of support among 
government and semi-public agencies, changes in various measures of research spending 
intensities, and the role of donors in supporting African agricultural R&D. Section 5.6 
gives a brief summary of relevant international agricultural research and section 5.7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
5.2 Institutional developments 
 
5.2.1 A brief history 
 
With political independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most African countries 
inherited agricultural research structures that operated as part of a regionalized system. As 
colonial structures collapsed many smaller countries found themselves effectively cut off 
from the network of research services to which they previously had direct access. Other 
countries were left with highly specialized research agencies that did not necessarily 
address local production problems. There were major incongruencies across countries 
regarding the existing research capacity. Moreover, research was largely oriented to 
meeting the demands of export agriculture and paid little attention to the production 
constraints faced by subsistence farmers. 
 
The transition to postindependence followed different paths in the former British and 
French colonies (see also Eisemon, Davis, and Rathgeber 1985). Throughout much of 
British Africa the local agricultural research infrastructure and administrative control was 
ceded to the new governments as an integral part of the country's administrative structure. 
In many cases, the flow of financial and technical support for research from Great Britain 
to its former colonies contracted quite quickly, leaving the financing and management of 
research as a largely national, often government, responsibility. 
 
In contrast, France continued to manage, execute, and fund agricultural research in most 
of her former colonies for many years following political independence. A series of 
bilateral agreements between France and the host governments were signed wherein 
research costs were shared. In most instances France continued to provide scientists and 
related costs, while the host country provided support staff. Eventually these arrange-
ments collapsed as domestic governments sought complete managerial and operational 
control over the public agricultural research activities in their countries. This usually 
coincided with the establishment of a national agricultural research organization (NARO) 
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into which the activities of the various French commodity research stations were 
incorporated.4 
 
5.2.2 Size 
 
During the past three decades African national agricultural research systems (NARSs) 
grew substantially in size. Particularly, the number of mid-sized systems (those 
employing 100-400 researchers) increased; in 1961 there were only three mid-sized 
systems, by 1991 there were 18. Similarly, only eight NARSs in Africa currently employ 
less than 25 full-time equivalent researchers, compared with 33 such systems three 
decades ago. 
 
While the general trend was toward larger NARSs, a number of systems have either 
completely collapsed or contracted markedly since independence because of political 
instability and civil war. This includes Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, Zaire, and, more 
recently, Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda. 
 
5.2.3 Institutional structure 
 
Public sector agricultural research in Africa is done mainly by government agencies 
(table 5.1). Semi-public agencies and universities play only a minor role. In 1961 
government agencies employed 90.7% of the full-time-equivalent researchers working in 
African NARSs; semi-public agencies accounted for 4.2% and universities 5.1%. Three 
decades later, the full-time-equivalent shares of government and semi-public agencies had 
shrunk to 86.5% and 3.5% respectively, while the universities share doubled to 10% of 
the total. 
 
Table 5.1: Sectoral composition African NARSs 
 
 Share of FTE researchers 
Category 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Annual  
growth rate 1961-91a 
 (percentage) 
Government 90.7 89.1 89.0 86.5 5.0 
Semi-public 4.2 3.8 3.1 3.5 3.6 
Academic 5.1 7.1 7.9 10.0 7.1 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 5.1 
Note: Data includes 21 countries. 
a Annual average growth rates were calculated using a least-squares regression method. 
 
                                                     
4 INERA in Burkina Faso, IRA and IRZ in Cameroon, IDESSA and IDEFOR in Côte d’Ivoire, IRAF in 
Gabon, FOFIFA in Madagascar, IER in Mali, INRAN in Niger, and ISRA in Senegal. 
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Government R&D agencies are those directly or indirectly administered by government, 
such as the research departments of ministries of agriculture or agricultural research 
institutes directly under a ministry. In contrast, semi-public agencies are not directly 
controlled by government and have significant “autonomous” sources of funding, usually 
a compulsory cess or marketing-board profits.5 They usually provide R&D services for a 
particular and often economically significant export commodity. Examples include 
agencies doing research on coffee (Kenya), sugar (Mauritius and South Africa), tea 
(Kenya and Malawi), and tobacco (Zimbabwe). All the semi-public research institutes 
noted here were in former British colonies and virtually all were established during 
colonial times. Very few semi-public agencies have been established since 1961, 
consequently they employed a shrinking share of the region’s agricultural researchers. 
 
As noted, university-based agricultural research has expanded considerably. The total 
number of full-time-equivalent researchers at universities grew on average by 7.1% per 
annum during the past three decades and 10% per annum if South Africa is excluded. In 
1961 only a few countries had the capacity to provide training in the agricultural sciences 
to the BSc level. Now, almost all African countries have some such capacity. Consider-
ably fewer countries, however, provide postgraduate training. 
 
Although university-based agricultural R&D in Africa has grown rapidly it was from a 
small base, so universities are still a small share of the overall research effort. Initially, 
university faculty throughout postindependence Africa were fully engaged educating 
graduates to staff the newly emerging national bureaucracies. Although the time they 
spent doing research gradually grew over the years, most faculty still allocate less than 
15% of their time to this endeavor. Further, the research they do is mainly discipline-
based rather than applied research aimed at solving specific production problems faced by 
farmers. Nevertheless, university personnel represent the better qualified component of 
most NARSs. The challenge is to usefully mobilize and manage this highly fragmented 
potential without undermining (and indeed hopefully enhancing) their important role in 
training future generations of African researchers. 
 
 
5.3 R&D personnel 
 
5.3.1 Overall trends 
 
Many African countries have made significant strides in the number of scientists working 
in their agricultural research agencies. In 1961 there were about 2,000 full-time 
equivalent researchers working in sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa). By 1991 
                                                     
5 Semi-public research agencies constitute those agencies not directly controlled by government and with no 
explicit profit-making objective. We required that an agency be governed by an autonomous board and that it 
also exhibit a certain degree of financial independence from the government before classifying it as a semi-
public agency. As a practical matter we required that an autonomously governed agency received more than 
25% of its income from sources other than government and international donors before classifying it as semi-
public. 
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this number had grown to more than 9,000.6 In addition, African agricultural research 
agencies employ an average of 1.7 technicians and 7.9 other support staff (including 
secretaries and agricultural labourers) per researcher, bringing the total number of staff 
working for national agricultural research agencies in the region to around 96,000 person 
years in 1991. 
 
For 19 countries, accounting for over two-thirds of the region’s researchers, more 
complete time-services data are available (table 5.2). Building from a rather small base 
that was initially made even smaller by the exodus of expatriate scientists in the years 
immediately following independence, the number of scientists grew by 6.2% per annum 
throughout the 1960s, 4.8% in the 1970s, slowing further to an average of 2.8% in the 
1980s. These totals mask a good deal of crosscountry variation. Agricultural research 
staff in Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Rwanda grew by 8% to 10% per annum during the 
1980s, while the number of scientists working in Botswana, Nigeria, and Senegal failed 
to grow during this decade. 
 
5.3.2 Expatriate researchers 
 
The composition of the scientific workforce has also changed substantially. Expatriates 
account for only 11% of the researchers currently working in national agencies 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), down dramatically from 90% in 
the early 1960s. This percentage, however, varies widely across countries. In 1991 more 
than a quarter of the agricultural scientists working in Botswana, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and the Seychelles were 
expatriates, while in Nigeria, Mauritius, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania they 
constituted less than 5% of the total. Former French colonies typically employ a higher 
proportion of expatriate researchers (21% in 1991) than former British colonies (7% in 
1991), reflecting the comparatively slower transition to full national control of local 
agricultural research facilities in the francophone countries. 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 This total includes 48 sub-Saharan African NARSs. For 11 (usually small) national systems an informed 
estimate, often involving extrapolations from secondary data or semi-processed but incomplete survey data 
was used in constructing the respective 1961 and 1991 regional totals. These data exclude personnel working 
at or for international or regional agencies. 
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Table 5.2: Trends in African agricultural researchers 
 
 Researchers  Annual growth rate a 
Country 1961 1971 1981 1991  1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1961-91 
 (full-time equivalents)  (percentage) 
Botswana 1.1  16.3  46.5  53.9   31.9  11.1  -0.2  12.5  
Burkina Faso 10.1  25.3  90.9  142.4    11.3  12.3  2.8  9.8  
Côte d'Ivoire 66.7  135.4  191.8  266.5    6.4  3.9  3.7  4.2  
Ethiopia 14.0  65.9  153.0  386.8    17.1  7.3  9.6  11.0  
Ghana 56.6 131.7 180.1 277.9   9.6  2.8  4.4  4.2  
Kenya 120.8  325.9  483.6  818.7    10.5  3.0  4.8  6.4  
Lesotho 1.0  7.0  16.8  27.5   19.2  8.3  5.2  10.4  
Madagascar 69.6  113.8  95.0  194.7    5.2  -2.7  8.6  2.2  
Malawi 30.2  80.8  126.2  184.9    12.0  4.8  3.2  6.1  
Mauritius 11.7  39.1  72.5  106.1    12.9  5.7  3.8  7.3  
Niger 11.5  14.4  49.5  101.6    1.0  17.6  6.6  9.3  
Nigeria 136.0  364.4  944.3  1,012.8    10.4  10.8  -0.3  7.5  
Rwanda 5.0  16.0  28.3  57.1    9.0  7.0  9.5  8.8  
Senegal 60.0  71.4  184.3  174.5    2.2  11.5  -1.1  5.4  
South Africa 736.8  956.8  1,140.4  1,339.1    2.7  1.6  1.3  2.0  
Sudan 48.0  125.2  324.0  424.4    9.4  8.6  2.3  8.4  
Swaziland 6.0  12.4  5.4 19.9   5.7  -9.8  5.6  3.8  
Zambia 25.7  100.8  174.7  279.4    14.4  4.6  4.1  8.0  
Zimbabwe 114.4  166.5  173.2  290.8    3.4  -0.5  5.9  2.7  
Subtotal (19 countries) 1,525.2  2,769.1  4,480.6  6,158.9    6.2  4.8  2.8  4.9  
          
Tanzania 48.7  142.3  345.2  545.9    11.9  8.6  3.9  8.8  
Togo 2.3  15.0  38.2  87.1    20.2  9.3  9.7  11.6  
                    
Total (21 countries) 1,576.2  2,926.4  4,864.0  6,791.9    6.4  5.1  3.0  5.1  
Note: Data include crop, livestock, forestry, and fisheries researchers working in government, semi-public, and 
academic agencies. Tanzania and Togo are listed separately because no corresponding expenditure time-series 
data are currently available. 
a Growth rates were calculated using a least squares regression method.  
 
5.3.3 Degree status 
 
Not only has the number of agricultural researchers in Africa increased fourfold since 
1961 (sixfold if South Africa is excluded), but their levels of formal training have 
improved as well. Nearly 65% of the national researchers in the 21 countries in our 
sample have postgraduate degrees. Just a decade ago only 45% were trained to that level. 
An estimated 1,372, or about 22%, of these researchers hold a PhD degree, although 63% 
of these doctorates work for just three NARSs; Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan. Indeed, 
52% of the researchers working in Sudan hold a PhD, which is an exceptionally high 
proportion compared with most other countries. 
 
 
85 
 
5.4 R&D expenditures 
 
Real agricultural research expenditures grew rapidly during the 1960s, moderately during 
the 1970s, and ceased to gross throughout the 1980s and early 1990s for the 19-country 
sample reported in table 5.3. But the more detailed data reveal a substantial degree of 
volatility and crosscountry variation around this trend. Long-term growth rates ranged 
from a high of 13.2% per annum for Botswana to a low of -2.4% for Madagascar. 
Nigeria’s pattern of growth is noteworthy. After substantial growth during the 1960s and 
1970s, largely financed by revenues from a booming oil sector, Nigeria’s agricultural 
research expenditures contracted sharply during the 1980s. They are presently less than 
half the 1970s levels. Severe economic crises and consequent structural adjustment 
programs have taken their toll throughout Africa with regard to the funding of agricultural 
research. 
 
Table 5.3: African agricultural research expenditures  
 
 Agricultural research expenditures  Annual growth rate a 
Country 1961 1971 1981 1991  1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1961-91 
 (millions 1985 int. dollars)  (percentage) 
Botswana 0.18 2.67 10.84 9.82  30.3  13.8  -3.8  13.2  
Burkina Faso 1.61 2.85 7.11 19.13   7.9  9.3  9.5  8.1  
Côte d'Ivoire 18.04 34.69 39.39 37.61   5.5  1.1  0.1  1.8  
Ethiopia 1.90 9.19 21.14 40.53   19.4  7.7  10.6  10.4  
Ghana 12.15 17.91 13.54 32.52   4.8  -3.2  14.4  2.1  
Kenya 22.36 49.69 62.28 95.97   8.4  1.7  4.0  4.4  
Lesotho 0.25 1.85 3.78 3.60   20.6  6.6  -1.8  8.1  
Madagascar 17.89 29.28 11.45 15.63   4.7  -7.4  3.0  -2.4  
Malawi 8.11 17.36 21.95 27.31   9.9  2.4  2.4  4.0  
Mauritius 3.20 7.59 9.63 12.63   9.1  1.8  1.3  4.0  
Niger 1.99 4.31 8.04 9.83   8.2  12.6  3.9  6.7  
Nigeria 42.15 92.07 211.86 86.90   6.4  7.1  -9.1  1.9  
Rwanda 1.97 3.63 5.76 10.03   5.8  6.7  11.4  5.7  
Senegal 17.82 25.48 37.36 23.85   2.9  4.7  -4.3  2.7  
South Africa 74.91 140.47 140.17 163.93   6.0  -0.6  1.8  2.0  
Sudan 12.99 34.94 39.90 21.46   9.9  0.5  -5.5  1.5  
Swaziland 1.05 2.87 3.53 5.89   8.4  -1.2  -2.4  6.6  
Zambia 4.18 14.81 19.66 24.67   14.3  4.0  0.0  5.3  
Zimbabwe 13.61 26.43 33.65 43.25   6.3  1.1  4.2  3.6  
                    
Total (19 countries) 256.37 518.10 701.03 684.55   6.8  2.6  0.1  2.9  
Note: Data correspond in coverage with tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
a Growth rates were calculated using a least-squares regression method. 
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To obtain an internationally comparable measure of the quantity of resources used for 
research, expenditures in local currency units were first deflated to base year 1985 with a 
local GDP deflator and then convened to 1985 international dollars using 1985 
purchasing power parities (Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig 1992).7 Purchasing power 
parities are synthetic exchange rates designed to reflect the purchasing power of 
currencies. Using purchasing power parities as conversion factors to denominate value 
aggregates in international dollars results in more realistic and directly comparable 
measures of the quantity of resources devoted to agricultural research in each country 
than if market exchange rates were used to do the conversion.8 Using official exchange 
rates to convert local currencies to US dollar denominated expenditures gives 
substantially lower totals, although the currency conversion procedures we use preserves 
the pattern of growth within each country. 
 
5.4.1 Resources per researcher 
 
Overall trends: The pattern of growth of real research expenditures contrasts starkly with 
that of research personnel. The number of research personnel and the amount of resources 
committed to research developed largely in parallel from 1961 to 1981 but thereafter 
followed dramatically different paths (figure 5.1a). Real expenditures stalled after 1981 
while the number of researchers continued to climb. As a result, the quantity of resources 
per researcher in 1991 for this group of 19 countries averaged about 66% of the amount 
allocated in 1961. Only Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe committed 
more real resources per scientist in 1991 than was the case three decades earlier. 
 
The national research systems in Nigeria and South Africa –two countries that together 
accounted for about 25% of the region's total investment in agriculture R&D in 1991– 
developed in distinctively different ways from each other and the rest of the region during 
the past 30 years. The South African system grew comparatively slowly but steadily and 
the rate of growth of its real research expenditures kept pace with the growth of its 
research staff (figure 5.1b). 
 
Nigeria developed in an erratic fashion (figure 5.1c). Fueled by a boom in public 
revenues from oil exports, research spending and staff numbers grew rapidly throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. But during the 1980s, research spending declined dramatically 
while the number of research staff stayed constant. The drop in research spending not 
only coincided with the rapid contraction of overall government revenues but also 
reflected a shift in government priorities away from agricultural R&D. Public spending 
on agricultural research accounted for 0.84% of consolidated government expenditures in 
                                                     
7 The purchasing power parity indexes we used were developed by the UN International Comparisons 
Program and published by Summers and Heston (1991) as the Penn World Tables (Mark 5).  
8 This is because the overwhelming share of agricultural research expenditures involves labour costs and 
other operating expenditures that are denominated in largely local not international prices. Purchasing power 
parity indexes arc constructed using a broad basket of goods and services that better reflect these local price 
differentials across countries. Exchange rate relativities are based on a narrower basket of internationally 
traded goods. 
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1981 but a mere 0.27% in 1991. The earlier rapid growth in the publicly funded R&D in 
Nigeria was characteristic of NARSs throughout the region at that time. Many African 
countries pursued policies that led to a rapid growth in their national agricultural research 
systems, though often from a small base. 
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Figure 5.1 (a-d): Research expenditures, staff, and spending per scientist, 1961-91 
 
Excluding the Nigerian and South African systems from the African average changes the 
quantitative but not the qualitative spending-per-scientist picture presented in figure 5.1a. 
Like the 19-country sample, the number of research personnel in the 17-country sample 
in figure 5.1d continued to climb throughout the post-1961 period but at a faster rate. For 
the larger group of countries growth in real research spending ceased after 1981 while for 
the smaller sample it grew throughout the whole period - albeit much more slowly after 
1971 compared with the 1960s. The combined effect was to hasten and speed up the 
overall rate of decline in spending per scientist in the smaller sample compared with the 
rate noted above for the 19-country sample. As a consequence, spending per scientist for 
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the 17-country sample in 1991 had fallen to about 53% of the resources made available 
per scientist three decades earlier. 
 
Differences due to colonial ties: Since 1961 both the number of research staff and the 
amount of expenditures grew more slowly in francophone than in anglophone Africa9 – 
respectively, 5.0% and 6.4% per annum for research staff and 2.2% and 3.3% per annum 
for expenditures. Spending per scientist, however, is about 20 to 25% higher in franco-
phone compared with anglophone countries. This partly reflects the higher dependence on 
relatively expensive expatriate researchers in francophone Africa. 
 
Institutional differences: Government and semi-public agencies developed in very 
different ways. Since the large majority of the researchers work in government agencies, 
the country aggregates are driven mainly by developments in those agencies. Figure 5.2 
reports spending-per-scientist ratios for eight major semi-public institutes spread across 
five countries, employing 236 researchers, and spending 50.4 million 1985 international 
dollars in 1991. For these agencies, the longer run growth in real expenditures slightly 
exceeded the growth in personnel.  
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Figure 5.2: Research expenditures, staff, spending per scientist  
by semi-public agencies (1961=100) 
 
Note: For legend see figure 5.1. 
 
Their spending per scientist ratio in 1991 was 12% higher than in 1961 compared with 
36% lower for the government agencies. These interinstitutional differences are less 
dramatic but still discernable when the government agencies are drawn from the same 
                                                     
9 The francophone sample includes Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, and Senegal 
and the anglophone countries are Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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five countries in which the sample of semi-public agencies operate (i.e., Kenya, Malawi. 
Mauritius, South Africa, and Zimbabwe). In contrast to the decline in spending per 
government scientist observed for the larger sample, government agencies in this smaller 
sample committed about the same quantity of resources per scientist in 1991 as they did 
three decades earlier.10 
 
5.4.2 Cost structures 
 
The spending per scientist patterns shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2 reflect a number of 
factors. Aside from the obvious asymmetries between the growth in total spending and 
the growth in the number of scientists supported by those expenditures, there are 
significant differences across agencies and changes over time in the composition of these 
personnel and expenditure aggregates. 
 
There were several partially offsetting developments regarding the researcher aggregates. 
First was the widespread move to replace relatively expensive expatriate scientists with 
less costly national researchers.11 Working in the opposite direction was the considerable 
upgrading of the degree status of local scientists. The training and additional salary costs 
implied by these developments are substantial. Another aspect that affects spending per 
scientist estimates is the size and composition of the support staff. Although some 
research agencies shed excess support staff in recent years, this tendency has been far 
from universal. Overstaffing with support personnel is still a problem for many govern-
ment research agencies. In addition, changes in the mix of support staff – for example, 
semi-skilled versus trained technical staff – also affect spending per scientist ratios. 
 
Similar, and clearly related issues are reflected in the cost structures that underlie the 
expenditure aggregates. Systems that undergo major programs of capital investments are 
likely to have higher spending per scientist ratios than those that simply maintain existing 
physical infrastructure. Although no comprehensive cost-share data for the earlier years 
are available, more detailed data were collected for the post-1985 period. Cost shares 
were reasonably stable throughout this period for government and semi-public agencies 
alike although there are substantial interinstitutional differences in the underlying cost 
structures (table 5.4). Government agencies direct a much higher proportion of their 
budget to personnel costs (i.e., the salaries and benefits of scientific, administrative, and 
support staff) and a smaller share toward operational costs than do semi-public agencies. 
Both sets of agencies spent around 14% of total costs on capital items. 
                                                     
10 This overall pattern masks a good deal of crosscountry variation, even in the smaller sample of countries. 
Spending per government scientist rose by 20% from 1961-91 in Zimbabwe and South Africa but fell 
between 40 and 60% for scientists employed by the government of Kenya, Malawi, and Mauritius. 
11 During 1981-91, about 11.5% of the decline in expenditures-per-researcher for the 19-country sample can 
be attributed to the decline of the share of expatriates in the total research staff. When Nigeria and South 
Africa are excluded from the sample – two countries that by 1981 already employed few expatriate 
researchers – over one-third of the decline in expenditures per researcher is attributable to the drop in 
expatriate researchers. 
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Table 5.4: Cost components for research and development 
 
Expenditures per researcher  Cost shares Cost 
category 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
 (thousands 1985 int. dollars)  (percentage) 
Government agencies 
  Personnel 74  68  71  72  67 67  59.3  56.0  57.1  59.1  60.3 61.2 
  Operating 35  32  33  32  30 27  27.7  26.2  26.5  26.1  26.7 24.9 
  Capital 16  22  20  18  14 15  13.0  17.7  16.3  14.9  13.0 14.0 
Total 125  122  124  121  111 109  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 
            
Semi-public agencies 
  Personnel 130  111  119  118  104 103  52.2  49.6  51.0  46.3  47.1 50.4 
  Operating 83  76  76  82  77 72  33.3  34.1  32.5  32.1  34.9 35.0 
  Capital 36  36  38  55  40 30  14.4  16.2  16.4  21.6  18.0 14.6 
Total 249  224  233  255  221 204  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 
            
Total agenciesa 
  Personnel 76  70  73  73  68 68  58.8  55.6  56.7  58.1  59.3 60.4 
  Operating 36  34  34  33  31 29  28.1  26.7  26.9  26.5  27.3 25.6 
  Capital 17  22  21  19  15 16  13.1  17.6  16.3  15.4  13.4 14.0 
Total 130  125  128  126  115 113  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 
Note: These data cover the following 17 countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and 
Zimbabwe. The personnel cost data represent the salaries and benefits received by both national and expatriate 
researchers plus the personnel costs of all technical, administrative, and other support staff. All cost data are then 
divided by the number of full-time equivalent researchers. 
a Government plus semi-public agencies. 
 
Table 5.4 also reports these cost components on a per-researcher basis. The quantity of 
research resources per scientist in the semi-public institutes is nearly twice that of the 
government institutes, and this difference persists across the personnel, operating, and 
capital cost components. This points to significant, and possibly very important, 
differences in the way government and semi-public agencies allocate their research 
budgets. These interinstitutional differences also hold if we limit our comparison to 
include only those countries that have semi-public research agencies. 
 
The anecdotal information suggests that research throughout Africa is severely curtailed 
because of inadequate operational resources. Our evidence seems to contradict this view, 
however, particularly for the semi-public institutes. But, it may be that a disproportionate 
share of operational funds are consumed by burdensome administrative overhead and the 
maintenance and upkeep of an extensive network of (comparatively small) research 
stations and farms. This seems especially so for government agencies. These funds might 
never find their way into bench-level research. Much of the personnel costs, for instance, 
are used to employ larger numbers of support staff that may have little direct input into 
research. For the semi-public institutes, the relatively high operational costs per 
researcher may partly arise because these institutes commonly earn much of their income 
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from estate farm operations that employ significant numbers of field staff. Disentangling 
farm costs from research-related costs is difficult. 
 
The data in table 5.4 clearly point to the salary crunch that has bedeviled scientists 
working in government agencies. Researchers salaries are constrained by civil service 
regulations, which often do not adequately reflect the differences of conducting R&D 
versus other government services. For many African countries the purchasing power of 
civil servants deteriorated dramatically during the past two decades because governments 
only partially compensated for inflation.12 The result has been widespread absenteeism in 
many research agencies as staff work at other, additional jobs and a rather rapid rate of 
turnover of senior scientific staff. Research managers face a dilemma in dealing with this 
problem. Freeing resources by reducing staff is often made difficult by public service 
regulations. Likewise, the same regulations make it difficult to raise the salaries of 
scientists above the general public-service salary structure. 
 
Comparative cost calculations based on official market exchange rates are more familiar 
to those who actually fund research. So for an alternative look at spending per scientist 
ratios, table 5.5 presents the 1991 ratios in US (rather than international) dollars per 
researcher and distinguishes between local and foreign personnel costs. A noteworthy 
feature of these data is the large share of expenditures per researcher due to technical 
assistance costs: nearly 13,000 US dollars per researcher, or 30% of overall personnel 
costs, are used to pay the salaries and benefits of expatriate researchers. And for nine out 
of the 17 countries in table 5.5 the personnel costs of expatriate researchers exceeds that 
spent on local staff. There is often little NARS managers can do about this aspect, as 
technical assistance costs are generally incurred by donors and there is little fungability 
between local and expatriate expenses. 
 
                                                     
12 Robinson (1990) provides ample evidence of the declines in the real salaries of civil servants in many 
African countries. He also noted a tendency to compress the salary scale by increasing lower salaries faster 
than higher ones. These trends are bound to reduce the motivation and effectiveness of the higher grades, 
accelerate staff turnover, and increase the rate of informal absenteeism as government workers moonlight at 
additional jobs. 
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Table 5.5: Expenditures per researcher by cost category in US dollars, 1991 
 
 Personnel costs    
Country Local TAa Total Operating Capital Total 
Burkina Faso 21,469 33,117 54,586 22,074 22,056 98,716 
Cape Verde 36,560 41,379 77,939 30,330 4,678 112,947 
Côte d'Ivoire 35,878 56,471 92,349 25,316 2,707 120,372 
Ethiopia 16,171 8,586 24,757 10,530 10,088 45,374 
Ghana 25,074 10,185 35,259 9,859 22,813 67,930 
Kenya 19,118 12,660 31,778 10,771 6,772 49,320 
Madagascar 11,727 25,140 36,866 8,680 2,664 48,210 
Malawi 20,054 22,599 42,653 19,133 7,477 69,262 
Mali 14,676 16,190 30,866 12,173 8,812 51,851 
Mauritius 35,307 0 35,307 25,737 9,298 70,341 
Niger 34,134 27,273 61,407 3,920 1,615 66,942 
Nigeria 9,748 1,812 11,560 5,477 4,490 21,527 
Rwanda 28,813 36,735 65,547 17,072 4,533 87,152 
Senegal 34,484 45,031 79,515 17,965 3,498 100,978 
South Africa 66,088 0 66,088 18,929 6,133 91,150 
Togo 20,753 30,000 50,753 15,079 6,115 71,946 
Zimbabwe 34,610 16,744 51,355 15,791 9,281 76,426 
              
Weighted average 30,026 12,760 42,786 13,505 7,087 63,377 
a TA indicates technical assistance. 
 
 
5.5 Financing agricultural R&D 
 
The common claim is that market failures in agricultural R&D lead to underinvestment in 
research if left to the private sector; research opportunities that would be socially 
profitable go unexploited. These market failures arise because some research is privately 
unprofitable due to appropriability problems – whereby the innovator (or investor) cannot 
appropriate all or sufficient benefits to warrant the investment – or the transaction costs 
involved in having farmers take collective action to finance (or execute) research that is 
beyond their individual reach are too high. In these instances markets will fail to provide 
the socially optimal mix of research and government action may be warranted. 
 
Alston and Pardey (1996) give a comprehensive and critical review of the evidence 
regarding market failures in agricultural research and discuss the principles and practices 
involved in designing ideal arrangements to finance or conduct research.13 The 
arrangements one may recommend to solve the underinvestment depends on which type 
of market failure that is being rectified. Developing a detailed understanding of the 
existing pattern of investments and the institutional context within which research funds 
                                                     
13 See also Thirtle and Echeverria (1994) who discuss some of the roles of public and private agricultural 
research agencies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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are raised, allocated, and spent is an invaluable first step in designing appropriate policy 
interventions to deal with the problem. 
 
5.5.1 Institutional differences 
 
Table 5.6 presents data on the financing arrangements for agricultural research in 13 
African countries. There are substantial differences in the sources of support for 
government versus semi-public agencies. While government agencies developed in ways 
that are broadly consistent with the aggregate country data, semi-public agencies receive 
about 80% to 90% of their funds from earmarked taxes or industry levies and own 
income. Moreover, since the mid-1980s the share of funds for semi-public agencies 
coming from general taxpayer revenues shrank while there was a noticeable increase in 
donor-sourced funds being channelled to these agencies. 
 
Table 5.6: Funding Sources, 1986-91 
 
Source of funding 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
 (percentage) 
Government research agencies 
  Government 57.9  51.5  52.6  51.1  51.4  49.9  
  Own income 5.3  5.4  6.1  5.5  4.5  4.2  
  Taxes 0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
  Donor 35.5  41.7  39.8  42.5  43.1  45.1  
  Other 1.3  1.3  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.7  
Total 100  100  100  100  100   100   
       
Semi-public research agencies 
  Government 11.3  8.5  6.2  7.4  5.8  4.4  
  Own income 32.1  15.0  17.6  11.3  17.8  17.6  
  Taxes 50.0  66.6  65.3  59.5  69.1  69.6  
  Donor 3.9  8.3  9.7  19.4  5.8  7.3  
  Other 2.8  1.5  1.3  2.4  1.6  1.1  
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  
       
Total research agenciesa 
  Government 55.9  49.6  50.4  49.0  49.0  47.5  
  Own income 6.5  5.8  6.7  5.8  5.1  4.9  
  Taxes 2.3  3.5  3.6  3.9  4.0  4.2  
  Donor 34.0  39.7  37.9  40.3  40.9  42.7  
  Other 1.4  1.4  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.8  
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  
Note: Based on data from Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
a Government plus semi-public research agencies. 
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5.5.2 Donor funding 
 
Funding in the form of loans and grants from international donors accounted for around 
34% of total research expenditures in Africa (excluding South Africa) during the early 
1980s (Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson 1991c). African NARSs became increasingly 
reliant on donor-sourced funds in recent years as this percentage increased to about 43% 
for a group of 22 countries (excluding South Africa) in 1991. Whether this reflects a 
temporary trend to shore up cash-strapped government research systems in African 
countries that continue to carry extraordinarily high levels of foreign debt, or a crowding 
out of alternative, local sources of finance is unclear. Analogous arguments were made by 
Alston and Pardey (1996) regarding the crowding out of private sources of support by 
state and federal public funding of agricultural R&D in the United States. 
 
The dependence on donor funding varies markedly among countries. At one extreme is 
Nigeria which received only 6% of its funds from donors during the latter half of the 
1980s, while countries as diverse as Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, and Zambia got more than 60% of their support from international sources. 
Grouping countries in various ways provides different perspectives on the nature of donor 
support for African agricultural research (table 5.7). Per capita income differences 
definitely matter. The share of donor support is considerably higher in the poorest African 
countries (62%) compared with the richer African countries (2.7%, or 14% if South 
Africa is excluded). 
 
Table 5.7: Donor support of African agricultural R&D, 1991 
 
  Donor share 
 (percentage) 
GDP/capita (1991)   
$ 750 < 62.4  
$ 750-1500 31.8  
>$ 1500 2.8  
    
Population (millions, 1991)   
Small (<5) 20.2  
Medium (5-20)  53.8  
Large (>20) 24.3  
    
Former colonial   
Anglophone 26.3  
Francophone 60.7  
Other 48.2  
  
Weighted average 33.7  
Note: Data include 23 countries. 
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Previous analysis, using a much larger sample including NARSs from around the world, 
showed that developing countries with small populations invest relatively more in 
agricultural research than developing countries with large populations (Pardey, 
Roseboom, and Anderson 1991c). This partly reflects the disproportionately large amount 
of donor funds directed to “small” countries when funding is measured on a per capita 
basis. The data in table 5.7, however, do not fully support this earlier finding. One 
observes the lower intensity of donor support to NARSs in countries with large compared 
with medium-sized populations, which is consistent with the earlier results. But those 
African countries with relatively small populations receive a much lower intensity of 
donor support than expected. It may well be that the effects of smallness are offset by the 
preponderance of relatively rich countries (such as Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia) 
with less than five million people in our sample, because, as noted, richer African 
countries receive much lower levels of donor support for R&D than poorer ones. 
 
Colonial precedents appear to have persistent influences in terms of the amount of foreign 
support to agricultural R&D. In 1991, donor funding accounted for 61 % of total support 
to the national agricultural research effort in francophone countries and only 26% in 
anglophone countries (36% if South Africa is excluded). Part of the difference between 
francophone and anglophone countries reflects the higher proportion of expatriate 
researchers working in francophone systems. 
 
The fragile state of many African economies and the large array of demands placed on the 
public sectors in these countries make it likely that continued, and in some cases 
substantial, donor support for research will be necessary for some time to come. It is 
questionable, however, whether these high levels of support can be sustained indefinitely. 
Certainly serious thought should be given to the appropriate amount to spend on R&D, 
the design of mechanisms for disbursing donor funds to avoid crowding out domestic 
sources of support (which may well have been the case over the past few years at least), 
and the development of means by which funds can be mobilized and deployed to 
stimulate rather than dissipate the productive potential of the resources committed. 
 
5.5.3 Research spending intensities 
 
To place agricultural research expenditures in a more meaningful context, it is common to 
scale these measures according to the size of the agricultural sector measured, for 
instance, in terms of agricultural output (AgGDP). Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the 
long-term development of this intensity ratio. The 19-country average increased through-
out the 1960s and much of the 1970s then declined steadily from a peak in 1981 of 0.93% 
down to 0.69% by 1991 below the level intensity that prevailed two decades earlier. 
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Figure 5.3: Expenditures as a percentage of AgGDP, 1961-91 
 
This sample average masks some major differences in research intensity among Nigeria, 
South Africa, and the rest of Africa. South Africa's research intensity ratio trended 
upward for much of the post-1961 period. At 2.6% in 1991 it is significantly higher than 
most other countries in the region. The instability in the ratio evident from figure 5.3 
reflects weather induced fluctuations in agricultural output rather than any significant 
year-to-year fluctuation in research spending. 
 
In contrast to South Africa’s persistent upward trend, Nigeria’s research intensity ratio 
grew steadily throughout the 1960s and early 1970s but declined precipitously during the 
past decade from 0.81% in 1981 to a lowly 0.19% in 1991. In 1991 a 17-country African 
average (excluding Nigeria and South Africa) was 0.92% compared with 0.69% for the 
19-country sample that includes these systems. 
 
Figure 5.4 presents the 1991 research intensity ratio decomposed by country and by 
source of funding. If all sources of funds are included, the 23-country sample average of 
the intensity ratio is 0.72% (0.69% for the 19-country sample); ranging from a high of 
6.3% for Cape Verde to a low of 0.19% for Nigeria. Measuring research spending 
intensities in terms of spending by research agencies from domestic sources only (i.e., net 
of international loan and grant funds) changes things considerably. The average spending 
intensity is lowered by a third from 0.72% to 0.48%. Moreover, the ranking of countries 
in terms of research intensities based on spending from all sources versus those intensities 
that include spending from domestic sources only are quite different. Botswana (rather 
than Cape Verde) invests its own funds more intensively in agricultural R&D than any 
other country in the sample. A relatively large and quite prosperous nonagricultural sector 
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forms the basis for this government support. At the other end of the spectrum, Burkina 
Faso, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sudan spend less than 0.2% of their AgGDP on agricultural 
research using local funds. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Agricultural research expenditures by source of origin 
as a percentage of agricultural GDP, 1991 
 
5.5.4 Government spending intensities 
 
Using a political economy framework to account for observed differences in government 
spending on agricultural R&D, Roe and Pardey (1991) looked at the share of total and 
agricultural spending by governments earmarked for agricultural R&D. Table 5.8 
presents contemporary government spending shares for various African countries grouped 
by per capita income. Data for Nigeria and South Africa have been reported separately 
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and they have been excluded from the respective middle and high-income classes whose 
averages they would dominate. 
 
Table 5.8: Agricultural research expenditures as a percentage  
of government expenditures 
 
Categorya  1971 1981 1991 
 (percentage) 
Low income (7)b 1.14  0.88  1.14  
Middle income (5) 1.91  1.16  1.13  
High income (4) 1.57  1.16  0.58  
Subtotal (16) 1.57  1.06  1.06  
    
Nigeria 1.50  0.84  0.27  
South Africa 0.59  0.44  0.42  
    
Total (18) 0.97  0.76  0.60  
a Income classes were defined as follows: low, less than $750; middle,  
$750-1500; and high, greater than $1500 in terms of 1991 per capita income  
figures measured in terms of 1985 international dollars per capita in 1991. 
b Number of countries in parentheses. 
 
Whereas the conventional research intensity ratio (i.e., agricultural research spending as a 
share of agricultural output) in South Africa has been rising and consistently among the 
highest of all African countries since 1961, agricultural research expenditures have 
constituted a falling and relatively small share of total government spending. In 1991 
South Africa spent only 0.42% of total government spending on agricultural R&D 
compared with 0.59% in 1971. This contrasts with the 16-country average whose share of 
R&D spending relative to total government spending was 2.5 times higher than the 
corresponding South African spending ratio. Aside from the exceptional case of Nigeria, 
poorer African countries currently commit much more of their public sector resources to 
agricultural R&D than Africa’s richer countries. Governments in poorer and richer 
African countries alike, however, were giving less priority to agricultural R&D in 1991 
than 1971. 
 
 
5.6 International R&D 
 
There are presently four international research centers of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, or CG for short) headquartered in Africa: 
IITA, ILRI, WARDA, and ICRAF (table 5.9). There are a further 12 CG centers located 
throughout the world, many of whom maintain regional offices or, in some cases, 
significant research facilities in Africa, and most undertake research in the region, often 
in conjunction with local NARSs. 
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Table 5.9: The CGIAR system in Africa 
 
 Date of   
 
Center 
Joining 
CG 
Foun-
dation 
Headquarters 
location 
 
Main areas of focus 
1995 
Expenditures 
(million US$) 
IITA, International 
Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture 
1971 1967 Ibadan, Nigeria Farming systems, rice, 
maize, cassava, 
cocoyams, soybeans 
31.43 
WARDA, West 
African Rice 
Development 
Associationa 
1975 1970 Bouaké, Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Rice 9.70 
ICRAF, International 
Centre for Research 
in Agroforestry 
1991 1977 Nairobi, Kenya Agroforestry, multi-
purpose trees 
16.90 
ILRI, International 
Livestock Research 
Institute b 
1995 1995 Nairobi, Kenya & 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Livestock production 
and animal health 
24.30 
Source: Baum (1986), TAC/CGIAR (1987), and unpublished CG documents. 
a Relocated from Monrovia, Liberia in 1989. 
b ILRI became operational in January 1995 through a merger of the International Laboratory for Research and 
Animal Diseases (ILRAD) and the International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA). ILRAD was established in 
1973 as a CG center headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya. Its research focused on livestock diseases (world) and tick 
borne disease and trypanosomiasis (sub-Saharan Africa). ILCA was established in 1974 as CG center 
headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and did research on animal feed and production systems for cattle, 
sheep and goats for sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The four African headquartered centers collectively spent $82.3 million in 1995, or about 
one-quarter of the CG total of $326.2 million. This misstates the size of the CG effort 
conducted in Africa – some of the work of these centers is conducted elsewhere, while 
other CG centers spend significant resources in the region. While it is possible, but 
difficult, to estimate the share of the CG's research undertaken in Africa, it is doubly 
difficult to meaningfully estimate the share of the system's effort directed toward Africa. 
This is because most of the international centers have global or commodity mandates; the 
results of their research are meant to spill broadly across various agroecologies that do 
not coincide with specific country or regional boundaries. Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, the CG centers estimate that about $127 million or 39% of total CG 
expenditures were directed toward Africa in 1994 (CGIAR 1995, p. 32); substantially 
higher than the 13% of overall developing country agricultural R&D expenditures spent 
by African NARSs in 1991. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries made some progress in developing their agricultural 
research systems during the past three decades. Particularly the development of research 
staff has been impressive in terms of numbers (a sixfold increase if South Africa is 
excluded), declining reliance on expatriates (from roughly 90% expatriates in 1961 to 
11% in 1991), and improvements in education levels (65% of the researchers held a 
postgraduate degree in 1991). The indigenous capacity to train researchers also expanded, 
although the capacity to train at the MSc and PhD level is still limited. 
 
Developments in agricultural research expenditures were considerably less positive. After 
reasonable growth during the 1960s and early 1970s, growth in expenditures basically 
stopped in the late 1970s. Although there is considerable variation around this trend, it 
brings back the notion that many African countries have lost ground with regard to 
financing their agricultural research. Donor support has clearly increased in importance. 
Its share in the financing of agricultural research increased from 34% in 1986 to 43% in 
1991. While increased donor support somewhat compensated for declining government 
funding, it is unlikely that such high levels of support can continue indefinitely. 
 
Many of the developments of the past decade in personnel, expenditures, and sources of 
support for public sector R&D in Africa are clearly not sustainable. The rapid buildup of 
research staff is not paralleled by an equal growth in financial resources. Spending per 
scientist has continuously declined during the past 30 years, but most dramatically during 
the 1980s. Richer and poorer African countries alike are giving lower priority to spending 
on agricultural R&D today than was the case two decades ago. Resources are spread 
increasingly thin over a growing group of researchers, which has negative effects on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of agricultural research. To turn this around is a complex 
undertaking but unless public and private funding for research is increased there is likely 
to be a painful and possibly wasteful reduction of research staff. 
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6. The transformation of the Dutch agricultural research system:  
An unfinished agenda 
 
By Johannes Roseboom and Hans Rutten1 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The national agricultural research system (NARS) in the Netherlands has undergone a 
major transformation in many respects during the pas 25 years. This transformation has 
been influenced by changes in the structure of the agricultural sector (including 
agricultural markets), advancements in the (agricultural) sciences, as well as more general 
political and ideological changes. In this paper, we focus on these more general political 
and ideological changes and investigate how they have influenced the institutional 
context within which the system operates. We then compare the Dutch experiences with 
those in other developed-countries NARS. We conclude with an exploration of possible 
future developments in the Dutch NARS. 
 
6.2 The present structure of the Dutch agricultural research system  
 
A stylized overview of the present structure of the Dutch agricultural research system is 
presented in table 6.1. The term “system” is used here rather loosely to refer to the 
various agencies that deal with agricultural research in the Netherlands. The agricultural 
sector has been defined as including primary agricultural production, as well as 
agricultural input and processing industries. 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (MOA) is 
responsible for agricultural research and extension as well as education. Since 1995, 
policy formulation in these areas has been entrusted to a single directorate within the 
ministry, the Directorate of Science and Knowledge Transfer (DSKT). At the same time, 
the National Agricultural Research Council lost its coordination and planning functions 
and has been transformed into an advisory committee conducting foresight studies. 
Insofar as central planning and coordination of research is deemed necessary, these 
functions have been assumed by DSKT, which is the single most important funder for 
agricultural research in the country. DSKT funds or purchases research services at the 
Agricultural Research Department (known under its Dutch acronym DLO), the 
Organization for Applied Research in Agriculture (an organization which includes nine 
experiment stations), Wageningen Agricultural University (WAU), and, to a substantially 
lesser extent, the TNO-Nutrition and Food Research Institute (TNO-Food) and the 
Faculty of Veterinary Sciences of the University of Utrecht (FVS). 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is a verbatim reproduction of an article that has been published earlier in World Development 
Vol. 26, No. 6 (June 1998): pp. 1113-1126. Not included are the summary and keywords. Headings and 
footnotes have been renumbered to match with this dissertation. All references have been included in the 
reference list of this dissertation. Final revision accepted, January 1998. 
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Table 6.1: Present structure of the Dutch agricultural research system 
 
Organization Description Research budget 
(1995) 
Directorate of Science and 
Knowledge Transfer 
(DSKT)  
Created in 1995 and responsible for the agricultural 
research, extension and education policies of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (MOA) 
Not applicable 
National Council for 
Agricultural Research  
Originally a coordinating and planning body but re-
established in January 1995 as a ministerial advisory 
body in charge of conducting S&T foresight studies for 
the agricultural sector 
Not applicable 
Agricultural Research 
Department (DLO)  
Executing branch of DSKT. Will be detached from MOA 
in 1998. Comprises 11 research institutes and a central 
publishing and documentation service center.a DLO 
institutes focus primarily on strategic and basic research.   
Dfl 370 million b 
Organization for Applied 
Research in Agriculture 
Another executing branch of DSKT. Comprises 9 
experiment stations.  Each of them conducts applied 
agricultural research for a specific agricultural subsector.c 
Traditionally funding of these stations is shared between 
MOA and the farmers  
Dfl 102 million 
Nutrition and Food 
Processing Division of the 
Netherlands Organization 
for Applied Research 
(TNO-Food) 
TNO-Food is a private, non-profit research organization 
and conducts research for both the public and the private 
sector. MOA is only one of its clients  
Dfl 104 million 
Wageningen Agricultural 
University (WAU) 
Comes under the responsibility of DSKT of MOA. Has a 
primary role to play with regard to basic research, but 
also conducts some strategic and applied research  
Dfl 319 million 
Faculty of Veterinary 
Sciences (FVS), 
University of Utrecht 
Comes under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Culture. Conducts primarily basic 
research  
Dfl 39 million 
Private sector  Includes research departments of private companies as 
well as a few research institutes fully financed and 
managed by the industry, such as the Institute for 
Efficient Sugar Production and Netherlands Institute for 
Dairy Research  
Dfl 745 million 
Source: Roseboom and Rutten (1996), Roseboom and Rutten (1997) and CBS (1997). 
a (1) Institute for Forestry and Nature Management (IBN-DLO); (2) Winand Staring Centre for Integrated 
Land, Soil and Water Research (SC-DLO); (3) Agrotechnological Research Institute (ATO-DLO); (4) Centre 
for Plant Breeding and Reproduction Research  (CPRO-DLO) (including the Centre for Genetic Resources); 
(5) Research Institute for Plant Protection (IPO-DLO); (6) Research Institute for Agrobiology and Soil 
Fertility (AB-DLO); (7) Institute for Animal Science and Health (ID-DLO); (8) Netherlands Institute for 
Fisheries Research (RIVO-DLO); (9) Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO); (10) Institute of 
Agricultural and Environmental Engineering (IMAG-DLO); (11) State Institute for Quality Control of 
Agricultural Products (RIKILT-DLO); and (12) Centre for Agricultural Publishing and Documentation 
(PUDOC-DLO).  
b A Dutch guilder (Dfl) equaled  0.62 US dollar in 1995. 
c (1) Arable crops and field vegetables; (2) fruits; (3) bulbs; (4) arboriculture; (5) floriculture and glasshouse 
vegetables; (6) mushrooms; (7) poultry; (8) pigs; and (9) cattle, sheep and horses. 
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With the creation of DSKT, the Ministry has adopted an agricultural knowledge system 
perspective in its policies. Instead of separate research, extension, and education policies, 
it now has one “knowledge policy” that is to operate for, and within, a knowledge system. 
Despite the recent integration at the policy level, the traditional cohesion between the 
different components of the knowledge system has been under considerable stress in 
recent years, because of major changes in the mandate, organization, and management of 
the various components of the system. Both extension and research have been detached 
from MOA and re-established as private, non-profit organizations in 1993 and 1998, 
respectively. Old bureaucratic links between the various actors have been cut-off, while 
new contractual arrangements have emerged. Both activities have to rely increasingly on 
the market for their funding and face – to some extent – market competition. For 
example, numerous private extension providers have emerged in recent years. 
 
The decision to privatize the execution component of the Directorate of Agricultural 
Research was taken in 1986, but it took more than 10 years to implement it. During this 
period DLO completely restructured itself and established a corporate identity.  
 
In recent years, the links between the DLO research institutes and Wageningen 
Agricultural University (as well as other universities) have also been strengthened by the 
establishment of so-called research schools and a further concentration of DLO research 
facilities in and around Wageningen. Most recently (in 1996), the Minister of Agriculture 
decided to merge DLO and WAU into a single organization – Knowledge Centre 
Wageningen (KCW). The boards of DLO and WAU have been merged and a new 
chairman was appointed in 1997. It is expected that some parts of the experiment stations 
will also be merged with KCW in the near future, while those parts not included in the 
merger will be handed over to the private sector (i.e. commodity boards or farmer 
organizations) or closed down. The only two entities not affected by this upcoming 
merger are TNO-Food and the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences. 
 
With an estimated intramural research budget of Dfl 745 million (US$ 462 million) in 
1995 (CBS 1997), the private sector is by far the largest component of the Dutch 
agricultural research system. This figure includes the intramural research expenditures by 
the private-business agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries (Dfl 89 million), food 
and drinks industries (Dfl 478 million), and an estimated 10%2 of the research 
expenditures by the chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Dfl 178 million). In 
addition, in 1995 the private sector funded about Dfl 126 million of agricultural research 
executed by the public sector (in particular TNO-Food). This brings the balance between 
public and private funding of agricultural and agriculture-related research in the 
Netherlands to about 50:50. 
 
                                                     
2 This percentage is a very rough estimate and requires further research.  
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6.3 The policy dynamics behind the transformation of the agricultural research system 
 
It is evident that the Dutch NARS has undergone substantial transformation in recent 
years. Some of the basic political and ideological changes that have shaped this 
transformation are: the changing role of government in society; public administration 
reform; and changing agricultural policies. None of these changes has been unique to the 
Netherlands, but apply in varying degrees to most countries. We will, therefore, discuss 
each of these changes in generic terms and explore their theoretical underpinnings. 
 
6.3.1 The changing role of government in society 
 
The rapid expansion of the government sector in the OECD countries during the 1960s 
and 1970s,3 was followed by a period in which further expansion of the government 
sector was considered undesirable and, above all, unfeasible because of rapidly growing 
government deficits and debts. This new consensus had its strongest advocates among 
neoliberal economists, who introduced (or revived) concepts such as “government 
failure” as opposed to “market failure” (the classic argument for government inter-
vention), transaction costs, the dead-weight loss of economic activity due to taxation, and 
the distortionary effects of lobbying for government funds and interventions.  
 
This change has introduced a more critical attitude toward government intervention, 
including public agricultural research.4 Alston and Pardey (1996) argue that market 
failure in agricultural research is by no means a sufficient condition for government 
intervention. From a welfare economic point of view, an intervention is justified only if it 
improves the situation by reducing the social costs of market failure – the benefits of the 
intervention should be greater than the costs. The market provision of (agricultural) 
research usually fails when benefits spill largely beyond the research originator. 
Spillovers are particularly large in agriculture because of the structure of the sector (many 
small producers)5 and the difficulty of excluding others from using the new technology or 
knowledge. Intellectual Property Protection (patents and plant variety rights) has solved 
the latter problem only to some extent. The presence of large spillovers provides an 
important economic rationale for government intervention.6 
                                                     
3 The average size of government expenditures in relation to nominal GDP in the OECD countries rose from 
27 to 47% during 1960-82. This growth was due, to a large extent, to a very rapid growth of transfer 
payments in the form of subsidies, social security benefits, social assistance grants, and interest payments on 
government debt. But, even when such transfer payments are netted out, government final consumption rose 
in the OECD countries from 15 to 23% of GDP, and general government employment from 11 to 18% of 
total employment during 1960-82 (OECD 1985). 
4 For arguments in favor of government intervention in agricultural research see Thirtle (1986) and Alston et 
al. (1997). 
5 Since the structure of the agricultural sector is changing rapidly in the direction of a greater concentration of 
production capacity, this argument may have lost some of its relevance. 
6 Identifying the beneficiaries of those spillovers may help to shape such government intervention. Hussey 
(1996), for example, argues that spillovers beyond individual businesses, but within an industry, are a 
justification for within-industry arrangements to fund research such as industry taxes, while spillovers to the 
wider society are a justification for government intervention, including public funding of (agricultural) 
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The presence of market failure in the provision of agricultural research leaves 
unanswered, however, the question of whether it is amenable to government-initiated 
solutions. There is ample evidence that governments have often failed to correct a 
problem adequately, or even worsened the situation by their intervention. Moreover, 
government intervention can take various forms, which vary in intensity. For example, 
the government can support agricultural research through legislation and regulations to 
facilitate private market operation (e.g. intellectual property rights and plant variety 
rights), through direct or indirect funding (e.g. by providing tax breaks or matching funds 
for research), or by direct provision of research services. The latter form of intervention is 
considered the least desirable as it requires intensive and permanent government 
intervention. 
 
Whatever government intervention is considered justifiable, it is important to determine 
ex ante whether the benefits of the intervention will outweigh the costs. The high rates of 
return usually reported for public agricultural research investments have been used 
frequently as an argument that there is underinvestment in (public) agricultural research 
(Ruttan 1982; Alston and Pardey 1996). Others are more skeptical and argue that those 
cost-benefit analyses ignore the transaction costs involved in collecting taxes and, more 
importantly, the distortions created in the markets being taxed, which cause dead-weight 
losses in economic activity. They claim that the social costs of these distortions are 
considerable.7 
 
The new political economy provides another critical perspective on the role of govern-
ment by highlighting the distortionary effects of (powerful) lobby groups on the 
distribution government subsidies and services.8 For some, these distortions are a reason 
to oppose government intervention altogether, while others see the need to limit or 
regulate the influence of lobby groups on the distribution of government subsidies and 
services. Certainly, a better understanding is needed of the processes and mechanisms by 
which the public agricultural research agenda is set and the way lobby groups affect the 
outcome of that process.9  
 
6.3.2 Public administration reform 
 
The changed perspective on the role of government in society, as well as tight govern-
ment budgets, have placed governments under increasing pressure to become more 
effective, efficient and accountable. This had led to some fundamental changes and 
innovations in the organization and management of government over the past two 
decades that are generally known as “new public administration”. The most important 
                                                                                                                                                 
research. Similarly, spillovers beyond national boundaries can be a justification for regionally or inter-
nationally orchestrated interventions. 
7 This issue was first raised in relation to public agricultural research in the United States by Fox (1985). 
8 In most developed countries, the agricultural lobby has been quite effective in obtaining a disproportionate 
share of government subsidies and services. 
9 Examples of studies that have applied this perspective to agricultural research are de Janvry and Dethier 
(1985) and Roe and Pardey (1991). 
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characteristics of the new public administration approach include the following (Kaul 
1997):10 
 
– Orientation toward the ultimate users of government services: consumers of 
government services are no longer seen as passive recipients but as active clients. An 
orientation toward those clients has substantially affected the organizational and 
managerial culture of government agencies, and included a shift from an emphasis on 
inputs and procedures (the traditional bureaucratic concern) toward outputs and 
outcomes. 
 
– Separation between policy and operation: the new public administration approach has 
introduced a strict separation between policy making and policy implementation in order 
to enhance transparency and accountability of government. Policy making is considered 
the core of government, while policy implementation can be contracted out to agencies 
within or outside the government. For both private and government providers, the same 
contractual arrangements, explicitly specifying the amount and quality of outputs to be 
delivered, can be used. The introduction of such contractual arrangements has been a 
major innovation within the government sector, and has replaced bureaucratic command 
structures with market-like relationships. 
 
– Separation between funding, purchasing and provision of services: the separation 
between policy and operation has also led to a clearer distinction between the roles of 
government as funder, purchaser and provider of services, and has opened up a variety of 
ways of organizing and managing the provision of government services. For example, 
one way of making government services more responsive to the needs of clients is by 
giving clients greater control over what is purchased. Mechanisms available to 
government to empower clients include representation of client groups on research 
councils and boards of agricultural research agencies, or providing financial incentives by 
client group initiatives (e.g. matching funding schemes and tax breaks for R&D 
undertaken by client groups). 
 
– Competition between service providers: competitive contracting of the delivery of 
services from other public or private providers puts pressure on current service providers 
to be efficient and effective. This requires the removal of monopoly protection for 
government providers, and the introduction of pricing systems that take into account the 
full resource costs of government-provided services. Eliminating monopoly protection 
may lead to complete privatization of a government service. 
 
                                                     
10 See also Banks (1996), Mountfield (1997) and Wilson (1996) for discussions of the new public 
administration. 
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6.3.3 Changing agricultural policies 
 
Increased public concern about the environment, the sustainability of agricultural 
production systems, food safety, animal welfare and land use has changed agricultural 
policies in developed countries substantially during the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these 
concerns came from outside the agricultural sector and often conflicted with traditional 
agricultural policies and beliefs, which focused exclusively on the production and 
productivity of the sector. Insofar as food security was concerned (a primary objective in 
the years directly after WWII), this fitted the production focus very well. 
 
Integrating these new public concerns into existing agricultural policies has been, and 
continues to be, a difficult process, in which policy makers often have to choose between 
serving the commercial interests of the sector, and serving the interests of society at large. 
The traditional one-dimensional focus of agricultural policies on production and 
productivity, shared by both the agricultural sector and the government, no longer exists. 
It has been replaced, at least by the government, with a far more complex mandate. This 
shift in agricultural policies has been of particular importance to the public agricultural 
research system because it has created a far broader and more complex research agenda. 
 
 
6.4 The transformation of the Dutch agricultural research system 
 
The changing role of government, public administration reform, and adjustments in 
agricultural policy orientation, have induced major changes in the Dutch agricultural 
research system. We will highlight here the most significant institutional changes over the 
past 25 years with regard to: mandate; policy formulation and coordination; organization, 
structure and management; and financing. 
 
6.4.1 Mandate 
 
For many years, the principle objective of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture was to raise 
the general level of welfare of the agricultural population and to assure food security for 
the population at large. In this context, public agricultural research and technology policy 
was straightforward and focused predominantly on increasing production and 
productivity. Measured in these terms, this policy has been very successful (van der Meer 
et al. 1991; Rutten 1992). 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s this one-dimensional approach to agricultural production came 
increasingly under attack. Under pressure of public opinion, issues such as the 
environment, food safety, animal welfare and land use increased in importance and 
dominated the agricultural (research) policy agenda. The Dutch agricultural sector, and to 
a lesser extent the Ministry, were slow to recognize the growing importance of these 
issues; pressure to put them on the agenda came mainly from outside the sector. In the 
course of the 1980s, however, MOA adopted the concept of sustainable development as 
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one of its core objectives, and changed its mission statement to “creating or improving the 
conditions for a competitive, safe and sustainable agriculture.” 
 
Despite this changed mission statement, the Ministry often finds itself caught between an 
agricultural sector that is reluctant to accept (or carry the financial burden of) stricter 
regulations with regard to pollution, food safety, or animal welfare and the rest of society, 
which insists on such regulations. In keeping with these new objectives, the Ministry has 
sought to reorient its research and technology policy accordingly, and has given greater 
priority to research on environmental, food-safety, animal-welfare and land use issues. 
This reorientation has been difficult as it came at a time when the budget of MOA for 
agricultural research was declining. In deciding what should be given up, the choice was 
made to reduce support to applied or near-market research because it supposedly has the 
lowest public-good content and, hence, could be privatized. 
 
An important guiding principle adopted by the Ministry in recent years is that “farmers 
should take more responsibility for themselves in financing and organizing support 
services.” MOA sees for itself a more limited role in the provision of services that accrue 
mainly to the agricultural sector itself, including agricultural research (MLNV 1996). 
 
6.4.2 Policy formulation and coordination 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, great emphasis was given to policy formulation and 
coordination within the Dutch agricultural research system. The National Agricultural 
Research Council played an important role in this regard. From 1972 onward, the Council 
produced a long-term vision for agricultural research every 4 or 5 years. This central 
policy formulation and coordination was deemed important because of the fragmentation 
of the research system at that time. Over time, however, the Directorate of Agricultural 
Research grew in importance, and in 1981 assumed responsibility for all ministerial 
research organizations except for the experiment stations and farms. As a consequence, a 
considerable amount of duplication with regard to policy formulation and coordination 
arose between the Directorate and the Council. 
 
The public administration reform embarked upon by the Dutch government in the early 
1980s, led to the cabinet decision in 1986 to privatize the execution (but not necessarily 
the funding) of public agricultural research. This motivated DLO research institutes to 
develop a strong corporate identity and to orient themselves more toward their clients. 
Instead of meeting representatives of their clients in the Council, they now consult their 
clients directly and formulate their own strategies. 
 
These developments undermined the position of the Council as a central entity for policy 
formulation and coordination, and finally culminated in the termination of the Council’s 
policy coordination and formulation role in 1995. Since 1995, the focus of the Council 
has been on long-term strategies and priorities for the NARS. To the extent that policy 
coordination is still deemed necessary, this is now done by the Directorate of Science and 
Knowledge Transfer. 
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6.4.3 Structure, organization and management 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, public agricultural research in the Netherlands expanded 
rapidly, and numerous new agricultural research institutes and stations were established. 
This resulted in a patchwork of agricultural research agencies with overlapping mandates. 
The past 25 years, however, can be characterized as a continuous process of consolidation 
and rationalization of agricultural research capacity. This process gained momentum 
when funding became tight, particularly after 1980. For example, since 1981 the number 
of DLO research institutes has been reduced from 22 to 11. In place of the traditional 
geographical spread of agricultural research capacity, Wageningen, and to a lesser extent 
Lelystad, were selected as locations to concentrate the research infrastructure. 
 
The responsibility for agricultural research within MOA has long been compartmental-
ized. Initially each subject-matter department had its own research capacity. A first step 
toward the consolidation of agricultural research into one agency was taken in 1962 with 
the establishment of a Directorate of Agricultural Research. Only the more upstream 
research institutes dealing with crop and livestock were transferred to this new 
directorate, while forestry, fisheries and veterinary research institutes, as well as the 
experiment stations and farms, remained within their subject-matter directorates. 
 
A further step toward the consolidation of agricultural research within MOA was made in 
1981. The number of directorates with administrative responsibility for one or more 
agricultural research entities was reduced from nine to three. Finally, with the 
establishment of the Directorate of Science and Knowledge Transfer in 1995, all research 
plus extension and education (including WAU) were brought together under one 
directorate. 
 
The decision of the government to privatize the execution of public agricultural research 
(and, to some extent, the funding as well, by applying a stricter public-good argument) 
has significantly changed the organization and management of agricultural research. As a 
first move toward privatization, the Directorate of Agricultural Research was split into a 
Directorate of Science and Technology (DST) and an Agricultural Research Department 
(DLO) in 1989. In this new structure, DST (now DSKT) determines policy and controls 
the research budget of MOA, while DLO manages the research institutes. Between DST 
and DLO a client-provider relationship was instituted, while the traditional bureaucratic 
management style has been replaced by a more commercial, private sector one. 
 
DLO will be formally privatized and detached from the Ministry in January 1998. 
Initially, the experiment stations were not affected by this privatization. After they were 
brought under the jurisdiction of DSKT in 1995, however, steps have been taken to 
organize and manage the experiment stations along the same lines as DLO. One of the 
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consequences is the termination in 1998 of a long tradition of shared funding of the 
experiment stations between MOA and the farmers through commodity levies.11 
 
A study on the future of the Dutch agricultural knowledge system, commissioned by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1995, concluded that there is considerable overlap and 
unnecessary competition in the Dutch agricultural research system (Peper 1996). One 
important recommendation in the report was to merge DLO and WAU – a rather 
revolutionary idea at the time. The Minister, however, adopted the recommendation right 
away and has made the integration of DLO and WAU one of his major policy objectives. 
The new organization – Knowledge Centre Wageningen (KCW) – will be one of the 
world’s largest agricultural science conglomerates. As mentioned in section 6.2, the 
boards of DLO and WAU were merged and a new chairman appointed in 1997. Further 
details of the merger are currently being worked out. It is also expected that parts of the 
nine experiment stations will be merged into KCW and reorganized into one cluster of 
applied livestock research, and one cluster of applied crop research. However, the 
experimental farms and gardens (some 20 in total), which are currently attached to the 
experiment stations, will most likely be transferred to the regional farmer organizations 
and more closely linked to extension. This is in line with MOA’s policy of devolving its 
responsibility for near-market research. 
 
6.4.4 Financing 
 
Over the past 25 years, important changes have taken place in the financing of public 
agricultural research with regard to its volume, source and the way it is provided. Figure 
6.1 gives an overview of the trends in expenditures by the most important (semi-) public 
agricultural research agencies. The initial steady expansion of funding halted in 1978, 
stagnated for about a decade, and picked up somewhat after 1988. Of the five research 
entities, DLO and, to a lesser extent, the experiment stations were hardest hit in terms of 
real budget cuts. In contrast, TNO-Food, Wageningen Agricultural University and the 
Faculty of Veterinary Sciences of the University of Utrecht increased their relative share 
in the public agricultural research system. 
 
The funding of public agricultural research has become increasingly diversified and 
complex over time. Figure 6.2 gives a stylized overview of the links between funding and 
executing agencies within the Dutch agricultural research system. The total budget of the 
system is estimated at Dfl 1679 million in 1995 (US$ 1041 million). Of the public 
sources of funding, MOA is by far the most important, but other ministries, the 
Netherlands Science Council and the European Union also provide substantial resources. 
Private sources of funding are: (i) the Agricultural Board and the commodity boards,12 
                                                     
11 The contributions from the agricultural producers are collected as levies by several commodity boards and 
the (now almost defunct) Agricultural Board. 
12 The Agricultural Board, which brought together the various interest groups within the sector and which had 
regulatory powers by law, collapsed in late 1995 over a labor dispute between farmers and the labor unions. 
The various tasks and responsibilities of the Agricultural Board (including the collection of levies for 
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which collects levies from farmers and agricultural business and pay about half of the 
costs of the experiment stations (MOA pays the other half); and (ii) the private business 
sector, which contracts out some research to public sector agencies but spends most of its 
R&D budget internally. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Agricultural research expenditures by the public sector 
 
Source: Adapted from Roseboom and Rutten (1996).  
Note: The time series data for DLO and the experiment stations do not include the costs of land and buildings, 
while the time series data for WAU only cover the agricultural sciences component of the university’s 
research portfolio. In 1995, a Dutch guilder (Dfl) equaled US$ 0.62.  
 
TNO-Food represents an interesting case, in that contracts with the private sector 
currently account for about two-thirds of its total budget. This not only reflects TNO-
Food’s close contacts with the Dutch food-processing and agrochemical industries, but 
also its rapidly expanding portfolio of research contracts with foreign clients, both public 
and private (approximately Dfl 12 million in 199513). TNO-Food has an active policy to 
enter foreign research markets and has, in recent years, opened offices in Prague and 
Tokyo together with the other TNO institutes. In 1998, when DLO will be privatized, it is 
expected that the DLO institutes will also orient themselves more actively toward foreign 
markets. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
research) are currently being split up. In recent years the various commodity boards, which cover the whole 
production column, have been merged into two: one for livestock production and one for crop production. 
13 Included here in the private sector contribution. 
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Figure 6.2: Funding flows within the Dutch agricultural research system in 1995 
 
Note: In 1995 the Dutch guilder was equal to US$ 0.62.  
 
Another recent development is the introduction of an R&D tax break for private 
businesses. This provision, introduced in 1994 to boost private sector R&D investments, 
subsidizes only personnel costs for R&D. Owing to an absolute limit on the total amount 
of tax reduction, the provision supports small- and medium-sized businesses more than 
large ones. The indirect subsidy provided by the tax break covers about 5-10% of total 
R&D costs. 
 
The funding profiles of public agricultural research agencies have changed profoundly 
during the past 20 years (table 6.2). In line with a policy introduced in the early 1980s, 
and further articulated in the 1990s, that farmers should take more responsibility 
themselves for applied research, the Ministry has cut back most significantly on its 
contribution to the experiment stations. This was compensated for, in part, by an increase 
in funding provided by farmers through commodity boards and the (now defunct) 
Agricultural Board. The DLO institutes also experienced a major cut in their funding by 
MOA. They have generally had greater difficulty finding other sources of funding and 
have been forced to reduce staff. The current average of 25% funding from other sources 
varies quite substantially among the DLO institutes. Some institutes are still very 
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dependent on MOA for their funding, while others obtain more than half of their funding 
from other sources. 
 
Table 6.2: Changes in sources of funding during 1978-95 
 
 Change in MOA’s 
subsidy in real terms 
Change in MOA’s share 
in funding research 
Other sources of funding 
DLO research 
institutes 
-19% From 85% to 75% Other ministries, private sector, 
European Union, Agricultural 
Board and commodity boards 
Experiment 
stations 
-33% From 75% to 51% Agricultural Board and 
commodity boards 
Wageningen 
Agricultural 
University 
-12% for the total 
university budget, but 
positive for research 
From 74% to 46% Netherlands Science Council, 
other ministries, European 
Union, private sector 
Source: Roseboom and Rutten (1996, 1997) 
 
Compared with other entities, Wageningen Agricultural University has fared relatively 
well. Despite the fact that MOA’s subsidy to the university (covering both education and 
research) declined 12% in real terms during 1978 and 1995,14 the number of full-time 
equivalent research positions paid by MOA increased from 223 to 361, while those paid 
by other sources (e.g. the Ministry of Development Cooperation, the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Netherlands Science Council, the European Union and the private 
sector) increased from 77 to 472. Of all the universities in the Netherlands, WAU has the 
highest proportion of external financing of research. 
 
In addition to the change in composition of the financing sources, important changes have 
been introduced in the way financing is provided. Traditionally, most MOA funding was 
provided as a grant to an institute. For the DLO institutes, which operated within the 
bureaucratic structure of MOA, these grants narrowly specified the types of expenditures 
(some even made in kind, such as land and buildings) but were not specific with regard to 
expected outputs. Financial control by the Ministry focused on the input, rather than the 
output side. The ministerial grants to the experiment stations and Wageningen 
Agricultural University, both operating at some distance from the Ministry, had been less 
specific and had more the character of a lump-sum payment. 
 
The new concept of public administration has led to a major change in the way MOA 
disburses its grants. Instead of providing open grants, the Ministry increasingly uses 
contracts that specify targets and outputs for the agreed-upon research programs, which 
are used to monitor and evaluate the research provider. With regard to the experiment 
stations, this has resulted in the decision by MOA to disentangle public and private 
interests, and end the arrangement for matching funding with the experiment stations as 
                                                     
14 Largely because of a dramatic decline in the number of students in recent years. 
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of 1998. In the future, government grants will only be provided to the experiment stations 
for agreed-upon research programs that reflect the priorities of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (van Vloten-Doting 1997). 
 
Not only has the Ministry introduced contract arrangements with the executing agencies, 
it has also tried to generate competition in the distribution of its research contracts by 
setting aside a small portion of its budget for competitive grants. Most of its research 
budget, however, is still spent in a rather closed system of consultation between DSKT 
and preferred providers (DLO, WAU, TNO-Food, etc.). This model of disbursing 
research funds is still far from a true “research market”. The future merger of DLO and 
WAU will even further reduce whatever competition exists between the preferred 
providers. Competition, however, plays an important role in obtaining funding from other 
sources (e.g. the private sector, European Union, Netherlands Science Council and other 
ministries). 
 
 
6.5 Experiences in other developed countries 
 
The forces that have shaped the transformation of the Dutch agricultural research system 
over the past 25 years have not been unique to the Netherlands. In the majority of 
developed countries, the changing role of government, public administration reform, and 
shifts in agricultural policies have induced institutional changes in the national 
agricultural research systems. 
 
In table 6.3 we have summarized in a stylized way the most important changes that have 
taken place over the past 25 years in five different NARS (Australia, England and Wales, 
Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States) with regard to mandate, policy 
formulation and coordination, organization and structure, management and financing. 
 
In all five NARS, the mandate for public agricultural research has moved away from the 
traditional productivity focus toward issues of wider social interest, such as the 
environment, animal welfare and food safety. In the context of the new role seen for 
government, these latter issues are ranked higher with regard to their public-good content 
than productivity issues. In all NARS, greater emphasis has been placed on cost recovery 
or cost sharing for research that is of direct benefit to agricultural producers, or to the 
agricultural input and process industries. 
 
Where governments still see a role for themselves in providing productivity-enhancing 
agricultural research, they have pushed for a better client orientation. In particular, public 
agricultural research systems of Australia, New Zealand, and England and Wales have 
been criticized in the past for being out of touch with their clients. In the course of the 
1970s and 1980s, each of them introduced changes in order to improve client orientation 
and to reorient the agricultural research agenda toward applied research. 
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Table 6.3: Institutional changes in some selected developed country NARS over the past two decades 
 
 Australia England and Wales Netherlands New Zealand U.S.A. 
Mandate  Increased emphasis on both 
productivity and public 
concerns related to 
environment, animal welfare 
and food safety 
Increased emphasis on public 
concerns related to the 
environment, animal welfare 
and food safety 
Increased emphasis on public 
concerns related to the 
environment, animal welfare, 
food safety and land use 
Increased emphasis on 
productivity and a relatively 
modest emphasis on 
environmental, animal- 
welfare and food-safety 
issues 
Increased emphasis on public 
concerns related to the 
environment, animal welfare 
and food safety 
Coordination 
and formulation 
of agricultural 
research policy 
More market oriented and 
more decentralized through 
the introduction of Rural 
Industry R&D Corporations 
that now fund about 30% of 
all agricultural research in 
the public sector 
Dual system of ministry and 
council responsibility. Since 
1984 a Priorities Board with 
considerable industry 
representation sets the research 
priorities for both entities  
From central coordination 
towards decentralized 
“research” markets 
Responsibility for  
agricultural research 
transferred to the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, 
greater market orientation 
Relatively decentralized, 
larger influence of Congress 
over federal funding through 
competitive and special grants 
Structure and 
organization 
Relatively few changes at 
the executing level, internal 
reorganization of CSIRO 
Major restructuring, 
consolidation of capacity, in 
some instances sold to the 
private sector 
Major restructuring, 
consolidation of capacity, 
privatization of executing 
agencies 
Major restructuring, 
autonomous crown institutes 
established 
Relatively few changes 
Management Adoption of private sector 
management principles 
Adoption of private sector 
management principles, 
delegated management 
responsibility 
Adoption of private sector 
management principles 
Adoption of private sector 
management principles 
Relatively few changes 
Financing Matching funding of farmer 
levies through Rural 
Industry R&D Corporations 
Financing by MOA now output 
oriented and increasingly 
competitive; in contrast council 
funding is lump-sum and long-
term; increase in private 
funding, establishment of levy 
boards 
Switch from input to output 
financing, greater reliance on 
other (including private) 
sources of funding 
Switch from input to output 
financing, increased reliance 
on private sources of 
funding 
Decrease in formula fun-ding, 
increase in competitive and 
special grants, increase in 
other sources of funding 
(including private sector 
through cooperative R&D 
agreements)  
Sources: Australia: Brennan and Davis (1996); Hussey (1996); Mullen et al. (1996); England and Wales: Jamieson (1989); Thirtle (1989); Thirtle et al. (1995); 
OECD (1995); Netherlands:  Roseboom and Rutten (1995); Roseboom and Rutten (1996) and Roseboom and Rutten (1997); New Zealand: Brennan and Davis 
(1996); Jacobsen and Scobie (in press); Radford (1996);USA: Alston and Pardey (1996); Fuglie, et al. (1996), Just and Huffman (1992); Huffman and Just (1994). 
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This increased emphasis on client orientation has resulted in important changes in the role 
of research policy coordination and formulation within the NARS, particularly when 
clients are being given the opportunity to pull the financial strings (e.g. the introduction 
of the Priorities Board in England and Wales). This has forced public research agencies to 
be more demand oriented. Central planning of agricultural research seems to have lost its 
importance in most countries considered. 
 
In three of the five countries, public research capacity has been significantly restructured 
over the past 10-15 years in order to improve efficiency. In all instances this has led to the 
consolidation of agricultural research into larger research entities. In addition, public 
administration reform has induced a separation of agricultural research policy formulation 
and execution in most countries, as well as more private sector-like management 
principles throughout the NARS. Our impression is that, at least at the macro level, the 
US agricultural research system has been affected the least by these public administration 
reforms.  
 
In all five NARS, public funding of agricultural research has become more competitive. 
In part this has been the result of an increase in the importance of third-party funding, 
such as other ministries, agricultural producers, or private businesses. These funders shop 
around for research providers. The principal financing agencies also administer an 
increasing share of their funding on a competitive basis. Whether or not funding is 
provided through competition, research financing is increasingly tied to specified outputs. 
The traditional way of financing a research agency with a lump-sum grant on the basis of 
its mandate is in decline in most countries. 
 
 
6.6 Future challenges 
 
We have argued that the transformation of the Dutch agricultural research system is 
unique neither to the Netherlands nor to agricultural research as such. Structural changes 
within the agricultural sector, as well as broader political-economic developments, are the 
main driving forces behind these changes. The transformation, however, is far from 
complete. All actors involved (i.e. research institutes, policy makers and representatives 
from business and other interest groups) are still in the process of redefining and “re-
finding” their roles. What are the perspectives for the next 10-15 years? Will a “new” 
agricultural research system be established and settled, and what features will it have? 
 
A recent foresight study by the National Agricultural Research Council (NRLO 1996) 
tries to shed light on these questions by identifying three separate domains that affect the 
environment within which the agricultural research system operates: (a) the utility 
domain, (b) the scientific and technological domain, and (3) the managerial-institutional 
domain. 
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Two important conclusions can be derived from the expected trends in the utility and 
science and technology domains: 
 
- agriculture, agribusiness and rural affairs (the utility domain) will become more 
integrated with other, nonagricultural and nonrural spheres; 
- agricultural research will become more intertwined with other sciences and 
technologies. 
 
Taken together, these two conclusions imply that agricultural research will lose much of 
its specificity and the distinction between agricultural and nonagricultural research will 
become increasingly blurred. The consequences for the agricultural research system are 
far-reaching. Much will depend on how managers and policy makers responsible for the 
present agricultural research system will and can react to these challenges. Should they 
try to guide this transition as smoothly as possible? Or should they strive for a new profile 
and organization of the NARS by redefining its core fields of interest? Or are both 
strategies called for? Within the Dutch agricultural research system there is not much 
support for pursuing the first strategy – which effectively would boil down to the NARS 
being absorbed into the national innovation system. The recent formation of Knowledge 
Centre Wageningen (KCW) is a clear choice for consolidating the NARS, rather than 
dissolving it. At the same time, however, the key to the success of KCW lies in whether it 
will be able to reposition itself effectively in a rapidly changing research market. This 
will depend very much on the organizational flexibility of KCW and on keeping the links 
open to science and technology developments elsewhere. 
 
Future trends in the managerial-organizational domain are largely an extrapolation of the 
developments described here, and which were set in motion during the past decade. New 
public administration practices and stricter policies with regard to the funding of near-
market research will have to be absorbed in the coming years. There are, however, still 
some crucial choices to be made by MOA with regard to its own position in the 
agricultural research market, namely: (i) will MOA reduce its role to that of a client only, 
or will it maintain a responsibility for the overall outcome of the “privatized” agricultural 
research market; and (ii) should MOA continue or even intensify its efforts to define its 
research needs in great detail, or should it adopt a more hands-off policy and return to a 
much broader definition of research needs? 
 
Dutch agricultural research managers and policy makers see the internationalization of 
the agricultural research market as an important future challenge. It will open up new 
opportunities for Dutch agricultural research agencies, but also possible competition from 
abroad. In the private segment of the agricultural research market, national borders are 
hardly an issue. In the public segment, however, strong national borders still exist and it 
is unlikely that they will disappear overnight. The only hope in this regard is for a 
stronger and more centralized European policy on science and technology and a switch 
from predominantly national to European funding for agricultural research – not a very 
likely scenario. The private segment of the agricultural research market, however, is large 
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and growing. The new private status of the DLO research institutes has given them much 
more flexibility to attract foreign clients than in the past. It is expected that at least some 
of the DLO research institutes (in particular, those that already derive much of their 
income from contracts with the private sector) will follow in the steps of TNO-Food and 
expand their research activities beyond national borders. 
 
119 
 
Part III: Underinvestment in Agricultural R&D Revisited 
 
An implicit assumption in most of the descriptive analysis of agricultural R&D trends and 
patterns in part II is that there is “underinvestment” in agricultural R&D and that any 
slowdown in the growth or contraction of agricultural R&D investments is reason for 
serious concern. Support for this is quite widespread (Ruttan 1980; Pinstrup-Andersen 
2001) and has been based on empirical evidence provided by a large number of studies 
that have estimated the rate of return (ROR) to agricultural R&D investment. The average 
rate that can be distilled from all these ROR studies is in the range of 40%-60% (Alston et 
al. 2000), which constitutes a more than excellent track record. This evidence has 
generally been interpreted as an indication of underinvestment in agricultural R&D – 
substantially more could have been invested profitably in agricultural R&D. 
 
Nevertheless, the underinvestment hypothesis has been under attack from several 
quarters. Counter arguments that have circulated in the literature most prominently 
include the following:  
 
(1) There are serious weaknesses in the ROR methodology, leading to systematic 
overestimation of the returns to (agricultural) R&D.  
(2) There is a bias in the selection of ROR studies towards the better-performing 
R&D projects.  
(3) It is not the rate of the average R&D project that determines the underinvestment 
gap, but the rate of the unobserved marginal R&D project.  
(4) The gap is real, but it can be explained by factors such as budget rigidity, 
deadweight losses due to taxation, and risk and uncertainty. 
 
The literature on measuring the economic impact of (agricultural) R&D is quite extensive 
and will therefore be discussed separately in chapter 7. An overview will be given of the 
most common approaches to measuring the relationship between (agricultural) R&D 
investment and productivity. The more important conceptual and technical details will be 
explored and summarized. The other three counter arguments will be taken up in chapter 
8, which critically revisits the underinvestment hypothesis but takes the ROR evidence as 
it comes. By introducing a model of the distribution of R&D projects on an expected rate-
of-return scale, the ROR evidence collected by Alston et al. (2000) will be interpreted in 
a new light. The proposed model provides a basis for estimating the under- or over-
investment gap as well as for modeling the impact of possible explanations for the 
observed underinvestment gaps. 
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7. Measuring the economic impact of (agricultural) R&D 
 
Rates of return (ROR) play a crucial role in the discussion of underinvestment in 
(agricultural) R&D. Therefore, this chapter sets out to review and discuss the standard 
methods used to quantitatively measure the economic impact of agricultural R&D. The 
two most common economic approaches in ex post evaluations of agricultural R&D are 
the economic surplus approach and the production function approach. Alston, Norton, 
and Pardey (1995) discuss both approaches in great detail.1 This chapter provides only a 
brief summary of the principal characteristics of the two approaches (sections 7.1 and 
7.2). A critical step in both approaches is the modeling of the relationship between R&D 
investment and measured R&D benefit (section 7.3). Section 7.4 discusses the various 
attribution problems encountered by R&D rate-of-return studies. Section 7.5 summarizes 
the conclusions. 
 
 
7.1 The economic surplus approach of measuring the impact of R&D 
 
The economic surplus approach uses a supply-and-demand model of a commodity market 
to estimate changes in consumer and producer benefits due to a research-induced shift in 
the supply curve. This is depicted graphically in figure 7.1 for a closed economy. 
 
D represents the demand for a homogenous product and S0 and S1 represent, respectively, 
the supply of the product before and after a research-induced technical change. All curves 
are defined as flows per unit time, typically annually, as are the economic surplus 
measures. The initial equilibrium price and quantity are P0 and Q0; after the supply shift 
they are P1 and Q1. 
 
Under these assumptions, the total annual benefit from a research-induced supply shift is 
equal to the area beneath the demand curve and between the two supply curves (∆TS = 
area I0abI1). This area can be viewed, with linear supply and demand curves and a 
parallel shift of the supply curve, as the sum of two parts: (a) cost savings on the original 
quantity (the area between two supply curves to the left of Q0 – area I0acI1) and (b) the 
economic surplus due to the increment to production and consumption (the triangular area 
abc). Alternatively, it is possible to partition the total benefit into a consumer surplus 
(∆CS = area P0abP1) and a producer surplus (∆PS = area P1bcd). 
                                                     
1 Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) mention a third, nonparametric approach to evaluating the impact of 
agricultural research. The advantage of this approach, which uses linear programming, is that by not imposing 
any functional form on the data, it avoids many of the pitfalls that come with the parametric method used in 
the production function approach. Chavas and Cox (1992) summarize the following advantages of a non-
parametric approach relative to parametric approaches: (1) non a priori restriction on substitution possibilities 
among inputs, (2) allows joint estimation of the production technology, technical chance, and the effects of 
research on technical progress using very disaggregate inputs, (3) flexibility in the length and shape of the lag 
distribution between research and productivity, (4) permits an investigation of the separate effects of private 
and public research on technical progress, and (5) empirically tractable. To date, the nonparametric approach 
has been used only rather sparsely to evaluate the impact of agricultural research.  
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Figure 7.1: Consumer and producer surplus measures 
 
The consumer and producer surplus measures can be expressed algebraically as follows: 
 
∆CS = P0Q0 Z (1+0.5Zη) [7.1] 
 
∆PS = P0Q0 (K-Z) (1+0.5Zη) [7.2] 
 
∆TS = ∆CS + ∆PS = P0Q0 K (1+0.5Zη) [7.3] 
 
where K is the vertical shift of the supply function expressed as a proportion of the initial 
price [(P0-d)/P0], η is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand, ε is the elasticity of 
supply, and Z = Kε /(ε+η) is the reduction in price relative to its initial value, due to the 
supply shift ((P0-P1)/P0). 
 
When Z or η are relatively small (reflecting a relatively small decline in price and 
relatively inelastic demand, respectively), it is reasonable to approximate the research-
induced benefits as follows: 
 
∆CS = P0Q0 Z [7.4] 
 
∆PS = P0Q0 (K-Z)  [7.5] 
 
∆TS = ∆CS + ∆PS = P0Q0 K [7.6] 
 
Or, relating back to figure 7.1, when the decline in price is small or the demand rather 
inelastic (i.e., more vertical than depicted in figure 7.1), the benefits represented by 
triangle abc are negligible in comparison to the benefits represented by area P0acd. 
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The latter approximation of the total economic surplus is frequently used in studies that 
use an implicit rather than explicit economic surplus model. The advantage of the implicit 
approach is that no estimations of the form and elasticity of the demand and supply 
curves are needed to estimate total benefits. While intuitively attractive, an implicit 
economic surplus model tends to obscure many of the underlying assumptions. 
 
The basic economic surplus model presented above assumes linear supply-and-demand 
curves and a parallel shift of the supply curve. In the literature, quite a number of 
alternatives to this simple representation have been proposed and tried out, such as 
divergent and convergent shifts of linear supply curves as well as parallel and 
proportional (or pivotal) shifts in (quasi) constant elasticity supply-and-demand models 
(see figure 7.2).2 
 
Depending on the model, the measure of estimated benefits can differ quite substantially. 
For example, given a linear supply curve function, total benefits from a parallel shift are 
almost twice the size of total benefits from a pivotal shift of equal size at the pre-research 
equilibrium (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). 
 
It is not only the elasticity of the supply curve that matters, but also that of the demand 
curve. The more inelastic the demand curve, the more likely producers will pass the 
benefits from a technical change on to consumers by means of lower prices. Also, if the 
supply elasticity is absolutely larger than the demand elasticity, consumers will tend to 
receive a larger share of the benefits than producers (Norton and Davis 1981). In the case 
of a pivotal supply shift and inelastic demand, however, farmers may actually be worse 
off than before the technical change. 
 
After having reviewed all these different supply-shift forms, Alston, Norton, and Pardey 
(1995) conclude that, in the absence of the information required to choose a particular 
type of supply shift, the most practical solution is to assume a parallel research-induced 
supply shift and a local linear approximation of the supply-and-demand curve.3 
 
                                                     
2 See Norton and Davis (1981) and Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) for overviews. 
3 A side issue is whether the shift is expressed as vertical (in the price direction) or horizontal (in the quantity 
direction). Expressing a K percent yield increase (or cost saving) as either a K percent vertical shift or a K 
percent horizontal shift has different implications unless the supply elasticity is unitary. The equivalent 
horizontal supply shift, J, for a K percent vertical supply shift is given by using the definition that 
dQ/Q=εdP/P and therefore, J = εK, where ε is the elasticity of supply (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995).  
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Figure 7.2: Different supply-shift assumptions 
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The basic economic surplus model deals with a single-commodity market in isolation – 
no interaction with the rest of the economy or world takes place. In chapter 4 of their 
book, Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) discuss a range of possible modifications and 
extensions to the basic model, which allow (1) disaggregation of economic-surplus 
effects across multiple markets horizontally (across geopolitical regions, socioeconomic 
groups, or commodities) and vertically (across stages of production or among factors of 
production), (2) the capture of the effects of interregional and international spillovers of 
research-induced price changes and research results, (3) incorporation of general-
equilibrium feedback and economy-wide adjustments, (4) accommodation of market 
distortions and the effects of research on the creation (or amelioration) of market 
distortions caused by government intervention or production externalities, and (5) 
accounting for the costs of taxation to finance government spending. It is these modified 
and extended versions of the economic-surplus model in particular that have attracted 
many practitioners and have resulted in a blossoming of the literature on this topic. 
 
Whatever the size of the measured R&D benefits, a critical consideration is how to link 
those benefits to past R&D investments. Or, in the case of an ex ante rate-of-return 
estimation, how to link an investment in R&D today to a benefit stream in the future. This 
issue will be taken up in more detail in section 7.3, as it is essential to both economic 
surplus as well as the production function approach. 
 
In summary, the estimation of the benefits from a research-induced supply shift boils 
down to four critical determinants: (1) K, the percentage research-induced reduction in 
costs of production when the results are adopted, (2) P0Q0, the size of the industry 
affected, (3) the nature of the research-induced supply shift, and (4) the timing of the 
flows of benefits (the research lags) (Alston et al. 2000). 
 
R&D investment evaluations using an economic surplus method either estimate the K-
shift on the basis of information derived from (preferably) on-farm trials and observed 
adoption patterns (Maredia, Beyerlee, and Anderson 2000) or on the basis of historical 
time-series data of output and corresponding input use, using econometric techniques. In 
the latter instance, there is a close link between aggregate growth accounting, index 
number theory, and the economic surplus approach. Growth accounting involves 
compiling detailed accounts of inputs and outputs, aggregating them into input and output 
indices, and using these indices to calculate a total factor productivity (TFP) index or, as 
in the case of the economic surplus model, calculate the K-shift (which boils down to the 
question of what it would cost to produce Q0 with today’s technologies). The theory of 
index numbers shows that the method by which the raw data are combined into a 
manageable number of subaggregates, and in turn reaggregated, matters (Antle and 
Capalbo 1988). The preferred method is a chained index, such as the Divisia index, as it 
minimizes the impact of relative price changes on the aggregate quantity index. While the 
Divisia index proper requires continuous measurement of input prices and quantities and 
is therefore unattainable, several discrete approximations to the Divisia index are 
possible, such as the Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher ideal, and Tornqvist-Theil approx-
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imations.4 In particular, Diewert (1976, 1980, 1981) has contributed to a better 
understanding of the economic assumptions and the underlying aggregation functions that 
are implicit in the choice of an indexing procedure.5 This understanding may help to 
match the right index with the right aggregator function. Growth accounting and index 
number theory are also of relevance to the production function approach discussed in the 
next section. 
 
 
7.2 The production function approach of measuring the impact of R&D 
 
The production function approach uses regression analysis to estimate an aggregate 
production (or productivity, cost, or profit) function model that can be used to evaluate 
the additional output (for given inputs) or the saving in inputs (for a given output) 
attributable to past investments in R&D. 
 
The production function and productivity increases 
 
A correct estimation of the production function is essential if one is to differentiate between 
various possible explanations for observed differences or increases in productivity correctly. Panel 
a in figure 7.3, adapted from Antle and Capalbo (1988), shows two single-output neoclassical 
production functions F1(X) and F2(X), which represent the technically efficient combinations of 
input X and output Q in period 1 and 2, respectively, using different technologies. X1,Q1 and X2,Q2 
are the input-output combinations observed in period 1 and 2, respectively. The total factor 
productivity (TFP), measured as the average product of factor X, is greater in period 2 than in 
period 1. This measured productivity increase can be attributed to three distinctive phenomena: 
 
(1) Increase in (technical) efficiency: Q1 is below F1(X), indicating technical inefficiency; 
efficient production would have resulted in output Q1*. 
(2) Scale of production: Q2 was produced with a greater input than was Q1, so there is a 
difference in scale of production, which explains the difference between Q1* and Q2*. 
(3) Technical change: Production function F2 exhibits a higher total productivity than F1, 
which explains the gap between Q2* and Q2. 
 
A slightly more complicated version of the production function allowing for two inputs, F1(X1, X2), 
is depicted as isoquant Q1 in panel b of figure 7.3. The isocost line (W1) defines the economically 
efficient combination of inputs X1, X2 (point A). The observed input combination B to produce Q1 
is economically inefficient, which can be disaggregated into technical and allocative inefficiency. 
Technical inefficiency refers to failure to operate at the production function (BC), while allocative 
inefficiency refers to failure to minimize production costs (CA) while at the production function. 
 
                                                     
4 See Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) for further details. 
5 The Divisia approximations of the Laspeyres and Paasche type imply either a linear production function in 
which all inputs are perfect substitutes or a Leontief production function in which all inputs are used in fixed 
proportions. Similarly, a geometric approximation is exact for a Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
Fisher ideal approximation is exact for quadratic aggregator functions, and the Tornqvist-Theil approximation 
is exact for a homogenous translog production function. Hence, the importance of index number theory lies in 
the linkage of the growth accounting approach to production theory (Antle and Capalbo 1988). 
127 
 
  
 
Figure 7.3: Possible explanations of productivity increases 
 
Panel c in figure 7.3 depicts two production functions for periods 1 and 2. For given technology, 
a change in the relative prices of inputs X1 and X2 (depicted as a change in the angle of the 
isocost line from W1 and W2) shifts the economically efficient optimum from a to b. The situation 
becomes more complicated when, at the same time, there is a (neutral) productivity improvement 
so that the same amount of output can be produced with fewer measured inputs (isoquant Q2). 
This would lead to a new optimum, point c. The difficulty in differentiating between these two 
phenomena is that points a and c can be observed, but point b can not. 
 
Total factor productivity (TFP) can be defined as aggregate output (Q) divided by 
aggregate input (X). Hence, TFP growth is simply equal to the rate of growth of aggregate 
output minus the rate of growth of aggregate input for Divisia indices of aggregate output 
and input. While the basic principles of how to measure TFP growth properly are clear, 
some important choices about the extent to which inputs and outputs should be kept 
disaggregated in the construction of the indices still have to be resolved. Ideally, inputs 
and outputs should only be pre-aggregated when they are perfect substitutes or grow at 
the same rate (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). If not, pre-aggregation of data may 
distort the measurement of TFP growth. Another, rather different measurement problem 
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is that there is typically no explicit allowance for the reduction in the stock of 
environmental and natural resources associated with agricultural production in terms of 
land degradation, depletion of soil fertility, chemical pollution of air and groundwater, 
build-up of resistant pests and diseases, and so on. By ignoring the contribution of these 
inputs, TFP growth will be overestimated.6 Putting aside these measurement problems, 
TFP growth can be attributed to technical and (although usually ignored) institutional 
change and, hence, to past investments in R&D. 
 
The most straightforward approach to formally linking notions of technical change with 
measured rates of growth in productivity is to assume that an index of the state of 
technology, τ, can be incorporated directly into a production function such that 
 
Qt = F(Xt, τt)  [7.7] 
 
Hence, technological progress (i.e., dτ/dt > 0) is perceived as an upward shift of the 
production function or, equivalently, as a downward shift of the production isoquant.7 
Rates of change in output over time can be partitioned into components due to changes in 
measured input use and those due to changes in the state of technology. Alston, Norton, 
and Pardey (1995) show that the primal rate of technological change can be expressed as 
the rate of change in output, minus a scale-adjusted index of the rate of change in input. 
Hence, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, input-output separability, 
efficient and optimizing producers, and disembodied technical change of the extended 
Hicks-neutral type, the primal rate of technological change equals the TFP growth rate 
mentioned above.8 
 
In order to estimate the production function, several closely interlinked choices have to be 
made with regard to (1) the functional form for the empirical model, (2) the variables to 
be included, (3) possible proxy measures for those variables, and (4) the representation of 
technological change. The first three choices will be discussed only briefly here, followed 
by a more extensive discussion of the representation of technological change. 
 
7.2.1 Functional form of the empirical model 
 
Choices about functional form are dictated to a great extent by the availability of data and 
the purpose of the analysis. The functional form used most frequently in the literature on 
agricultural production is the Cobb-Douglas production function, although since the early 
1960s, more flexible forms have also been explored, such as constant elasticity of 
                                                     
6 For attempts to correct for this error see for example Oskam (1991) and Barnes (2002).  
7 For a discussion of other approaches to modeling technical change see Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995, p. 
114-116).  
8 It is also possible to use the cost or profit function to derive a dual rate of technological change that is the 
counterpart of the primal rate. Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) show that under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale, the primal and dual rates are equal but opposite in sign. Because of scale effects, direct 
estimates of primal and dual rates of technological change generally differ. 
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substitution (CES), quadratic functions, and quadratic functions in logarithms (translog).9 
The translog production function, in particular, has been considered a good alternative to 
the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas production function. However, quadratic production 
functions, by their very nature, contain many variables that are intercorrelated, and 
therefore the estimated parameters suffer from low precision to the extent that they often 
do not make sense (Mundlak 2000). 
 
The Cobb-Douglas production function can be written as follows: 
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Where X, K, and Z respectively represent the quantities of conventional inputs, variables 
that determine the stock of knowledge in use (approximating the state of technology, τ), 
and various “fixed” institutional, infrastructural, and policy-related variables. As can be 
seen, the Cobb-Douglas production function is just a special case of the translog 
production function, one for which the parameters on all squared and interaction terms 
are assumed to be zero (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). 
 
A popular alternative to the primal or production function approach is that of the dual 
approach, which formulates production in terms of a cost or profit function. The 
advantage of dual functions is that they contain information about both optimal behavior 
and the structure of the underlying technology or preferences, whereas primal functions 
describe only the latter. Statistically, there is also the advantage of using factor prices 
(rather than their quantities) as explanatory variables, which may avoid problems of 
simultaneity that arise when input choices are jointly endogenous with output because 
factor (and product) prices are more likely to be behaviorally and, hence, statistically 
exogenous to a firm and even to an industry (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). Mundlak 
(2000), however, seriously questions the use of dual functions. He argues that many of 
                                                     
9 See Mundlak (2000) for a more detailed historical overview. 
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the properties of the dual estimators are derived for competitive firms and are not 
automatically applicable to aggregates that do not meet the underlying assumptions. 
 
7.2.2 Variables to be included and their possible proxies 
 
Variables usually included in a production function are conventional inputs such as land, 
labor, and capital, as well as some selected purchased inputs. To the extent that the 
available data do not differentiate inputs according to their intrinsic quality (e.g., 
reporting tractor hours rather than horsepower hours), indirect “quality” indices may be 
included to correct for such aggregation errors.10 The labor and capital input variables 
require some additional careful handling, as available data usually represent labor and 
capital stock rather than their preferred service flow (e.g., tractors rather than tractor 
hours). In their seminal paper on the explanation of productivity change, Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) point out that all such measurement issues matter and that if quantities of 
output and input are measured accurately, growth in total output may be largely explained 
by growth in total input. Based on data for the private domestic economy in the US for 
the period 1945-65, their initial productivity growth of 1.6% annually (explaining 52.4% 
of the output growth) drops to only 0.1% annually (explaining only 3.3% of the output 
growth) after correcting for the following measurement distortions: (1) error of 
aggregation, (2) the prices of investment goods, and errors in (3) relative utilization, (4) 
aggregation of capital services, and (5) aggregation of labor services. While data for other 
periods and with different adjustments yielded less extreme differences, their principal 
argument remains valid – that the construction of output and input indices need careful 
attention as one may easily end up with spurious TFP growth results.11 
 
In addition to the conventional inputs and their quality shifters, two sets of non-
conventional inputs are usually included, namely, one set dealing with “fixed” factors 
outside the realm of the decision makers whose production decisions are being modeled 
(e.g., infrastructure, agricultural policies, and political stability) and one set dealing with 
the stock of knowledge in use as a proxy for technological change. Including “fixed” 
factors in the production function is rather arbitrary for two reasons: (1) it is not always 
clear whether the factor belongs in the model and (2) it is not always possible to know 
whether the proposed proxy is a close enough approximation to the actual phenomena 
that one assumes has an impact on agricultural production. 
 
 
                                                     
10 One would prefer, however, that the input indices reflect changes in quality differences properly so that the 
real service flow provided by the input is measured. For commodities that have quality characteristics that are 
multi-dimensional, so-called “hedonic” price indices may be used to correct for “quality change.”  
11 The fact that constructing correct price and product indices is not a minor issue is reflected in the findings 
of a recent study commissioned by the US Senate Finance Commission, which found that the US Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) overstates inflation by approximately 1.1% annually, of which 0.5 percentage points are 
due to index problems and 0.6 percentage points are due to new products and changes in quality (Nordhaus 
1997). With an average CPI rate of 2%–3% annually, this upward bias is far from negligible. This finding has 
led to the introduction of new, corrected price indices in the US, resulting in lower inflation rates and higher 
TFP growth rates than had been the case with the traditional price index methods. 
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7.3 Modeling the link between R&D investments and R&D benefits 
 
In the literature, a range of different approximations of technical change can be found. 
The most common one is to explain a change in TFP, or τ, by past investments in R&D. 
The questions then is: R&D expenditures on what, where, when, and by whom? Of these 
four questions, the when question is technically the most challenging, although the other 
three need careful consideration as well. 
 
Defining agricultural R&D has its own pitfalls. One way is to differentiate R&D 
activities on the basis of the economic activity that is targeted directly. This establishes a 
one-to-one relationship between agricultural R&D and agricultural production. In this 
definition, R&D activities by non-agricultural industries, supplying as well as processing 
industries (e.g., chemical, machinery, and food processing industries), are thus excluded. 
To the extent that input indices pick up quality and price changes correctly, the (new) 
technology embodied in inputs has been taken care of, so R&D activities by these 
supplying industries should not play a role in explaining τ. However, when input indices 
fail to reflect quality and price changes properly, R&D activities by the supplying 
industries may explain some of the observed productivity changes in primary agri-
culture.12 
 
By its very nature, basic research does not fit into an economic activity classification. 
Possible solutions are the following: ignore it, prorate it, or include it as a separate 
variable that explains τ. Each solution will affect the link between τ and R&D 
expenditures differently. In cases where the productivity analysis focuses on just one 
commodity or cluster of commodities, it is necessary not only to identify the R&D 
specific to that commodity or cluster of commodities, but also the generic (not-
commodity-specific) agricultural R&D activities. The same solutions found for basic 
R&D are possible. Assuming that there is little difference in the timing of R&D benefits 
between commodity-specific and generic agricultural R&D, prorating the generic 
agricultural R&D activities is preferred. 
 
Regarding the question of where, the answer is usually determined by the geographical 
location of the production considered, such as a state or province, country, or a particular 
region of the world. The basic assumption is that the R&D taking place in a particular 
geographical location primarily targets production in that location. This assumption holds 
reasonably well for public agricultural R&D, as it tends to be location-specific. In so far 
as the assumption of location does not hold, the concept of “technology spillovers” has 
been introduced to deal with this problem, at least conceptually.13 For the R&D activities 
of the supplying industries, however, the location of where the research is done and 
                                                     
12 As will be shown in section 7.4, a substantial part of the benefits of R&D activities undertaken by 
supplying industries are captured by those industries. Hence, the relationship between R&D in a particular 
supplying industry and τ is different between industries as well as for R&D that targets agricultural 
production directly. 
13 Productivity studies that actually take the effects of technology spillover into account are very rare (Alston 
et al. 2000). 
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where it has an impact on agricultural production can differ significantly. In this instance, 
the one-to-one plus spillover assumption is of little use. Trade data (assuming technology 
gets embodied in products) may help to identify where the R&D of supplying industries 
has an impact (Roseboom 2000). 
 
Who undertakes R&D or who finances it does not really matter when it comes to 
explaining TFP growth. However, some differentiation between R&D performers may be 
warranted when they specialize in certain types of R&D. For example, universities tend to 
focus more on strategic and basic research, while private companies focus more on 
applied research. Hence, the expected R&D benefit stream from university research in 
terms of lag, length, and form may differ from that of private companies (Griliches 1973). 
In the same way, the lag, length, and form of the R&D benefit stream of forestry research 
may be different from that of crop, livestock, or fisheries research, or R&D in other 
industries, for that matter. It is in establishing the link between the research activity and 
the benefit stream that differentiating by R&D performer may be relevant. 
 
In order to link past research investments to today’s changes in TFP (the when question), 
the concept of a knowledge stock is being introduced, which, similar to the concept of 
capital stock, allows a service flow measure of knowledge to be estimated. Such a service 
flow depends on the existing (but unobserved) knowledge stock as well as its utilization 
and approximates the state of technology, τt. The stock of useful knowledge (K) can be 
defined as follows: 
 
Kt = Kt-1 + It -Dt = (1-δ) Kt-1 + It [7.10] 
 
Where I represents additions to the knowledge stock as a result of R&D and D 
depreciations of the knowledge stock as knowledge becomes obsolete or is replaced by 
better information. Assuming a constant rate of knowledge depreciation, δ, D can be 
expressed as δKt-1. Through a repeated substitution for Kt-1 in equation 7.10, it can be seen 
that the current knowledge stock, Kt, is defined by the entire history of changes in this 
knowledge stock, implying an infinite lag structure for research (Alston, Norton, and 
Pardey 1995). However, there is one exception and that is when δ =1, which means that 
the knowledge stock completely depreciates in one period and Kt = It. The opposite option 
is to assume that useful knowledge does not depreciate at all (δ =0), which implies that 
increments to knowledge in the past are just as effective today as the most recent 
increments to knowledge. Neither extreme is realistic. Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) 
cite several studies from the industrial R&D literature that have used knowledge 
depreciation rates ranging from 0% to 25%. However, most studies on the returns to 
agricultural R&D implicitly assume a depreciation rate of 100% (which means δ =1), so 
that Kt =  It. Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) argue that this is true of all studies that 
model Kt (and hence, τt) as a function of a finite lag of research investments, Rt-GL-LL, such 
that 
 
Kt = It = i(Rt-GL, Rt-GL-1,……., Rt-GL-LL, εt)  [7.11] 
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where GL represents the gestation lag (the time it takes before research shows its first 
impact), LL is the total lag length (the period over which R&D is assumed to have an 
impact), and εt represents chance. Other possible explanatory variables, which have been 
suppressed here, are (1) various factors affecting the productivity of research, such as 
research orientation (in some areas, it is easier to make progress than in others) and 
improvements in the organization and management of research (with the same money, 
more innovation can be produced) and (2) spillovers of knowledge from research 
elsewhere or from other industries.14 
 
The dynamics of the relationship between past investments in R&D, R, and increments in 
useful knowledge, I, are complicated and uncertain. There are at least four forces at work 
here, which are depicted in a stylized way in figure 7.4: (1) the lag between research 
investment and the actual invention of a new technique (a-b), (2) the lag between 
invention and the first economic application of the invention (b-c), (3) the lag between 
first use and complete diffusion (c-d), and (4) the disappearance of the technique due to 
depreciation (e.g., erosion of plant yields and chemical crop-protection techniques) or 
obsolescence (replacement by a better technique) (d-e). Based on the diffusion literature, 
an S-shaped diffusion pattern is being assumed as well as an adoption ceiling. The R&D 
benefit stream can be infinite, depreciate gradually (biological inventions tend to erode), 
or end abruptly as the technology is replaced by a better one (Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction). Also, in the latter instance, a mirrored S-shaped phasing out of the 
technology can be expected, complementary to the diffusion of the new technology. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Research, development and adoption lags 
 
Evenson (1968) was the first to investigate this question of research lag and length 
econometrically and found that an “inverted-V” distributed lag form fit his data best, with 
the peak influence coming with a lag of five to eight years and the total effect dying out 
                                                     
14 Griliches (1979) provides a good introduction about how to model the effects of within-industry and 
within-economy knowledge spillover.  
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in about 10 to 16 years. In most ROR studies on agricultural R&D investments, however, 
rather than formal testing, a functional form has been imposed on the R&D expenditure 
data. This is usually done to avoid multicollinearity and degrees-of-freedom problems 
and not on the basis of some theoretically derived priors. Also, data availability often 
forces analysts to adopt short research lags. The functional forms most frequently used in 
empirical work are the inverted-V, polynomial, and trapezoidal lags.15 Pardey and Craig 
(1989), using a free-form lag structure to model the relationship between agricultural 
research and public-sector agricultural research in the US, found evidence that the impact 
of research expenditures on agricultural output may last as long as 30 years, which was 
considerably longer than hitherto assumed. Chavas and Cox (1988, 1992) provided 
similar evidence using a nonparametric approach. But the questions of how much longer 
and what type of functional form to use remain unanswered. 
 
Getting the lag structure correct is important because the implied internal ROR to 
agricultural research is quite sensitive to the (partial) research production coefficients 
derived from models estimated with inappropriate lag structures (Pardey 1986). Alston 
and Pardey (1996) further substantiated this argument by comparing R&D benefit streams 
with different lags, lengths, and profiles and found that the implied internal rates of return 
showed important differences. A further step in tackling the problem was made in a 
recent paper by Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998). They assumed the following linear 
form between TFP, τt, and the useful knowledge stock, Kt: 
 
τt = α + β Kt + γ Wt + ut [7.12] 
 
where Wt represents a single weather-related variable and ut the usual random residual.16 
Quasi differencing this equation and using equation 7.12 gives17 
 
τt = αδ + β [Kt - (1-δ) Kt-1] + γ [Wt - (1-δ) Wt-1] + (1-δ) τt-1 + ut + (1-δ) ut-1 [7.13] 
 
Taking innovations in equation 7.11 to be a linear function of a finite lag of past 
logarithms of research investments, 
 
It = ∑ bs lnRt-s [7.14] 
 
the unobserved capital stock term in equation 7.13 can now be replaced by It (see 
equation 7.10) to yield 
 
τt = αδ + β ∑ bs lnRt-s + γ [Wt - (1-δ) Wt-1] + (1-δ) τt-1 + vt [7.15] 
 
                                                     
15 See Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) pages 178-185, for a detailed description of these functional forms.  
16 Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) suggest a far more complicated relationship between τ and K, involving 
the stock of farmers’ human capital, extension expenditures, and the relative prices of outputs and inputs.  
17 In this case, quasi differencing involves lagging equation 7.12 with one period, multiplying by 1-δ, 
subtracting the result from equation 7.12, and reducing terms to get equation 7.13. 
135 
 
This model nests the three depreciation alternatives discussed earlier: (1) the stock of 
knowledge never depreciates, δ=0, (2) the stock of useful knowledge vanishes in finite 
time, δ=1 (the implicit assumption in most models with a fixed cost-benefit structure), 
and (3) the intermediate case in which useful knowledge decays only gradually, 0<δ<1. 
Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) use this model to evaluate typical assumptions about the 
shape of the research lag, as well as implicit assumptions about knowledge depreciation 
associated with explicit assumptions about the research lag length. The findings of 
Alston, Craig, and Pardey’s evaluation “reinforce the view that agricultural research 
affects productivity for much longer than most previous studies have allowed, possibly 
forever. A [polynomial] model consistent with infinite lags is statistically preferred over a 
more conventional [trapezoidal] model with finite lags. The results also suggest that many 
previous studies may have unduly restricted the shape of the research lag profile – often 
basing the entire distribution of lag coefficients on a single estimated parameter. The 
implications for reported rates of return are quite dramatic. The statistically preferred 
method indicated a real, marginal internal ROR to public agricultural research in the 
United States of 6.8 percent per annum whereas a more typical model, using a trapezoidal 
lag structure with shorter lags, indicates a more typical rate of 48 percent per annum” 
(Alston and Pardey 2000, p. 20.) 
 
 
7.4 Attribution imperfections affecting rate of return estimations 
 
It should be clear by now that ROR calculations of (agricultural) R&D investment are not 
without problems. There is a wide range of issues that affect the ultimate outcome of such 
calculations. And, given the average high rates of return reported by most studies, there is 
a general tendency to attribute this result, at least in part, to methodological flaws. Alston 
and Pardey (2000), for example, argue that rates of return on agricultural R&D 
investments tend to be overestimated because of attribution imperfections. They focus in 
particular on spill-ins of research results from parallel research programs and on the 
temporal aspects of the attribution of benefits (see above). 
 
Another significant weakness in the ROR calculations is the treatment of purchased 
inputs. Usually only a limited number of the purchased inputs stemming from industries 
other than agriculture are included in the analysis. In most international comparisons, for 
example, only fertilizers and tractors are included as purchased industrial inputs and 
considered representative for all purchased industrial inputs (see, e.g., Hayami and Ruttan 
1985).18 This would to some extent be acceptable when the R&D activity and subsequent 
spillover across all input-suppliers would be more or less the same, but this assumption is 
highly questionable. Moreover, in the international comparisons, input quantities are used 
rather than values. This means that process innovations in the input industry leading to 
                                                     
18 Mundlak (2000) and his colleagues at the World Bank made a major effort to better measure the capital 
input into agricultural production across 58 countries. This yielded quite significantly different results 
compared to earlier cross-country productivity analyses. 
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lower input prices are not accounted for. And, as Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997) 
argue, such quantities are often not adjusted for quality differences and changes either. 
 
But even when input prices are available, as in many national studies, the standard price 
indices tend to have some major shortcomings. One such shortcoming is the type of price 
index, as has been discussed in section 7.1. Another shortcoming is that price indices 
usually fail to capture the introduction phase of a new product or a new input correctly. 
As Nordhaus (1997) points out, the standard procedure is to “link” new goods and 
services into the price index rather than to re-price the basic category to take the quality 
change into account. In other words, the first bang that the introduction of a new product 
or a new input may give to economic growth is not measured.19 Moreover, for many new 
products or inputs, the price often declines quite rapidly during the first few years after 
their introduction. The usually delayed inclusion of new goods and services in the price 
index is another factor that results in their contribution to economic growth being 
underestimated (Griliches 1979). 
 
Overall, the way purchased inputs are treated in (agricultural) productivity analyses and 
ROR studies is rather unsatisfactory and constitutes a source of distortion. Only proper 
measurement of quality-adjusted inputs and prices can contain this problem and correctly 
capture the benefits stemming from input use in (agricultural) production and eliminate 
any unaccounted spill-ins related to their use.20 Since this ideal approach may never be 
achieved, alternative approaches have been tried to measure technology spillovers 
(including those coming with purchased inputs) explicitly rather than eliminating them. 
 
Griliches (1979) identified two main sources of potential externality generated by R&D 
activities: rent spillovers and knowledge spillovers. Rent spillovers originate exclusively 
from economic transactions and can therefore be traced by monitoring such transactions. 
Knowledge spillovers, however, arise when knowledge developed in one industry 
contributes to the innovation process of other industries. It is assumed that technology 
proximity rather than transaction intensity facilitates knowledge spillovers. Hence, the 
direction and intensity of rent and knowledge spillovers may differ greatly. In practice, 
however, it is difficult to empirically dissociate rent spillovers from knowledge spillovers, 
which creates quite some ambiguity in analyzing technology spillovers. 
 
Figure 7.5, adapted from van Pottelsberghe (1997), provides a schematic overview of the 
potential rent and knowledge spillovers. Intermediate inputs, investment goods, patent 
                                                     
19 Nordhaus (1997) somewhat overshoots his argument when he compares horses with automobiles. The first 
automobiles were hardly more efficient than horses. It is only because of the steady improvement of 
automobiles that they became so much more superior. Nevertheless, despite all technological progress, the 
average speed of traffic in London was in the 1990s not much higher than in the 1890s. 
20 There is still another type of spillover that correct measurement of input use and prices does not account 
and that is the spillover of ideas and knowledge between industries.  
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flows, and technology proximity are the four channels by which technology spills over 
from one industry to the next.21 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Potential rent and knowledge spillovers from industry i to industry j 
 
Most studies on technology spillovers focus on just one type of spillover channel. Only a 
few have tried to compare the different approaches or capture the whole range in one 
model. Each spillover channel can be approximated by its own technology weighting 
matrix, resulting in the following four measures of external R&D capital stocks: 
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Mi,j is industry j’s intermediate input purchase from industry i, Ii,j is industry j’s 
investment good purchase from industry i, Pi,j/Pi is the share of industry i’s patents that 
are likely to be used by industry j,22 wi,j is an indicator of industry j’s proximity to 
                                                     
21 See van Pottelsberghe (1997) for an overview of studies using the different weighting matrices. Early 
pioneers of technology weighting matrices are (1) Terleckyj (1974), using input-output matrix data for both 
intermediate inputs and investment goods, (2) Scherer (1982), using patent data to create a technology flow 
matrix, and (3) Jaffe (1986), pioneering various forms of technology proximity.  
22 Rather than measuring “potential” use of patents, it would be more appropriate to measure actual use of 
patents on the basis of royalty payments. Unfortunately, however, detailed data on royalty payments are not 
available. 
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industry i, and Qi and Ri are industry i’s output and R&D capital, respectively (van 
Pottelsberghe 1997). While the external R&D capital stocks, Sm,j and Sk,j, match the rent 
spillovers and Sw,j with knowledge spillovers, the external R&D capital stock, Sp,j, takes a 
somewhat intermediate position, covering both types of spillovers. Comparing the 
different technology weighting matrices, van Pottelsberghe (1997) concludes that the 
technology flow matrix is closer to the input-output matrix than to the technology 
proximity matrix and, hence, matches the rent spillover better than the knowledge spill-
over. 
 
Roseboom (1999, 2000) provides an example of applying the input-output matrix 
approach to measure technology spill-ins into primary agricultural production. An 
approximation of Sm,j and Sk,j in itself is interesting (also because the study differentiates 
between local and imported inputs), but for the actual measure of technology spillover, 
two additional pieces of information are needed: (1) the success rate of R&D in each of 
the supplying industries, as this defines the total R&D benefit, and (2) how the R&D 
benefit is shared between the innovator and subsequent users. In most studies, the average 
success rate of R&D is usually assumed to be the same and is hence ignored. This may, 
however, not be a valid assumption. With regard to the second question, some strong 
opinions can be found in the literature. One such opinion is that multinationals manage to 
appropriate all or nearly all of the benefits from their R&D, and hence, farmers have 
nothing or very little to gain from buying inputs. Another popular opinion, formulated by 
Cochrane (1958), is that farmers are trapped in a technology treadmill and that most of 
the R&D benefits (either from within or outside the agricultural sector) are passed on to 
the processing industry or consumers by means of lower agricultural prices. Operating in 
a very fragmented and competitive industry means that farmers are in a weak position to 
appropriate much of the R&D benefits. 
 
Looking from the perspective of the innovator, both the total benefits and the benefit 
distribution can be estimated by using an economic-surplus model. According to this 
model, the more inelastic the demand, the more the user rather than the producer (and 
innovator) of the new input will appropriate the R&D benefits. However, as discussed by 
Moschini and Lapan (1997), the economic-surplus model needs considerable 
modification when private innovators can protect their innovation with intellectual 
property rights and can legally exercise some monopoly power. Compared to the more 
conventional competitive version of the economic-surplus model, this will not only affect 
the overall size of the R&D benefits, but, more important, their distribution. In their study 
into the welfare effects of adopting Roundup Ready soybeans, Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky (1999) estimated that about 44% of the R&D benefits accrue to Monsanto, 
16% to farmers (but with a negative effect for non-adopting farmers), and 40% to 
consumers (nearly two-thirds of whom live in countries that have not adopted the 
technology). Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson (1999) used a similar approach in their 
study on the benefit distribution of the use of Bt technology in cotton in the US.23 They 
                                                     
23 Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) is the name of the bacteria from which a gene was taken and built into crops so 
that they are resistant to Roundup, Monsanto’s best-selling insecticide.  
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estimated that about half the benefits from Bt cotton accrue to Monsanto and related seed 
companies, 40% to farmers, and 10% to consumers. 
 
The other alternative is to look from the perspective of the user. The standard approach 
here is to explain the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) of an industry from its own 
R&D investments and from R&D investments by supplying industries, by industries that 
supply patents, or by industries that are close technologically. A selective list of ROR 
results from various studies using different approaches is presented in table 7.1. Including 
outside R&D in the ROR calculation of own R&D usually considerably reduces the ROR 
to own R&D. The ROR to external R&D could be interpreted as the “net” social ROR, 
i.e., the social rate minus the private rate to the innovator. Hence, the evidence suggests 
not only that the social rate exceeds the private rate by quite a margin (often more than 
double), but also that this margin differs significantly across industries and studies. 
Nevertheless, all these studies provide surprisingly consistent evidence for the existence 
of important technology spillovers (Griliches 1995). 
 
The various approaches to measuring the spillovers and spill-ins of R&D benefits give 
results that are not easily comparable because essential information is often lacking. For 
example, in order to translate the difference between social and private ROR into a 
benefit distribution, it is necessary to know the cost-benefit structure of the underlying 
R&D project(s). Similarly, the benefit distribution by Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 
(1999) and Falck-Zapeda, Traxler, and Nelson (1999) cannot be translated into private or 
social ROR because the actual R&D expenditure by Monsanto and the seed companies is 
unknown. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the distribution of R&D 
benefits between producer/innovator and user varies quite a bit across industries, and 
probably also over time and between different groups of users. 
 
Table 7.1 Selected estimates of returns to own and external R&D 
 
Type of study Author ROR to 
own R&D 
ROR to outside R&D 
Case studies Mansfield, et al. (1977) 25 56 
I-O weighted Terleckyj (1974) 29 78 
 Sveikauskas (1981) 10-23 50 
 Goto and Suzuki (1989) 26 80 
R&D weighted 
(patent flows) 
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) 46-69 11-62 
 Mohnen and Lepine (1988) 56 28 
Proximity Jaffe (1986)  30% of own R&D 
Cost functions Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989) 9-27 10-160 
 Bernstein and Nadiri (1991) 14-28 Median: 56% of own R&D 
Source: Adapted from Griliches (1995). 
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7.5 Conclusions 
 
Despite several decades of dedicated work by economists on ROR to (agricultural) R&D, 
the problems surrounding such studies are still huge. This chapter has provided an 
overview of the most common problems and issues in ROR studies. Three issues stand 
out in particular: 
 
(1) The choice between economic surplus, production function (primal or dual), or a 
non-parametric approach. The answer to this question is and probably will remain 
inconclusive as each of them has its own strengths and weaknesses. In the end, 
the choice depends on the context within which an analysis takes place and the 
other issues (besides economic impact) that are relevant. 
(2) The formal modeling of the link between increased productivity, or K-shift, and 
past R&D investments. Recent work by Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) has 
focused particularly on the lag structures that are usually assumed in ROR 
studies, as well as on the issue of knowledge stock depreciation. Some of their 
still somewhat experimental results suggest that lag structures are longer and 
more complex than usually assumed, resulting, in the case of the production 
function approach, in lower rates of return than hitherto estimated. 
(3) The importance of measuring and aggregating inputs and outputs correctly cannot 
be stressed enough, but in practice, one hardly ever accomplishes this 
satisfactorily. Particularly disturbing is the poor coverage of purchased inputs in 
most agricultural ROR studies, which creates a significant risk of attributing 
increases in productivity to own R&D rather than to the use of inputs and the 
underlying R&D activities in supplying industries. This seriously limits whatever 
progress is made in the formal modeling of the relationship between R&D and 
production, and reduces the confidence one can have in the measured impact of 
R&D. 
 
The fact that assessments of the impact of agricultural R&D are still surrounded by 
considerable uncertainty is a major handicap in convincing policymakers and taxpayers 
that public investment in agricultural R&D is really a profitable proposition and that 
more, rather than less, should be invested. The evidence may look impressive, but it is 
evidence that is not above all doubt. While the defenders of the underinvestment 
hypothesis share many of these concerns, they argue that the average ROR is so high that 
even after adjusting for the various uncertainties, the evidence will hold. In the next 
chapter, reported ROR results will be taken as they come but interpreted differently in a 
model that provides considerably more structure to the underinvestment hypothesis. 
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8. Modeling underinvestment in agricultural R&D 
 
An implicit assumption made in chapters 3 through 6, as well as in the agricultural R&D 
literature in general, is that there is widespread “underinvestment” in agricultural R&D 
and that any slowdown in the growth or, even worse, contraction of agricultural R&D 
expenditures is reason for serious concern. Moreover, such underinvestment is more 
critical in countries with low intensity ratios for agricultural R&D than in countries with 
high intensity ratios.1 
 
But what do we actually know about this underinvestment? How real is it? Is it higher in 
developing than in developed countries? Is it higher for some types of research than for 
others? And, how much more should have been invested in agricultural R&D? Studies on 
rates of return to (agricultural) R&D usually come up with rather high rates ex post, and 
the general conclusion is that it points to acute underinvestment in (agricultural) R&D. 
However, what matters is not the average of the rates of return ex post, but whether ex 
ante the expected rate of return (ERR) on the marginal R&D project is considerably 
higher than the social rate, or whatever other cutoff point is considered appropriate. This 
chapter aims to shed new light on the hypothesis of underinvestment in agricultural R&D 
by introducing in sections 8.1-8.4 a more solid analytical framework than has hitherto 
been used in the literature. After estimating how much more (or less) should have been 
spent on agricultural R&D, in section 8.5 we set out to see how the underinvestment gap 
could be explained. Perhaps, after all, decision makers behave more rationally than the 
proposed model would have us believe. Conclusions will be drawn in section 8.6. 
 
 
8.1 An economic model of the selection of R&D projects 
 
The ranked distribution of all possible R&D projects can be assumed to follow an 
exponential pattern, with the number of possible R&D projects increasing exponentially 
from high to low ERRs (figure 8.1).2 Under the assumption of rational economic behavior 
and full information, the selection of R&D projects for implementation starts with the 
project with the highest ERR and continues with the next highest until the R&D budget 
has been exhausted or the ERR on the last (i.e., marginal) R&D project approaches the 
                                                     
1 Fox (1985) provides a brief survey of early statements on the underinvestment hypothesis. In particular, 
Ruttan’s (1980) article “Bureaucratic Productivity: The Case of Agricultural Research” triggered some debate 
in the early 1980s. Although the debate was somewhat inconclusive, most leading agricultural economists 
support the underinvestment hypothesis. 
2 It is assumed that R&D projects are independent of each other. If they are not, they should be considered 
jointly. For example, when R&D projects target the same technical problem, only the project that has the 
highest ERR should enter the selection. However, when possible gains are high relative to the chance of R&D 
success, it may be worthwhile to select several R&D projects targeting the same problem simultaneously. In 
such an instance, the selected projects should be considered as a single joint R&D project.  
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social rate, whichever comes first.3 When the highest ERR in the ranking does not exceed 
the social rate, no R&D projects should be implemented at all. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: A ranked distribution of R&D projects 
 
In a situation of abundant funding (i.e., where every project with an ERR equal to or 
higher than the social cutoff rate will be financed), the peak or mode of the ranked project 
distribution can be expected to be at the social rate.4 In a tight funding situation, however, 
the downturn in research proposals takes place before the social rate is reached. 
Researchers expect only project proposals with a substantial margin above the social rate 
to be funded and adjust their behavior in regard to proposals accordingly. Moreover, 
selection committees and research managers will reinforce this behavior by only selecting 
the most promising R&D proposals. 
 
As also plotted in figure 8.1, the number of imaginable R&D projects is also assumed to 
increase steadily after the cutoff rate has been passed. Negative rates of return indicate 
that the expected costs of the R&D project exceed the expected benefits. 
 
Assume that the postulated distribution of R&D projects on an ERR scale can be thought 
of as taking the following semilog form: 
 
XeeY 10 ββ=  [8.1] 
 
                                                     
3 The focus here is on the marginal R&D project, not on the marginal dollar spent on a project. Moreover, the 
private rate of return rather than the social rate is of relevance when considering private R&D rather than public 
R&D. 
4 Private R&D of course uses a private cutoff rate.  
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where Y stands for the number of R&D projects and X for the ERR. The coefficient β1 has 
to be negative in order to get an asymptotic curve, as shown in figure 8.1. The closer the 
slope coefficient is to zero, the flatter the ranked distribution. 
 
The cumulative number of R&D projects can be estimated by the following integral: 
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where Yr stands for the number of R&D projects with a rate of return of r and higher. A 
simpler notation for the cumulative version of the ranked distribution is: 
 
XeeY 10* ββ
∗
=  [8.3] 
 
where *Y stands for the cumulative number of R&D projects at a certain value of X (the 
ERR). The slope coefficient β1 is the same for both the cumulated (equation 8.3) and the 
non-cumulated (equation 8.1) version of the ranked distribution – only the constant β0 
differs. 
 
The relative under- or overinvestment in (agricultural) R&D as a percentage of the 
original investment level can be estimated as follows: 
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where s is the social rate and r the implicit cutoff rate and where ∆X represents the 
difference between r and s. 
 
Based on this simple, stylized model, underinvestment in R&D can be captured in the 
following two propositions: 
 
(1) Assuming full information and a strict economic selection of R&D projects, 
under-investment in R&D manifests itself in a cutoff rate that is higher than the 
social or private rate. 
 
(2) The size of the R&D underinvestment gap depends on three variables: (a) the 
relevant social or private rate, (b) the actual cutoff rate, and (c) the slope of the 
ranked distribution curve. 
 
144 
 
To answer the question of whether there is underinvestment in R&D or not and, if so, 
how much, variables b and c need to be estimated and a set. 
 
8.1.1 Selecting the relevant social or private rate 
 
Underinvestment is a relative notion, so it is important to determine up-front the bench-
mark against which one wants to compare the actual level of investment. The relevant 
benchmark for private investments in R&D is the minimum private rate of return that a 
company has set for itself across all its activities. Such rates are usually in the range of 
15%–20% real (that is adjusted for inflation) before taxes for companies in developed 
countries. 
 
For public agricultural R&D investment, it is not the private rate but the social rate that is 
the relevant benchmark. By applying the same social rate across all government activities, 
governments try to identify those activities where underinvestment is most severe and 
where an additional dollar of investment will create the highest social pay-off. 
 
Disagreements among economists and policymakers on the right conceptual basis for the 
social rate as well as on the selected value are quite prevalent. In the literature, various 
definitions of the social rate as well as guidelines on how the rate should be approximated 
can be found. For our purposes, the choice amounts to the following two definitions of 
the social rate: (1) the opportunity cost of capital and (2) the social time preference rate, 
which is the rate at which society is willing to trade present for future consumption. 
 
The first definition is the most widely adopted and is used, for example, by the US 
Federal Government and the World Bank. According to the Revised Circular No. A-94 
issued by the Office of Management and Budget of the White House in October 1992, the 
real discount rate to be used to evaluate US Federal Government programs is 7%. The 
document states that this rate approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an 
average investment in the private sector in recent years. A comparable rate for developing 
countries is believed to be somewhere between 8% and 15% in real terms (Gittinger 
1982). A common choice, also adopted by the World Bank, is 12%. 
 
Zerbe and Devily (1994), however, make a strong and convincing plea for adopting the 
social time-preference rate definition and base the social rate on the after-tax, real rate of 
return on government bonds of the same length as the project in question. For the USA, 
these adjusted bond rates fluctuated between 2.5%–5.0% during the 1980s and early 
1990s, with the ones close to 5% coming closest to the average length of an agricultural 
R&D project.5 While statistics on the government bond market are readily available for 
developed countries, this is not the case in most developing countries. Often such markets 
                                                     
5 Zerbe and Devily (1994) extensively discuss the problem of displacement of private capital but show that in 
most instances, this issue can be neglected or, if necessary, the borderline cases can be identified by a 10% 
adjustment in costs. It is only when government agencies are in direct competition with the private sector that 
the private-sector rate should be applied to both proposals. 
145 
 
are nonexistent or rather thin and volatile, and statistics are unavailable. An attempt to 
replicate Zerbe and Devily’s estimate of the social rate for developing countries was not 
possible because of the lack of data; hence, the decision to fall back on the more 
traditional opportunity-cost-of-capital definition of the social rate and adopt 7% and 12% 
as the relevant social rates for developed and developing countries, respectively. These 
rates are probably also closer to political than economic reality. Nevertheless, one should 
keep in mind that there are good theoretical grounds to believe that the “economic” social 
rates are somewhat lower and that the underinvestment gaps may therefore be somewhat 
underestimated. 
 
It is sometimes argued that the social rate should be topped up with a risk premium in 
order to capture the fact that agricultural R&D is a significantly riskier activity than the 
average government project. The White House circular, however, argues that any notion 
of risk specific to a project should be included in the ERR calculation rather than in the 
social rate. 
 
8.1.2 Estimating the implicit cutoff rate 
 
In the real world, most selection committees do not rank R&D projects on the basis of 
ERRs, nor do they have a concrete idea about the cutoff rate that they implicitly apply. 
However, the selection criteria actually used tend to underpin some kind of economic 
rationale. Since the selection is less than economically optimal, a number of R&D 
projects with ERRs less than the “optimal” cutoff rate will be selected at the expense of 
R&D projects with an ERR equal to or above the “optimal” cutoff rate. This results in an 
ex ante ranked distribution of R&D projects that takes the form of a bell-shaped 
distribution, although lopsided to the left (figure 8.2).6 
 
Within reasonable limits, however, the assumption can be made that the modes of the 
optimal and suboptimal distributions more or less coincide. At first, this may seem a 
rather bold assumption, but the opposite assumption, namely that the two modes 
significantly differ, is considerably more unlikely. It all hinges on the selection procedure. 
When the selection is weak (i.e., deviating strongly, but not completely, from rational 
economic behavior), the mode of the suboptimal selection may be found to the right of 
the mode of the optimal selection. This requires a large number of R&D projects with 
ERRs at or higher than the cutoff rate not to be selected, while those with lower ERRs 
are. The latter results in a relatively long left-hand tail in the distribution. Although some 
suboptimality in the selection procedure is unavoidable because of imperfect information, 
etc., one wants to avoid mixing up an inefficient selection procedure with under-
investment in agricultural R&D (i.e., a high cutoff rate). The relevant parameters of the 
distribution for checking for exceptional selection inefficiency are (a) the percentage of 
R&D projects with a rate lower than the mode of the distribution (the higher the 
percentage, the more imperfect the selection procedure) and (b) the position of the 
                                                     
6 For the distribution to be lopsided to the left, the median of the distribution should be smaller than the mean. 
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median of the distribution (which should always be lower than the mean and preferably 
higher than the mode). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Optimal versus suboptimal selection of R&D projects 
 
It is difficult to say at which level of selection inefficiency the assumption that the 
optimal and suboptimal modes fall together breaks down. And, what can be done to 
estimate the optimal mode, knowing only the suboptimal one. For now, it is assumed that 
with a moderate level of selection inefficiency, the two modes roughly fall together. 
 
If the following hypothetical selection procedure is used, it is possible that the mode of 
the suboptimal selection could be found lower than the mode of the optimal selection. 
The selection committee makes a pre-selection of all R&D projects with an ERR above a 
certain cutoff rate that is lower than the “optimal” cutoff rate and subsequently funds 
projects at random until the R&D budget is used up. The mode of this suboptimal 
distribution will fall together with the cutoff rate used in the first step of the selection 
procedure. Although perhaps a plausible characterization of some selection procedures, 
its flaw lies in the fact that it assumes that information about the ERR of R&D projects is 
used in the first step of the selection procedure, but not in the second step. This is a rather 
implausible assumption. The importance of the first step in this hypothetical selection 
procedure is that without it, selected “suboptimal” R&D projects would spread out 
(creating a left-hand tail) rather than concentrating and creating a mode in the 
distribution. All in all, the chance of finding, ex ante, a suboptimal mode that is lower 
than the optimal mode seems unlikely. 
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The next step is to link the ex ante distribution with the ex post distribution. The two 
should be roughly identical if the following assumptions hold: (1) the differences between 
expected and actual rates of return of R&D projects are only stochastic and not systematic 
and (2) the outcome distributions of the ERRs are more or less symmetric. This latter 
assumption clearly does not hold when the success of an R&D project is considered 
discrete – it is either a full success or a complete failure. Although a common metaphor, it 
is more realistic to assume that the success of R&D (especially biological R&D) is 
relative rather than discrete and, hence, creates a continuous statistical distribution. Given 
the various parameters that enter an ERR calculation, each with its own probability 
distribution, the overall probability distribution of the ERR of an R&D project or program 
cannot be calculated easily. This is particularly true when the relationship between 
parameters and benefits is nonlinear. In such an instance, a Monte Carlo simulation can 
be used to estimate measures of the central tendency (e.g., mean or mode) and dispersion 
(e.g., variance and coefficient of variation) of the outcome distribution (Sprow 1967). To 
our knowledge, only a few studies (Greig 1979; Anderson 1991) have actually used this 
approach in an agricultural R&D setting. They reported probability distributions that were 
only slightly skewed. 
 
Based on a rather strict, neoclassic interpretation of the R&D priority-setting process (i.e., 
that R&D investments are based on full information about profit opportunities and 
rational priority setting), the following proposition is suggested: 
 
(3) Assuming that the evaluated R&D projects are selected at random and their ex 
post rates of return differ only stochastically and not systematically from the 
expected rates of return, the mode of the ex post distribution of R&D projects 
conveys some rough indication of the implicit cutoff rate used in the ex ante 
optimal selection procedure. 
 
8.1.3 Estimating the slope coefficient 
 
The distance between the social rate and the implicit cutoff rate is not the only parameter 
that determines the magnitude of the underinvestment gap. The slope of the ex ante 
ranked distribution is also needed to estimate the optimal R&D budget by which all R&D 
projects with an ERR at or above the social or private rate are funded. Some strict 
assumptions have to be made in order to distill this information from the ex post rate-of-
return results. Figure 8.3 sketches the problem that needs to be tackled. 
 
Due to suboptimal selection, some of the projects with an ERR higher than the cutoff rate 
are not selected, while projects with an ERR lower than the cutoff rate are. It is assumed 
that all projects cost the same. If the selection were optimal, only R&D projects at or 
above the cutoff rate would have been selected. In order to reconstruct the ex ante optimal 
distribution, the right-hand side of the distribution has to be topped up with the number of 
R&D projects below the cutoff rate. 
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Figure 8.3: Reconstruction of the optimal selection of R&D projects 
 
Of the various options available, distributing the suboptimal R&D projects proportionally 
seems to give a reasonable approximation and has the practical advantage that the 
adjusted and unadjusted right-hand side of the distribution has the same slope coefficient. 
However, a proportional distribution implies that the chance of not being selected is the 
same for all R&D projects above the cutoff rate. A more realistic assumption is that R&D 
projects close to the cutoff rate have a higher chance of not being selected than projects 
with higher ERRs. Such a differential in chance would lead to a steeper optimal slope 
and, hence, a bigger underinvestment gap. However, we lack empirical evidence on this 
chance distribution and have therefore adopted the second-best solution, namely, 
assuming equal chance and proportional distribution. Hence, the following proposition: 
 
(4) The slope of the right-hand side of the ex post distribution of R&D projects is a 
reasonable but somewhat lower estimate of the slope of the optimal ex ante 
distribution. 
 
 
8.2 Empirical evidence 
 
The (average) high rate-of-return results have been used frequently in the agricultural 
economics literature as an indication of underinvestment in agricultural R&D. The 
argument made here is that the mode of the ex post rate-of-return results provides 
substantially more information about relative underinvestment in agricultural R&D than 
the mean. Hence, it is necessary to give a new interpretation to the rate-of-return results, 
which have been compiled by several authors in the past (Evenson, Waggoner, and 
Ruttan 1979; Echeverría 1990; Alston and Pardey 1996). 
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The most recent compilation of rates of return to agricultural R&D has been published by 
IFPRI (Alston et al. 2000). The focus of the IFPRI study, which is a meta-analysis of 
more than 1800 agricultural R&D rate-of-return calculations, is to understand differences 
in rate-of-return results due to differences in methods, research focus, location, time, etc. 
For the purposes of the current study, however, a large number of the rate-of-return 
observations had to be eliminated, as they are not comparable. For example, all nominal 
(rather than real) rates of return were eliminated, as well as all rates of return pertaining to 
“all agricultural R&D,” “crop & livestock R&D,” or “all crop R&D.” Such R&D 
programs are far too aggregate to provide meaningful information about the marginal 
R&D project.7 Even after this correction, the set of rate-of-return results is still somewhat 
biased towards research programs rather than discrete research projects. The latter would 
be preferred in order to get as close a correspondence with the ex ante choice situation as 
possible. 
 
Most rate-of-return studies provide multiple rates for the same R&D project or program, 
depending on the assumptions made, such as the time lag between R&D investment and 
impact. Rather than having four or five, or sometimes even 20, different rates for the 
same R&D project or program, the analysis proposed here requires only one observation 
per project or program, so multiple observations had to be reduced to only one. Since 
there is not yet a solid theoretical basis for preferring one method above the other, an 
average was calculated for each research project.8 All in all, the more than 1800 
observations in the IFPRI study boiled down to only 201 useful rate-of-return 
observations, of which 78 pertain to developed countries (mainly the USA) and 123 to 
developing countries.9 It is assumed that these 201 rate-of-return observations represent a 
reasonable sample of all the agricultural R&D projects that have been undertaken 
worldwide. Although R&D projects with low or negative rates of return are 
underrepresented in the sample, this has fairly little effect on the two parameters that we 
want to estimate (the implicit cutoff rate and the slope coefficient) because, as will be 
documented below, the modes of the rate-of-return distributions stay far away from low 
or negative rates. Each observation is given the same weight, which implies that each 
R&D project is assumed to have cost the same. 
 
Figure 8.4 plots the distribution of ex post rates of return for both developed and 
developing countries. As can be seen, the mode for developed countries (estimated at a 
rate of return of 20%) stands out more clearly than that for developing countries 
(estimated at a rate of return of 40%). Apparently, the assumption that the selection of 
R&D projects took place under more or less the same budget constraints (i.e., the same 
cutoff rate) and with more or less similar innovation opportunities holds less well for the 
                                                     
7 The ranked distribution of the aggregate studies has a higher mode and a lower standard deviation than the 
ranked distribution of the more specific R&D programs and projects. 
8 Alston et al. (2000) discuss in great detail the large variety of methods for calculating rates of return and 
provide some quantitative insight into how rate-of-return results can be affected by the choice of method. 
However, they do not provide a conclusive recommendation about which method should be preferred. 
9 Other observations that were eliminated are (a) observations that are not discrete, (b) private rates of return, 
and (c) rates pertaining to extension only. 
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developing countries as a group. This is confirmed by the quite different region-specific 
distributions and modes as reported in tables 8.1 to 8.3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Ranked distribution of ex post rate-of-return results 
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Table 8.1 provides more detailed and differentiated information about the characteristics 
of the distributions. The differentiation between developing regions is somewhat 
speculative because of the rather small number of observations. Still, the distributions 
follow the expected pattern quite well. In all cases, the ranked distribution is lopsided to 
the left with a median lower than the mean, and an estimated mode lower than the 
median. The share of observations lower than the estimated mode ranges between 20% 
and 40%. When the distribution is perfectly representative (which unfortunately is not the 
case), this share would give an objective indication of selection performance. 
 
Table 8.1: Rates of return by geographical region and time period 
 
Rate of return  
 
Number 
of 
estimates 
Estimated 
mode Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
% obs. < 
mode 
 (count) (percentage) 
Developed countries  78 20.0 38.8 65.8 119.7 23.1 
Developing countries  123 40.0 50.0 58.9 37.9 31.7 
 Africa 25 30.0 36.1 46.4 27.2 20.0 
 Asia and Pacific 38 45.0 56.2 77.1 51.7 21.1 
 Latin America and Caribbean 56 40.0 47.9 51.9 26.7 36.4 
       
Developed countries, 1985 ≤ 31 20.0 41.3 79.6 152.6 22.6 
Developed countries, >1985 47 20.0 34.0 56.7 92.6 23.4 
       
Developing countries, 1985 ≤ 33 40.0 47.8 55.3 32.3 39.4 
Developing countries, >1985 90 40.0 51.4 60.3 39.9 28.9 
Note: The grouping per time period is based on the publication date of the information. 
 
The current sample includes a few very high rates of return (the highest is 855%), which 
causes rather high standard deviations for some distributions, and means that are biased 
upwards. Although one does not want to exclude very high rates of return a priori 
(although some healthy skepticism is warranted), statistically one expects them to be rare. 
However, the rate-of-return sample may not only have a blind spot for failed R&D 
projects, it may be biased toward the extreme success cases. Very successful R&D 
projects have a higher chance of being selected for an ex post evaluation than the average 
R&D project. 
 
To estimate the underinvestment gap, it is not only relevant to know the implicit cutoff 
rate and the social rate, but also the slope coefficient β1. The approach taken here is to 
estimate β1 by regressing the rate-of-return observations on the right-hand side (those 
above the cutoff rate) of the ex post cumulated ranked distribution. Rates of return higher 
than 100% were excluded in order to eliminate their distorting effect on the estimation of 
the slope coefficient. As shown in table 8.2, this leads to a substantially better statistical 
fit of the exponential curve. 
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Table 8.2: Regression results for estimating slope coefficient β1 
 
 n β0 t-statistic β1 t-statistic R2 
Developed countries – cutoff rate 20%       
All rates of return ≥ 20%  58 3.5859 43.45 -0.0054 -10.19 0.642 
All rates of return ≥ 20% and ≤ 100% 51 4.6193 242.54 -0.0257 -66.68 0.989 
       
All rates of return ≥ 15% and ≤ 100% 60 4.6340 315.62 -0.0259 -81.51 0.991 
All rates of return ≥ 25% and ≤ 100% 43 4.6525 176.98 -0.0262 -53.38 0.986 
       
All rates of return ≥ 20% and ≤ 100%, ≤1985 19 3.7143 51.51 -0.0242 -15.98 0.938 
All rates of return ≥ 20% and ≤ 100%, >1985 32 4.1117 188.13 -0.0264 -61.08 0.992 
       
Developing countries – cutoff rate 40%       
All rates of return ≥ 40% 84 5.1689 81.98 -0.0233 -30.34 0.918 
All rates of return ≥ 40% and ≤ 100% 71 5.6659 264.60 -0.0308 -90.71 0.992 
       
All rates of return ≥ 30% and ≤ 100% 92 5.6091 377.08 -0.0300 -116.53 0.993 
All rates of return ≥ 50% and ≤ 100% 51 5.5628 196.02 -0.0295 -71.42 0.991 
       
All rates of return ≥ 40% and ≤ 100%, ≤1985 18 4.3305 52.27 -0.0313 -25.20 0.975 
All rates of return ≥ 40% and ≤ 100%, >1985 53 5.3658 176.03 -0.0305 -61.74 0.987 
       
Africa: all rates of return ≥ 30% and ≤ 100% 16 3.9918 52.87 -0.0349 -23.34 0.971 
Asia: all rates of return ≥ 45% and ≤ 100% 21 3.9940 62.36 -0.0162 -17.09 0.939 
Latin America: all rates of return ≥ 40% and ≤ 
100% 33 5.4419 80.66 -0.0442 -40.73 0.982 
 
Varying the implicit cutoff rate with five percentage points for the developed countries 
and 10 percentage points for the developing countries affects the slope coefficients only 
marginally. Splitting the data sets into two time periods (before and after 1985) did not 
yield radically different slope coefficients either, nor did it suggest a notable change in 
the cutoff rate over time. However, the breakdown of developing countries by region led 
to a differentiation in implicit cutoff rates as well as slope coefficients. Given the 
relatively small number of observations, these latter results are statistically not very 
robust. Nevertheless, it partially explains why we did not find a very clear mode for the 
developing countries as a group. 
 
To summarize, the estimated slope coefficients are a reasonable approximation of the 
slope coefficient of the ex ante optimal distribution of R&D projects if the following 
assumptions more or less hold: 
 
(a) The semilog function is a good approximation of the ranked distribution of R&D 
projects. 
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(b) The ex ante selection of R&D projects has not been optimal, but is sufficiently 
vigorous economically. 
(c) The chance not to be selected is equal for all R&D projects with an ERR above 
the implicit cutoff rate. 
(d) Differences in the ex ante and ex post rates of return are merely stochastic and 
not systematic. 
(e) The stochastic variation has a normal distribution. 
(f) The sample of ex post rates of return is only biased at the extreme ends. 
(g) The R&D projects in the sample are of equal size. 
 
With estimates for the implicit cutoff rates as well as the slope coefficients and the social 
rate set at 7% for developed countries and 12% for developing countries, the 
underinvestment gaps can now be calculated using equation 8.4. The results of these 
calculations are presented in table 8.3 and indicate a considerably larger underinvestment 
gap for developing countries (137%) than for developed countries (40%). Differentiating 
the sample in studies from before and after 1985 hardly affects these results. Given the 
very approximate nature of the identified mode, extreme values for the mode were 
adopted, which resulted in lower and upper bounds of the underinvestment gap. Not 
surprisingly, the underinvestment gap is quite sensitive to the estimation of the mode. 
Grouping the rates of return of developing countries by region yields quite a bit of 
variation in both the cutoff rate and the slope coefficient and suggests that under-
investment in agricultural R&D has been particularly high in Latin America. 
 
Table 8.3: Estimations of the underinvestment gap  
 
 
 
Cutoff rate 
Slope coefficient  
β1 
Underinvestment  
gap 
Developed countries (social rate 7%)    
Baseline 20% -0.0257 39.7% 
Rates of return before 1986  20% -0.0242 37.0% 
Rates of return after 1985  20% -0.0264 41.0% 
5% points lower cutoff rate 15% -0.0259 23.1% 
5% points higher cutoff rate 25% -0.0262 60.4% 
    
Developing countries (social rate 12%)    
Baseline 40% -0.0308 136.9% 
Rates of return before 1986  40% -0.0313 139.9% 
Rates of return after 1985  40% -0.0305 134.8% 
10% points lower cutoff rate 30% -0.0300 71.6% 
10% points higher cutoff rate 50% -0.0295 206.3% 
Africa 30% -0.0349 87.3% 
Asia 45% -0.0162 70.3% 
Latin America 40% -0.0442 244.5% 
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Adopting a social-time-preference definition as the basis for the social rate would lower 
the social rates by roughly two percentage points, i.e., from 7% to 5% and from 12% to 
10%. This would increase the underinvestment gap for developed countries to 47% and 
for developing countries to 152%. 
 
While there is considerable room for improvement in the statistical data used in the 
present analysis (both in coverage as well as the quality of the rate-of-return methods 
used), the ranked distribution model cuts quite nicely through what looked like a Gordian 
knot. It shows that the high means of the rate-of-return distributions as such are no 
evidence of underinvestment in agricultural R&D, nor are they indicative of the size of 
the underinvestment gap. The modes of the rate-of-return distributions are a substantially 
better indicator of underinvestment. 
 
What is important to grasp is that under- or overinvestment in agricultural R&D is always 
relative to the portfolio of profitable innovation opportunities available and, hence, the 
importance of reconstructing the ex ante, ranked distribution of R&D projects. This is in 
essence what priority-setting methods also try to do. Even with relatively simple priority-
setting tools, such as scoring methods, it is possible to identify quite adequately the R&D 
projects with very low or high rates of return. The real problem, however, lies close to the 
cutoff rate, where one can expect to find the majority of R&D projects and where rate-of-
return differences between R&D projects are relatively small. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the relative ranking of R&D projects, the advantage of a more sophisticated 
(and costly) economic-surplus method in priority setting is less clear than sometimes 
suggested. Reducing the issue of choice to those R&D projects close to the cutoff rate, the 
gains from a better ranking method is relatively modest. However, the economic-surplus 
approach has, in a different way, a clear advantage over scoring methods because it 
reveals ERR values. This is, as has been shown above, important information to judge 
whether there is under- or overinvestment in agricultural R&D. A scoring method only 
provides a relative ranking.10 
 
Innovation needs should not be mistaken for innovation opportunities. Particularly in 
poor countries, innovation opportunities are far more limited than innovation needs. This 
is certainly unfortunate, but it is counterproductive to push for investment levels in 
agricultural R&D that would lead to funding R&D projects with very low or negative 
ERRs. In such instances, the emphasis should be placed on creating a better environment 
for innovations to prosper. This will enhance the portfolio of profitable R&D projects 
and, hence, pull more investment into R&D. In the next section, the focus is on the 
determinants of the ranked distribution of R&D projects and what the possible 
intervention points to increase the portfolio of profitable R&D projects could be. 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 The highest-ranking R&D project may still have an ERR that is lower than the social rate and therefore 
should not be implemented, nor should any of the projects that rank below it.  
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8.3 The position of the distribution of R&D projects on the ERR scale 
 
Our model of the selection of R&D projects suggests that the optimal level of investment 
in R&D depends on the position of the distribution of possible R&D projects on the ERR 
scale. 
 
Differences in R&D intensity are quite large across countries, industries, companies, and 
over time. We want to understand why. Therefore, in this section, an attempt will be 
made to present and analyze the most likely underlying factors that shape the economic 
ranking of R&D projects and, hence, the relative position of the R&D portfolio on the 
ERR scale. 
 
8.3.1 Possible factors shaping the R&D portfolio 
 
The position of the portfolio of possible R&D projects on the ERR scale can be thought 
of as depending on the following six interacting factors: (a) technology, (b) scale, (c) the 
structure of the industry, (d) R&D efficiency and effectiveness, (e) adoption rate, and (f) 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
The technical ranked distribution of all imaginable R&D projects is based only on the 
technical merits of the imagined innovations relative to the technology (and economic 
structure) in place and can be expressed in terms of a reduction in production cost per unit 
output. This technical ranked distribution is then multiplied with innovation-specific scale 
factors reflecting market potential or, in the case of public R&D, reflecting potential 
social impact.11 This may change the original technical ranking quite substantially – 
promising technical improvements can turn out to have very low or negative ERRs 
because their potential use is limited, while small insignificant technical improvements 
can turn out to have high ERRs because of their wide application. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the S&T literature frequently makes a distinction between 
major technological breakthroughs and small cumulative improvements. Major break-
throughs, such as a shift in the scientific frontier (Dosi 1982) or the introduction of a new 
design configuration (Metcalfe 1995), open up new R&D opportunities. Assuming that 
such new opportunities become available all at once, this would result in a new and very 
promising portfolio of possible R&D projects (i.e., reaching far to the right). Due to 
limited R&D capacity, however, not all R&D projects can be implemented at once. 
Instead, R&D projects are implemented over time, starting with the most promising ones 
first. As a result, the portfolio of possible R&D projects retracts to the left over time and 
the average of the rates of return declines steadily until the next major breakthrough. 
 
A more realistic description is that only a small part of the R&D opportunities are 
immediately clear or sufficiently profitable at the time of the scientific breakthrough or 
the introduction of a new design configuration. Technological innovation is more an 
                                                     
11 This difference in focus also leads to different ERRs – the first is private, the second is social.  
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incremental, cumulative, and path-dependent process, so R&D opportunities only open up 
gradually, resulting in a relatively stable R&D portfolio through time. Although major 
breakthroughs constitute a necessary condition for opening up new R&D opportunities, 
the rate at which these new opportunities open up may depend on quite different factors. 
Biotechnology, for example, is a scientific breakthrough that has created a wealth of new 
opportunities, most of which are still on hold, waiting for research costs to come down 
and uncertainties around safety and consumer acceptance to be resolved. 
 
The structure of an industry also plays an important role in shaping the portfolio of 
possible R&D projects. A monopolist, for example, can be assumed to capture the whole 
potential market and, hence, appropriate all potential R&D benefits, while a small firm in 
a very fragmented market can only expect to capture a fraction of the market and the 
potential R&D benefits. In the latter case, the private incentive to invest in R&D will be 
quite small, leading to market failure in the provision of new technology. Patent rights 
may overcome this latter problem to some extent as they grant the inventor exclusive use 
of the technology for a restricted period of time (usually 15-20 years) on the condition 
that the technical details of the innovation are made public. This can help to avoid future 
duplication of R&D efforts, which is another disadvantage of very fragmented and 
competitive industries. In a monopolistic situation, however, the duplication of R&D 
effort is close to zero, while the potential portfolio of profitable R&D projects is the 
largest because of scale advantages. Nevertheless, a monopoly may not lead to the 
technologically most dynamic situation, as the competitive incentives to exploit potential 
opportunities for innovation are weak. Therefore, in the S&T literature, an industry with 
oligopolistic tendencies is considered to be the most conducive to technological 
innovation (Cohen 1995). 
 
Primary agriculture is a classic example of a very fragmented industry where market 
failure prevails when it comes to generating new technology. The benefits individual 
farmers can appropriate from an invention are far too small to constitute much of an 
incentive to invest substantial sums in their own R&D. Joint action or government 
intervention is needed to overcome this market failure. Organizing and planning 
agricultural R&D as if the agricultural sector were just one big national farm brings 
important scale advantages to the provision of agricultural technology in the form of a far 
larger portfolio of profitable R&D projects. At the same time, duplication of R&D efforts 
can be minimized, at least nationally. However, whether this potential is actually 
exploited depends also on the competitive incentives (the monopolist dilemma) and the 
organizational capacity of governments or farmer and industry groups to do so. One could 
argue that autarkic economic policies provide fewer incentives to governments or farmer 
and industry groups to fully exploit innovation opportunities in agriculture than the open-
trade policies advocated in more recent years. 
 
R&D efficiency and effectiveness determine the ultimate costs and success of the R&D 
activity undertaken. These two performance indicators are assumed to affect all R&D 
projects within the same organization equally. They differ between R&D organizations, 
but more importantly between countries. Weak R&D performance usually reflects weak 
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organizational capability in a society in general. Idachaba (1998), for example, 
documented how the late and very erratic release of government funding places a major 
constraint on the performance of agricultural research organizations in Nigeria. Over-
staffing is another phenomenon that often negatively affects the performance of agri-
cultural research organizations in developing countries (Pardey, Roseboom, Beintema, 
and Chan-Kang 1998). After all salaries have been paid, hardly any budget is left for 
operating expenses or capital investments. 
 
Because of incomplete or slow adoption, not all potential benefits of an innovation may 
materialize. For example, a new maize variety could potentially be grown by 70% of the 
farmers, but past adoption rates indicate that only half of them will actually grow it. 
Hence, the technical ranked distribution of R&D projects must not only be corrected for 
scale, structure, and R&D efficiency and effectiveness, but also by a factor that reflects 
the adoption rate of the proposed innovation. Low adoption rates can be thought of as 
being caused by weak institutions and high transaction costs – problems that are 
particularly prevalent in developing countries. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, crucial to the adoption of new technology is how information 
about the new technology is packaged and transferred to farmers and how farmers assess 
the new technology in their own specific situation. Farmers may know about the new 
technology and be convinced about its superiority, but they may face other constraints, 
such as lack of capital or credit, lack of required inputs at the place and time needed, land 
tenure issues, and seasonal labor shortages, to name just a few, as listed by Pinstrup-
Andersen (1982). Government policies targeting these constraints play an important role 
in improving rates of adoption and, hence, shifting the distribution of R&D projects to the 
right on the ERR scale. 
 
The distinction between lack of scale and non-adoption can at times be difficult to 
establish. In the example given above, researchers could argue that the new variety is of 
relevance to only 35% of the farmers. In that instance, the scale factor subsumes the 
adoption factor. It is important, however, to keep the two factors separate as they may 
require different policy measures. 
 
Being an inherently risky and uncertain activity, research is at odds with the risk-averse 
nature of humanity. Hence, private individuals and companies will, depending on how 
averse to risk they are, shy away from risky R&D projects and discount for statistical 
variance of the ERR when ranking R&D projects. A suggestion made by Freeman and 
Soete (1999) is that high ERRs are usually associated with high risks (i.e., higher 
variance). Therefore, risk-aversion effectively biases private R&D to the less uncertain, 
but usually also less rewarding, R&D projects. The risk-averse version of the ranked 
distribution of R&D projects can be thought of as positioned lower on the ERR scale than 
the risk-neutral version. This creates a divergence between the ex ante and ex post rate-
of-return distributions, as the latter will more or less coincide with the risk-neutral 
version. 
 
158 
 
An alternative option for private companies is to think in terms of an R&D portfolio 
rather than separate R&D projects and to pool some of the risks. A few very promising 
and risky projects are selected in combination with a large number of less promising, but 
also less risky, projects. Pursuing a diversified R&D portfolio spreads the overall risk, 
and the larger the R&D portfolio, the more risk and uncertainty can be spread. Taken a 
step further, Arrow and Lindner (1970, 1972) argued that in a typical public-investment 
situation, governments could safely ignore risk as long as the investment is small relative 
to national income. Given that this is true for most public agricultural R&D projects, risk 
aversion should not play much of a role in the selection of public agricultural R&D 
projects or programs (Anderson 1991). In other words, public agricultural R&D projects 
or programs with the same ERR, but with one being riskier than the other (reflected by a 
higher statistical variance), should be treated the same. The weighted chance of a lower 
outcome is compensated by the weighted chance of a higher outcome. This does not mean 
that risk and uncertainty can be ignored altogether for public agricultural R&D. As shown 
by Anderson (1991), risk may play a role in accurately determining the mean project 
performance or ERR. The ERR obtained from taking every parameter at its most likely 
value will differ from the ERR derived from a Monte Carlo simulation if the distributions 
are asymmetric and the relationship between parameters and benefits are nonlinear 
(Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). 
 
In theory, administrators of public research should be indifferent to risk and uncertainty 
when selecting R&D projects. Given the very limited use of probabilistic cost-benefit 
approaches in R&D selection processes, one would expect this to be true in practice, too. 
However, as Greig (1981) pointed out, public research administrators may very well be 
risk-averse and prefer a less profitable but also less risky R&D portfolio, so that demands 
for accountability can be answered by at least some positive results. Hence, even in the 
public-sector case, an R&D project with a high ERR but wide variance may be 
discriminated against in practice. 
 
Risk and uncertainty are not static and may decline over time. R&D proposals that 
initially are turned down as being too risky may be selected at a later stage when critical 
variables can be predicted more accurately. For example, experience in a certain research 
field may increase the confidence in research effectiveness over time. 
 
8.3.2 Policies that could improve the portfolio of possible R&D projects 
 
The six underlying factors presented in the previous section are not necessarily 
exhaustive. Other factors may play a role as well. Moreover, the relative importance of 
each of the six factors differs across research fields. Market structure, for example, can be 
safely ignored when considering public (agricultural) R&D.12 For other fields of research, 
however, this may constitute a highly relevant factor that affects the ERR of R&D 
projects and, hence, shapes the available R&D opportunities. Understanding which 
                                                     
12 This does not mean that market structure is of no relevance when prioritizing agricultural R&D projects, 
but that research managers of public agricultural R&D can effectively assume that they hold a monopoly.  
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factors are the most critical is important when considering policies that could shift the 
portfolio of possible R&D projects higher up on the ERR scale. 
 
Table 8.4 summarizes some of the government policies that could affect each of the six 
factors positively. Several of these policies are far broader than just R&D policy. These 
policies condition the extent to which R&D can contribute to the overall economy. In 
developing countries in particular, the profitability of R&D projects is (often severely) 
constrained by structural and institutional factors, such as infrastructure, education, and 
incomplete markets. One of the most constraining factors, however, is that of political 
instability – it disproportionately affects investments with a long time horizon, like R&D. 
 
Table 8.4: Policies that could affect R&D opportunities positively 
 
Factors affecting the  
ranked distribution 
Policies that could affect the position of the ranked distribution 
positively 
Technology Investment in basic science, training of researchers, improved access 
to knowledge  
Scale Legislative and financial support for joint R&D activities in 
fragmented industries; supranational cooperation  
Structure of the 
innovating industry 
Effective anti-trust legislation to avoid monopolistic situations and 
patent legislation to provide incentives for private investment in R&D 
R&D efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Developing capacity to train researchers, improve management and 
organization of government research organizations 
Adoption rate and speed Markets, infrastructure, credit, education, etc. 
Risk and uncertainty Political stability; clear policies on IPR, ethical standards, and other 
regulatory measures 
 
R&D can also be self-enforcing in the sense that past R&D results and experiences may 
have a positive influence on (some of) the underlying factors that shape the portfolio of 
possible R&D projects today. For example, becoming more experienced in conducting 
R&D increases the efficiency and effectiveness of R&D over time, and technology 
adoption may become easier once consumers and markets have become accustomed to 
rapid technical change. Risk and uncertainty may also be reduced by past R&D results. 
 
The ranking of industries by R&D intensity stands out as rather stable in cross-country 
comparisons among developed countries (Freeman and Soete 1999). Despite substantially 
lower levels of investment in R&D in general, industries in developing countries also 
comply to roughly the same ranking (Roseboom 1999). So, across all countries, food-
processing industries have relatively low R&D intensities and pharmaceutical industries 
have relatively high ones. This finding could be explained by assuming that some of the 
underlying factors are more industry-specific, such as technology and industry structure, 
while other factors are more country-specific, such as scale, R&D efficiency and 
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effectiveness, and technology adoption. Risk and uncertainty could fit in either category. 
Hence, explanations for differences in agricultural R&D intensities across countries 
should be sought among the more country-specific factors. 
 
This characterization of the ranked distribution of R&D projects provides a rough outline 
of the factors that shape the portfolio of innovation opportunities. Depending on the 
specific industry and country, a further detailing of these factors should provide a better 
understanding of the innovation opportunities within reach and also what could be done 
to enhance them. 
 
 
8.4 The R&D opportunity curve 
 
In the previous sections, agricultural R&D investments have been characterized without 
any reference to the actual amount invested. In this section, the analysis will be taken a 
step further by linking the characteristics of the reconstructed ex ante distribution of 
agricultural R&D projects (i.e., the implicit cutoff rate and slope coefficient β1) with past 
agricultural R&D investment levels as reported in chapter 3. By cumulating the ranked 
distributions, a third dimension can be added to the picture, namely, that of R&D 
expenditure or intensity. The resulting R&D opportunity curves provide a comprehensive 
way of simultaneously illustrating the differences in R&D opportunities and the 
underinvestment issue (section 8.4.1). By assuming a standard cost-benefit structure 
across all R&D projects in the sample, the effect of changes in R&D benefits or costs on 
the R&D opportunity curve can be modeled and the R&D benefit or cost elasticity can be 
estimated (section 8.4.2). 
 
8.4.1 Comparing R&D opportunity curves 
 
By combining the characteristics derived from the rate-of-return samples (i.e., the implicit 
cutoff rate and the slope coefficient) with the corresponding levels of agricultural 
research expenditures (either in absolute or relative terms), R&D opportunity curves can 
be constructed as depicted in figure 8.5.13 These curves represent the economically 
optimal R&D portfolios and are the relevant curves for assessing the characteristics of the 
underinvestment gap. 
 
 
                                                     
13 Since a breakup of the sample into studies published before and after 1985 did not yield significantly 
different implicit cutoff rates or slope coefficients, the whole sample has been taken as approximate for the 
1981–1985 R&D opportunity curve.  
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Figure 8.5: R&D opportunity curves 
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The positions and slopes of the R&D opportunity curves capture the differences in 
innovation opportunities between developed and developing countries in a nutshell. In 
retrospect, the optimal level of investment in agricultural R&D for developed countries 
can be estimated at $6.7 billion per annum rather than the actual $4.8 billion spent, by 
bringing the cutoff rate down from 20% to the social rate of 7%.14 For developing 
countries, the difference is substantially larger – rather than the actual $4.4 billion, $10.4 
billion could have been spent before reaching the social rate of 12% (figure 8.5a). In 
relative terms, however, the developed countries clearly stand out as having a far larger 
portfolio of profitable agricultural R&D investment opportunities than the developing 
countries have. Their optimal R&D intensity ratio stands at 2.8%, compared to 1.0% for 
developing countries (figure 8.5b).15 
 
In figure 8.5c, the R&D opportunity curves are plotted assuming extreme values for the 
implicit cutoff rate. The implied lower- and upper-bound values for the optimal intensity 
ratios are 2.5% and 3.3% for developed countries and 0.7% and 1.3% for developing 
countries, respectively. This suggests that the R&D opportunity curves for both sets of 
countries are clearly distinctive. A further differentiation of the R&D opportunity curve 
for developing countries by region is presented in figure 8.5d. Although the actual R&D 
intensity for all three developing regions clusters around 0.5%, their estimated optimal 
R&D intensity ratios differ quite significantly: 0.9% for Africa, 0.6% for Asia, and 2.0% 
for Latin America. The robustness of these latter estimates is rather weak given the small 
number of rate-of-return observations per region. Nevertheless, it illustrates how, with 
sufficiently good rate-of-return data, some far-reaching conclusions regarding under-
investment in agricultural R&D could be derived. 
 
In figure 8.6, the R&D opportunity curves have been plotted for two different time 
periods. The results of the rate-of-return studies published in and before 1985 have been 
related to the expenditure level of 1961–65, while those published after 1985 are related 
to the expenditure level of 1981–85. The figure shows how, for both developed and 
developing countries, the R&D opportunity curve has shifted outward. If the R&D 
opportunity curve had remained unchanged, the increase in R&D spending would have 
reduced the implicit cutoff rate and, hence, the underinvestment gap. For developing 
countries, this would have brought the cutoff rate close to 25%, while for developed 
countries, the cutoff rate would have dropped below zero. 
 
 
                                                     
14 The expenditure data reported here are expressed in constant 1985 PPP dollars. 
15 Defined here as public agricultural research expenditures as a percentage of agricultural GDP. 
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Figure 8.6: The shift of the R&D opportunity curve over time 
 
An implicit assumption frequently made in the literature and also in policy advice is that 
there is one single R&D opportunity curve that is the same across countries and over 
time. For example, the recommendation made by the World Bank that developing 
countries should invest 2% of their AgGDP in agricultural R&D by 1990 (World Bank 
1981) is based on this assumption.16 The developed-country investment level of the early 
1980s is taken as the target, and assuming that all countries are on the same curve, closing 
the underinvestment gap is a matter of moving along a fixed curve. If the advice had been 
followed, developing countries would have overinvested in agricultural R&D by quite a 
margin. The results of the current analysis suggest that for 1981–85, the optimal 
investment level for developing countries was about 1.0% (rather than the actual 0.4%) 
and that for developed countries, it was about 2.8% (rather than the actual 2.0%). It is 
important to realize that even at modest investment levels, overinvestment may very well 
take place if profitable innovation opportunities are scarce or nonexistent. Lack of scale 
in small countries, for example, may place many innovation opportunities out of reach 
economically. More generally, institutional constraints such as nonexistent or poorly 
functioning markets may hold back innovation opportunities and, hence, the level of 
R&D investment. 
 
Developed countries invest far more in agricultural R&D per unit of value-added than 
developing countries for three reasons: (1) in relative terms, their portfolio of profitable 
R&D projects is far larger (that is, positioned more to the right), (2) their social rate or 
optimal cutoff rate is lower (7% against 12% in developing countries), and (3) their actual 
(implicit) cutoff rate is substantially lower (20% against 40% in developing countries). 
                                                     
16 Even with just some feel for orders of magnitude, it should be quite clear that increasing the agricultural 
R&D capacity more than fivefold in just 10 years is physically quite impossible. 
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Moreover, their portfolio of profitable R&D projects has grown considerably faster than 
their AgGDP, which has resulted in more than a doubling of the agricultural research 
intensity ratio in 20 years’ time. In contrast, the R&D opportunity curve for the 
developing countries has moved only slightly. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
(5) Differences in research intensity across countries and industries and over time 
are due primarily to differences in the number of profitable innovation 
opportunities. 
 
8.4.2. R&D benefit or cost elasticity 
 
An improvement in the adoption rate of a particular technology or the price of the 
targeted commodity will lead to higher benefits and, hence, to an improvement in the 
relative ranking of an R&D project. In contrast, a price increase of all agricultural 
commodities enhances the profitability of all agricultural R&D projects and, assuming the 
same cost-benefit structure across all projects, shifts the whole R&D opportunity curve 
up, i.e., towards higher ERRs. With an overall price decrease, the opposite can be 
expected. Also, measures or factors that improve the efficiency or effectiveness of R&D 
or the adoption of technology in general, such as education, infrastructure, and markets, 
can help to improve the position of the R&D opportunity curve. 
 
In reality, not all R&D projects have the same cost-benefit structure. As a consequence, 
the impact of a general price increase will differ across R&D projects and will cause 
changes in the relative ranking of R&D projects on the R&D opportunity curve. 
However, for reasons of simplification, the same cost-benefit structure has been assumed 
across all projects in order to model the effects of general R&D benefit or cost changes 
on the underinvestment gap. More precisely, a cost-benefit structure has been assumed of 
five years of costs followed by 16 years of benefits, as depicted in figure 8.7. 
 
An asymmetric, inverted-V structure for R&D benefits has been selected as 
representative for the average agricultural R&D project.17 The corresponding cost-benefit 
equation can be written as follows: 
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where ρˆ represents the internal rate of return at which costs equal benefits. 
 
                                                     
17 Other benefit distributions, such as trapezoidal and polynomial, are also frequently used (see Alston, 
Norton and Pardey 1995). While such benefit structures may yield different rate-of-return results, they do not 
yield significantly different responses to benefit or cost changes as long as the time periods are roughly the 
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Figure 8.7: Assumed cost-benefit structure of an average agricultural R&D project 
 
 
The effects on the ERR of changes in R&D costs or benefits can be estimated across all 
projects using equation 8.5, and the resulting shift in the R&D opportunity curve can be 
approximated by estimating new values for coefficients 0β and 1β . Table 8.5 summarizes 
the reaction of the R&D opportunity curves to changes in R&D costs and benefits. 
 
The elasticity of the optimal R&D portfolio to changes in R&D costs and benefits can be 
estimated by dividing the change in profitable R&D projects by the change in R&D costs 
or benefits (see table 8.5). Two important results stand out. One is that the R&D benefit 
(or cost) elasticity for developed countries is considerably lower than for developing 
countries. A 10% change in R&D costs or benefits leads to an increase or decrease in the 
optimal R&D portfolio in the order of 3.9% to 4.3% for developed countries and 8.7% to 
9.8% for developing countries. In part, this is due to the steeper slope coefficient in the 
ranked distribution (a flatter slope for the R&D opportunity curve) for developing 
countries, but more important, it is because of the high implicit cutoff rate. Assuming an 
implicit cutoff rate and social rate  
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Table 8.5: R&D benefit and cost elasticities 
 
Elasticity R&D opportunity curve – developed countries (marginal cutoff rate of 20%, social rate 7%) 
Change in R&D benefits (%) -50 -25 -10 -1 0 1 10 25 50 100 
Change in number of profitable R&D projects (%) -27.5 -11.6 -4.3 -0.4  0.4 3.9 9.1 16.7 28.7 
Underinvestment gap (%) 12.1 28.1 35.4 39.3 39.7 40.1 43.6 48.8 56.4 68.4 
Elasticity 0.551 0.464 0.428 0.409 0.407 0.405 0.389 0.366 0.334 0.287 
Slope coefficient -0.0301 -0.0275 -0.0263 -0.0258 -0.0257 -0.0256 -0.0251 -0.0244 -0.0234 -0.0219 
           
Change in R&D costs (%) -50 -25 -10 -1 0 1 10 25 50 100 
Change in number of profitable R&D projects (%) 28.7 11.8 4.3 0.4  -0.4 -3.9 -9.0 -16.3 -27.5 
Underinvestment gap (%) 68.4 51.5 44.0 40.1 39.7 39.3 35.8 30.6 23.4 12.1 
Elasticity -0.574 -0.472 -0.430 -0.409 -0.407 -0.405 -0.387 -0.361 -0.326 -0.275 
Slope coefficient -0.0219 -0.0240 -0.0251 -0.0256 -0.0257 -0.0258 -0.0263 -0.0271 -0.0282 -0.0301 
           
Elasticity R&D opportunity curve – developing countries (marginal cutoff rate of 40%, social rate 12%) 
Change in R&D benefits (%) -50 -25 -10 -1 0 1 10 25 50 100 
Change in number of profitable R&D projects (%) -59.8 -25.8 -9.6 -0.9  0.9 8.8 20.9 38.4 67.1 
Underinvestment gap (%) 77.1 111.1 127.3 136.0 136.9 137.8 145.7 157.7 175.3 204.0 
Elasticity 1.195 1.031 0.959 0.922 0.918 0.914 0.882 0.834 0.769 0.671 
Slope coefficient -0.0361 -0.0329 -0.0316 -0.0309 -0.0308 -0.0307 -0.0301 -0.0293 -0.0280 -0.0262 
           
Change in R&D costs (%) -50 -25 -10 -1 0 1 10 25 50 100 
Change in number of profitable R&D projects (%) 67.1 27.0 9.8 0.9  -0.9 -8.7 -20.1 -35.9 -59.8 
Underinvestment gap (%) 204.0 163.9 146.6 137.8 136.9 136.0 128.2 116.8 101.0 77.1 
Elasticity -1.342 -1.081 -0.976 -0.924 -0.918 -0.913 -0.868 -0.804 -0.719 -0.598 
Slope coefficient -0.0262 -0.0288 -0.0301 -0.0307 -0.0308 -0.0309 -0.0315 -0.0324 -0.0338 -0.0361 
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similar to those of developed countries (i.e., 20% and 7%) would bring the R&D benefit 
elasticity for developing countries down to 0.522, which is substantially closer to that of 
developed countries (0.407). Hence, the following proposition: 
 
(6) The R&D benefit or cost elasticity depends on (a) the assumed cost-benefit 
structure of R&D projects, (b) the slope coefficient of the R&D opportunity 
curve, and (c) the implicit cutoff rate. 
 
 
8.5 Possible explanations for the underinvestment gap 
 
While Ruttan’s claim that there is substantial underinvestment in agricultural R&D has 
been generally accepted, it has not been completely undisputed. Pasour and Johnson, for 
example, argued in their critique of Ruttan’s claim that (Pasour and Johnson 1982, p. 
306): 
 
The only legitimate conclusion that can be drawn when the analyst’s estimates do not 
coincide with those of his subjects’ is that the analyst has incorrectly estimated the 
expected cost and benefits as perceived by decision makers.  
 
This argument is of course also valid for the underinvestment gap as estimated by our 
model. In other words, “Are there rational explanations of why underinvestment gaps 
exist and why they are bigger in developing than in developed countries?” Such 
explanations may provide useful insights into how underinvestment gaps could be 
reduced. In addition to possible weaknesses in our model, three other possible 
explanations will be explored that have been suggested in the literature, namely, (a) 
deadweight losses due to taxation, (b) rigidities in budgeting, and (c) political bias in the 
selection of R&D projects. 
 
8.5.1 Possible weaknesses in the estimation of the R&D opportunity curves 
 
R&D opportunity curves are a stylized version of reality, based on several rather critical 
assumptions. However, not all of the assumptions may hold in reality, causing the R&D 
curve to be estimated wrongly. Four issues in particular stand out, which could explain 
(part of) the underinvestment gap: (1) a systematic overestimation of rates of return, (2) 
possible biases in the rate-of-return samples, (3) risk and uncertainty, and (4) weak 
priority setting. 
 
The technical and more theoretical problems related to the measurement of R&D rates of 
return have been discussed in detail in chapter 7. With regard to a possible overestimation 
of rates of return to public agricultural R&D investment, two issues stand out in 
particular: 
 
(1) The assumed cost-benefit structure. Alston and Pardey (2000) argue that in many 
instances, the assumed length of the R&D benefit stream is too short, which leads 
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approach and to an underestimation when using an economic-surplus approach. 
Given the fact that the first method is used more frequently in ex post 
evaluations, the net effect would be an overestimation of the average rate of 
return. 
(2) A systematic underestimation of the contribution of purchased inputs from other 
industries to technological innovation in agriculture. 
 
These two factors affect each R&D project differently but, in general, will bring the 
estimated rates of return downwards. This would result in a shift of the ranked 
distribution to the left and a reduction of the underinvestment gap. When real, such 
corrections should be applied, but one has to keep in mind the fact that the “apparent” 
underinvestment gap could also be explained by other factors. There is a danger in trying 
to explain away the underinvestment gap by focusing on only one aspect of it. 
 
One of the assumptions in the model is that the sample of rate-of-return studies is 
perfectly random. However, it is very likely that there is a bias in the sample towards the 
more successful R&D projects, as there is usually little interest in knowing the rate of 
return of R&D projects that have failed. The distribution of the rate-of-return results 
seems to confirm this argument – only one out of 202 is negative. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that the actual left-hand tail of the ranked distribution is 
considerably longer than observed.18 However, as long as the implicit cutoff rate is 
relatively high, the right-hand side of the distribution and the estimated position of the 
implicit cutoff rate should not be affected by this bias. It is only the right-hand side of the 
ex post distribution that is used when estimating the underinvestment gap. The only 
possible effect of the bias in the sample could be a too optimistic assessment of the 
quality of the ex ante selection. In extreme cases, this may lead to an estimated implicit 
cutoff rate that is too high and therefore to an overestimation of the underinvestment gap. 
In such an instance, weak priority setting would mistakenly be interpreted as 
underinvestment. 
 
As mentioned in section 8.3, risk and uncertainty may cause a divergence between ex 
ante and ex post rates of return when risk and uncertainty are discounted in the ex ante 
selection procedure. Although concrete examples of using probabilistic cost-benefit 
approaches are very scarce, some notion of probability of success most likely enters into 
selection procedures in rather informal ways. Assuming a strong and positive correlation 
between ERR and probability variance, the risk-averse version of the ex ante distribution 
can be thought of as positioned left of the risk-neutral version on an ERR scale and 
deviating more as the ERR increases. The ex post results should more or less coincide 
with the risk-neutral version of the distribution, which provides a possible explanation for 
the underinvestment gap observed ex post. 
                                                     
18 The relative share of negative rates of return also depends on the level of aggregation of the R&D 
“projects” or “programs” evaluated. Aggregated R&D programs yield a substantially smaller spread in rate-
of-return results (and, hence, negative rate-of-return observations) than more disaggregated R&D projects. 
The same is true when such R&D projects are split into smaller sub-projects. At a higher level of aggregation, 
negative research results are compensated by positive research results and are hence less visible. 
169 
 
with the risk-neutral version of the distribution, which provides a possible explanation for 
the underinvestment gap observed ex post. 
The estimated underinvestment gaps represent the optimal selection case. The fact that 
selection procedures are imperfect has deliberately been eliminated in order to get a better 
view of underinvestment. Hence, the model calculates what optimally could have been 
invested in agricultural R&D at a given social rate. Policymakers, however, may very 
well know that the selection of R&D projects is less than perfect and this negatively 
affects their assessment of what is an optimal level of investment in agricultural R&D. It 
is difficult to determine, however, to what extent weak priority setting could explain the 
observed underinvestment gap. Nevertheless, improved priority setting is often 
considered an important prerequisite for enhancing R&D budgets. The World Bank, for 
example, nearly always includes better priority setting as a condition in its loans for 
agricultural research capacity building. 
 
8.5.2 Deadweight losses due to taxation 
 
The argument of underinvestment in agricultural R&D has come under some considerable 
criticism as part of a broader discussion in the public-finance literature, which argues that 
the social opportunity cost of a dollar of government spending is larger than a dollar. 
There are direct costs to collecting taxes, but what is more important is that taxes 
introduce distortions in factor and product markets that create deadweight economic 
losses. It is particularly these latter losses that have drawn considerable attention in the 
public-finance literature. Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985), for example, estimated 
the marginal welfare costs or excess burden for the USA in the range of $0.17 to $0.56 
per US dollar of tax income. 
 
Fox (1985) was the first to introduce the excess-burden argument in a paper discussing 
underinvestment in public agricultural R&D in the USA. He adopted the excess-burden 
rates as calculated by Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) and used a method of 
calculating a rate of return that assumes a very simple relationship between research costs 
and benefits: research costs (C) are all incurred in the first year, while the benefit stream 
comes in equal portions (B) over a period of 16 years. The internal rate of return ( ρˆ ) of 
this hypothetical R&D project can be solved as follows: 
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However, the true social cost of the project is (1+υ) C0, where υ represents the marginal 
excess burden or welfare costs of taxation. The internal rate of return adjusted for taxation 
losses, ρˆ , solves 
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0.30 for the USA (about the mid-point of the range), he finds that the marginal rate of 
return for agricultural R&D that is adjusted for the excess burden of taxation is 26% 
rather than 37%. However, a major weakness of Fox’s example is the assumed cost-
benefit structure. It is not a good representation of the cost-benefit structure of a typical 
agricultural R&D project. All costs are assumed to take place in year 0, but most R&D 
projects take several years before they are completed and start to have an impact. Plant 
breeding projects, for example, take more than 10 years. Adopting a more 
“representative” cost-benefit structure, as presented in section 8.4.2, equation 8.7 should 
be modified as follows: 
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In this case, the downward adjustment of the marginal rate of return is considerably 
lower, namely, from 37% to 32% rather than the 37% to 26% reported by Fox. It is the 
longer cost period in particular that affects this result. 
 
Most subsequent authors on investment in agricultural R&D agree in principle with the 
social opportunity-cost argument (e.g., Dalrymple 1990; Alston and Pardey 1996), but 
there has been some debate on the specifics. First, as pointed out by Ballard and Fullerton 
(1992), in certain situations the excess burden of taxation can be positive rather than 
negative, for example, in the case of a tax on pollution. While interesting for selecting the 
optimal tax instrument, it is more relevant for the current discussion to find out the 
marginal excess burden of the average taxation instrument, given that public agricultural 
R&D is usually paid out of general tax revenues.19 Second, there is a difference between 
gross and net measures of marginal excess burden or welfare costs of taxation. The gross 
measure refers to the effect of a tax irrespective of its use, while the net measure takes the 
use of funds into account. If these are invested in, for example, infrastructure or 
productivity-enhancing R&D, then the net excess burden of taxation can be considerably 
lower (Dalrymple 1990). Third, measures of the marginal costs of funding as reported in 
the literature range from as high as $4 (Browning 1987) to as low as $0.62 (Fullerton and 
Henderson 1989). Which one to pick? Alston and Pardey (1996), citing a study by 
Fullerton (1991), suggest a considerably more modest range of $1.07 to $1.25 for the 
USA. More relevant perhaps is the decision in 1992 by the US Federal Government to 
use $1.25, but allowing for lower rates to be used if the investment leads to cost savings 
for the Federal Government (Office of Management and Budget 1992).20 Whether this is 
the “economically” correct excess-burden rate is not that relevant; it is the one that the US 
Government insists on using when evaluating government programs. 
 
                                                     
19 Alston and Pardey (1996) argue that the marginal excess burden of a commodity-specific R&D tax is 
considerably lower than that for general taxes. 
20 To my knowledge, there are no real cases yet of agricultural R&D evaluations in the US that have used the 
excess-burden rate or, for that matter, a net excess-burden rate. There is no indication yet what would be the 
appropriate net excess-burden rate for agricultural R&D. 
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the “economically” correct excess-burden rate is not that relevant; it is the one that the US 
Government insists on using when evaluating government programs. 
 
Whatever excess-burden rate of taxation is considered appropriate, the ranked distribution 
of R&D projects will shift to the left and will also become slightly steeper. Figure 8.8 
shows how an excess-burden rate of $1.25 shifts the R&D opportunity curve to the left 
(assuming the same cost-benefit structure across all projects). Keeping the research 
intensity fixed, the underinvestment gap for developed countries is reduced from 40% to 
31%, and for developing countries from 137% to 117%. Hence, the argument about the 
excess-burden rate of taxation can explain the underinvestment gap to some extent, but by 
no means the whole gap. Moreover, it has more impact on reducing the underinvestment 
gap for developed countries (-23%) than for developing countries (-15%). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Shift of the R&D opportunity curves due to a tax-burden rate of 25% 
 
Although often seen as a rather typical American, anti-government sentiment, the 
influence of the excess-burden literature on taxation policies has also outside the USA 
been quite significant. The recent trend in the OECD countries to lower high marginal tax 
rates is based on this literature. To my knowledge, however, there are no other countries 
that use an explicit excess-burden rate in their evaluations of government programs. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that it is not a factor of importance in making a decision of 
whether or not to fund a government program. Politicians want to be re-elected (or, if it is 
not a matter of elections, to remain in a position of power), and they know that they do 
not make themselves popular by raising taxes unless they can show that the programs that 
are being funded bring significant (economic) benefits to society. One could argue that 
the excess-burden rate makes this economically rational resistance to taxation explicit, 
and it may explain why, when no provision is made for the excess-burden factor, 
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Fox (1985) was certainly ahead of his time in applying an excess-burden rate to public 
agricultural R&D investments, but he considerably oversold his argument by suggesting a 
social rate of about 20% (nominally, this is more in the range of, say, 15-16% real terms) 
and an excess-burden rate of 1.30. The US Federal Government adopted a standard in 
1992 that is considerable lower: a social rate of 7% (real, that is adjusted for inflation) 
and an excess burden rate of 1.25, which may be adjusted downward if the investment 
leads to cost savings for the Federal Government. 
 
8.5.3 Rigidities in the budget process 
 
Oehmke (1986) argued that rigidities in the budget process prevent an immediate 
response to new investment opportunities in agricultural R&D. Such new opportunities 
arise, for example, because of increases in product demand or research efficiency, which 
translates into respectively higher R&D benefits or lower R&D costs. Oehmke (1986) 
argues that these rigidities are rather permanent and lead to persistent underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D. He captures this fact in his model by basing R&D investment decisions 
on prices and quantities of period T-1 rather than period T, which results in an 
underestimation of the R&D benefits and an overestimation of R&D costs. 
 
Assuming that the T-1 prices and quantities underestimate the actual benefits by 25% and 
overestimate the actual costs by 10% across all R&D projects, two R&D opportunity 
curves representing the developed-country case can be constructed as depicted in figure 
8.9. Again, the same cost-benefit structure is assumed across all projects (see equation 
8.5). The R&D opportunity curve based on T-1 prices and quantities is positioned to the 
left of the R&D opportunity curve based on T prices and quantities. Taking the social rate 
as the cutoff rate, optimal investments could have been 9.7% higher if T rather than T-1 
prices and quantities had been used. For the developing countries, assuming the same 
price and quantity distortions, the underinvestment gap would yield 13.0%. Despite the 
quite substantial price and quantity distortions assumed, the estimated underinvestment 
gaps are relatively small in comparison with the ones actually observed. Therefore, 
budget rigidity can explain some of the underinvestment in agricultural R&D, but by no 
means all of it. 
 
Budget rigidities, however, may also work in the opposite direction and cause over-
investment in agricultural R&D. It is quite exceptional to find an R&D portfolio that only 
grows. A more realistic assumption is that some parts of the R&D portfolio grow and 
others shrink. One can expect that the speed by which such adjustments are implemented 
is less than optimal due to rigidities in the budget allocation process as well as in 
organization. Cutting back on a particular R&D activity may perhaps be even more 
difficult than trying to start a new one. Persistent overinvestment can be as much of a 
problem as persistent underinvestment. 
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Figure 8.9: Shift of the R&D opportunity curves due to budget rigidity 
 
8.5.4 A political bias in the selection of R&D projects 
 
One of the criticisms of the rather strict neoclassical approach to the selection of R&D 
projects is that it is based exclusively on economic considerations. It is blind to the initial 
distribution of assets as well as to who ultimately benefits from the R&D projects 
selected and implemented. De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fafchamps (1989) provide a more 
balanced perspective by introducing transaction costs and concepts of collective action 
into the debate.21 They show that transaction costs differ across farmers due to differences 
in assets and that when this is taken into account, the ERR of a new technology to 
individual farmers becomes conditional on the distribution of assets.22 Consequently, a 
single optimum R&D portfolio across all farms does not exist. It is this multiplicity of 
private optima that, in turn, makes collective action to influence choices in R&D so 
important. 
 
If collective action by large commercial farmers is more effective than that by poor small-
holders (as seems to be the case in Latin America), the selection of R&D projects will be 
biased towards those that benefit large commercial farmers most. In the terminology of 
the induced-innovation theory, the R&D portfolio will be biased towards labor-saving 
technology. However, de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fafchamps (1989) argue that the bias is 
also affected by the size of the R&D budget. They find that with a sufficiently large R&D 
budget, the bias will converge to neutrality. This latter finding can be explained as 
                                                     
21 Earlier versions of the ideas presented in de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fafchamps (1989) can be found in de 
Janvry (1977) and de Janvry and Dethier (1985). 
22 Other factors may also play a role, such as geographical location (farmers close to the market face different 
transaction costs than farmers far away) and education.  
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particularly beneficial to them will be selected first, but such projects still have to exceed 
the social rate. In the most extreme case, all R&D projects preferred by large commercial 
farmers are selected first and only if there is funding left will R&D projects preferred by 
poor smallholders be selected. In reality, the distortion is probably less extreme, but it is 
still realistic to assume that there is some considerable distortion in the selection.23 
 
Following this reasoning, the consequences of underinvestment in agricultural R&D are 
not neutral. Poor smallholders will be affected more than large commercial farmers. 
While acknowledging this bias, what should not be overlooked is that the portfolio of 
profitable R&D projects for large commercial farmers may be substantially larger than 
the portfolio for poor smallholders. A strictly balanced distribution of R&D resources 
may look politically correct but can be counterproductive economically. To illustrate this 
point, imagine a world government that could reallocate total agricultural R&D funding. 
It can do so by taking either an economic or a political perspective. The political 
perspective would argue for an allocation of R&D funding that is egalitarian. In other 
words, the distribution of R&D funding should be such that the R&D intensity across all 
countries is the same. Using the R&D opportunity curves as estimated in section 8.4, this 
would result in an intensity ratio of 0.7% and implicit cutoff rates of 22.6% (point c) and 
61.4% (point d) for developing and developed countries, respectively (figure 8.10). In 
contrast, an economic perspective would argue for an allocation of R&D funding that 
would equalize the marginal rate of return of R&D projects between developing and 
developed countries. This would be the case at an implicit cutoff rate of 31.8% and 
intensity ratios of 0.53% (point e) and 1.50% (point f) for developing and developed 
countries, respectively. 
 
The example given above can also be used to represent a dual-economy situation in 
which the developing countries represent poor smallholders and the developed countries 
the large commercial farmers. The initial asset distribution leads to quite distinctive 
innovation opportunities for the two groups and, hence, R&D opportunity curves as 
depicted in figure 8.11. However, in real life the positions and shapes of the R&D 
opportunity curves are generally not known. Instead, it is often assumed, usually 
implicitly, that both groups of farmers are on the same R&D opportunity curve. This 
leads to no other conclusion than that the R&D portfolio is very much biased in favor of 
the large commercial farmers and that this bias is economically suboptimal. 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Hence, the difference between the optimal and suboptimal selection of R&D projects is not only a matter of 
weak priority setting but also the result of the lobbying activities of interest groups. 
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Figure 8.10: The political versus economic equilibrium in the allocation of R&D resources 
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Assuming two distinctive R&D opportunity curves leads to considerably different 
conclusions. A part of the bias in the R&D portfolio can still be attributed to overly strong 
lobbying by large commercial farmers that leads to an economically suboptimal outcome, 
but another (and in this example, larger) part of the bias in the R&D portfolio makes 
economic sense. The R&D investment opportunities are considerably better for large 
commercial farmers than for poor smallholders and, therefore, different R&D investment 
intensities are justified from an economic point of view. The model also reveals another 
fact, namely that strong lobbying by large commercial farmers should not be explained 
only in terms of better conditions for collective action (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and 
Fafchamps 1989) but also in terms of strong economic incentives. Settling on the more 
“democratic” proportional distribution of R&D resources would leave many very 
profitable R&D projects that target large commercial farmers unfunded (i.e., all R&D 
projects with an ERR lower than 61.4%). In contrast, the economic incentive for poor 
smallholders to lobby for (additional) R&D would be less as the cutoff rate of their 
preferred portfolio of R&D projects is considerably lower (i.e., 22.6%). In particular, 
farmers who are not integrated into the market have very little incentive to lobby for 
R&D as it only leads to untradable surpluses (de Janvry 1985). 
 
This is rather sobering news for those of us who want to target R&D to the poorest of the 
poor and at the same time want to subscribe to economic rationality. Still, some things 
can be done to improve poverty targeting. One argument, for example, is that an extra 
dollar earned by a poor farmer should be valued higher than an extra dollar earned by a 
rich farmer. As shown in figure 8.11, the model can easily deal with such a correction 
under the assumption that the cost-benefit structure is the same across all R&D projects 
(i.e., five years of costs followed by 16 years of benefits). An additional premium of 25 
cents for every additional dollar earned by a poor farmer shifts the R&D opportunity 
curve for poor smallholders up and to the right. With a fixed R&D budget, the new 
equilibrium for the marginal cutoff rate settles at 34.4% and the economically optimal 
agricultural research intensity ratios for poor smallholders and large commercial farmers 
settle at 0.55% (point g) and 1.40% (point h), respectively. 
 
The effect of a poverty premium in this model is very modest – at higher poverty 
premiums as well, as shown in table 8.6. A one-dollar premium for every additional 
dollar earned by a poor farmer translates itself into a differentiated marginal cutoff rate of 
28.1% for R&D projects targeting poor smallholders and 40.3% for R&D projects 
targeting large commercial farmers. The intrinsic limiting factor in the model is that the 
total number of profitable R&D projects for poor smallholders is, at least in relative 
terms, smaller than that for large commercial farmers. A poverty premium does not alter 
this fact. 
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Figure 8.11: The welfare effects of introducing a poverty premium on R&D targeting poor farmers 
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Table 8.6: Allocation of agricultural R&D funding under different assumptions 
 
 
MDCs = large 
commercial 
farmers 
LDCs = poor 
smallholders All 
AgGDP (million 1985 PPP$) [a] 237089 1075293 1312381 
Actual allocation    
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) [b]  4812.9 4408.7 9221.6 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) {[b]/[a]}x100 2.03 0.41 0.70 
Marginal rate of return (%) 20.0 40.0  
Average rate of return (%)a [c] 58.4 72.0 64.9 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) {[b]x[c]}/100 2811.6 3172.9 5984.5 
Economic equilibrium at optimal budget    
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) 6223.0 11107.2 17330.3 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) 2.65 0.98 1.32 
Marginal rate of return (%) 10.0 10.0  
Average rate of return (%)a 48.4 42.0 44.3 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) 3013.0 4661.6 7674.7 
Economic equilibrium at fixed budget    
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) 3551.4 5670.2 9221.6 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) 1.50 0.53 0.70 
Marginal rate of return (%) 31.8 31.8  
Average rate of return (%)a 70.2 63.8 66.3 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) 2494.7 3617.6 6112.2 
Adjusted economic equilibrium: 25% poverty premium 
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) 3323.1 5898.5 9221.6 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) 1.40 0.55 0.70 
Marginal rate of return (%) 34.4 34.4  
Average rate of return (%)a 72.8 62.5 66.2 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) 2420.2 3687.7 6108.0 
Adjusted economic equilibrium: 50% poverty premium 
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) 3138.8 6082.8 9221.6 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) 1.32 0.57 0.70 
Marginal rate of return (%) 36.6 36.6  
Average rate of return (%)a 75.1 61.5 66.1 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) 2355.8 3742.0 6097.8 
Adjusted economic equilibrium: 100% poverty premium 
Agricultural R&D expenditures (million 1985 PPP$) 2853.2 6368.3 9221.6 
Agricultural research intensity ratio (%) 1.20 0.59 0.70 
Marginal rate of return (%) 40.3 40.3  
Average rate of return (%)a 78.8 60.0 65.8 
Net R&D benefits (million 1985 PPP$) 2247.4 3822.9 6070.2 
Note: The figures in italics represent the values for the unadjusted R&D opportunity curves and are the 
relevant values against which to compare the effect of a poverty premium. 
a Of R&D projects above the marginal rate of return. 
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Closing the estimated R&D underinvestment gap (i.e., increase R&D investment for both 
groups of farmers until the marginal rate hits 10%) requires an additional R&D 
investment of $8,109 million and creates a net benefit gain of $1,489 million for poor 
smallholders and $201 million for large commercial farmers.24 The additional sums 
invested in agricultural R&D bring down the average rates of return quite significantly, 
particularly for the poor smallholders. 
 
Reallocating R&D funding while the budget is fixed, as suggested by economic 
equilibrium, would create a net benefit gain of $128 million. Relative to the actual net 
benefits of $5,984 million, this is a rather minor improvement and, hence, the conclusion 
that, aside from the (probably substantial) losses due to poor priority setting, the 
allocation of R&D resources is not that far from the economic optimum. The 
distributional effect, however, is considerable: poor smallholders would gain $445 
million, while large commercial farmers would lose $317 million. 
 
Another finding is that poverty premiums of 25, 50, and 100 cents per dollar create net 
benefit losses of $4.3 million, $14.4 million, and $42.0 million, respectively. Again, 
relative to the total net benefits, these are minor distortions. The distributional effect is 
more significant: with poverty premiums of 25, 50, and 100 cents per dollar, poor small-
holders would gain $70.2 million, $124.5 million, and $205.3 million, respectively, while 
large commercial farmers would respectively loose $74.4 million, $138.9 million, and 
$247.3 million. 
 
The model assumes that R&D projects can be clearly differentiated between those that 
target poor smallholders and those that target large commercial farmers and that there are 
no negative externalities. This is of course an oversimplification. Poverty targeting is 
considerably more complicated when R&D projects have distributional effects that are 
less clearcut. For example, an R&D project may lead to a new technology that creates 
major benefits for large commercial farmers but, at the same time, has negative extern-
alities for poor smallholders. As a consequence, each R&D project would be affected 
differently by a poverty premium. This makes it difficult not only to model the effects of 
a poverty premium but also to come to a general conclusion. It all depends on the 
(assumed) benefit distribution within a given R&D project.25 
 
Rather than artificially shifting the R&D opportunity curve for poor smallholders, it is 
perhaps more useful to think about policies that could actually shift the R&D opportunity 
curve for poor smallholders outward. What are the factors that hold R&D investment 
opportunities for poor smallholders back vis-à-vis those for large commercial farmers? 
Without doubt, the distribution of assets plays a major role and land reform may lead to 
                                                     
24 These benefit streams do not, of course, all end up with either the rich or poor farmers. A great deal is 
passed on to consumers in terms of lower prices. 
25 A classic example in the Green Revolution literature is that while richer farmers have tended to profit from 
Green Revolution technologies more than poor farmers, lower food prices have been particularly beneficial to 
poor consumers. Most authors therefore come to the conclusion that the net impact of Green Revolution 
technologies on poverty alleviation has been positive. 
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R&D opportunity curves that are closer to each other and with greater overlap. However, 
there are also many other factors, such as market structure, access to credit, transport 
facilities, education, and health, that all influence the adoption of a new technology 
positively and help to shift the R&D opportunity curve outward. Rather than pushing 
technology, it makes more sense to try to pull technology and R&D investment into 
smallholder agriculture by creating an environment in which innovation can prosper. In 
situations in which such an environment does not exist or is declining, investment in 
R&D can do very little. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
Representing the ranked distribution of R&D projects by a semilog function has turned 
out to be a very fruitful way of structuring the underinvestment hypothesis. Rather than 
focusing on the average of the reported rates of return as is generally done in the 
literature, it shifts focus to the rate of return of the marginal R&D project funded. A great 
advantage of the model is that it defines underinvestment in agricultural R&D 
unambiguously. To estimate the underinvestment gap, only three parameters are needed: 
(a) the social cutoff rate, (b) the ex ante, implicit cutoff rate, and (c) the slope coefficient 
of the ranked distribution. The first parameter is set outside the model, but the latter two 
have to be estimated. By assuming certain values for the actual cutoff rate and the slope 
coefficient, the model can simulate various aspects of the underinvestment hypothesis. 
 
With actual estimates for the implicit cutoff rate and the slope coefficient derived from a 
sample of ex post rate-of-return results, the model can produce actual estimates of past 
underinvestment in agricultural R&D. In order to do this, it is necessary to eliminate the 
suboptimality in the ex ante selection of R&D projects from the rate-of-return dataset. 
This factor obscures our sight of the optimal distribution of R&D projects. The actual 
rates of return produce a lopsided, bell-shaped distribution, not the expected asymptotic 
distribution. However, as is shown in this chapter, under some plausible assumptions, the 
latter can be derived from the former. 
 
It is noteworthy that the estimates of underinvestment are made without any reference to 
the actual level of R&D investment. Bringing the two together substantially enriches the 
model and allows for the construction of R&D opportunity curves. These curves, based 
on the rule that the R&D project with the highest ERR is funded first, depict cumulated 
R&D expenditures against ERR. What is important conceptually is that these curves are 
not static; they differ across industries and countries and over time. An implicit 
assumption in much of the literature on investments in agricultural R&D is that the R&D 
opportunity curve is fixed. This is wrong. Allowing the R&D opportunity curve to change 
position over time and across countries (and within countries across regions, 
commodities, and farmer groups) provides a far better fit with the observed facts, as well 
as opportunities for policy measures. 
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The underinvestment gaps estimated by the model are less pronounced than often 
suggested on the basis of the average rate of return across a large number of R&D 
projects. The model shows that a high average rate of return in combination with a low 
marginal rate of return is very possible; hence, the conclusion that a high average rate 
provides no conclusive information about underinvestment. 
 
Taking as a starting point the idea that R&D investment intensities are defined foremost 
by the innovation opportunities available gives a different perspective of the observed 
differences and changes in agricultural R&D intensities. Rather than pressing 
governments in countries with low or declining intensity ratios to invest more in 
agricultural R&D, it is more useful to stimulate those governments to adopt policies that 
improve opportunities for innovation. This would increase the profitability of agricultural 
R&D projects across the board and, in turn, pull additional R&D funding into agriculture. 
Such an approach also fits better with the suggestion that there may be perfectly rational 
explanations of why governments decide to stop funding agricultural R&D before the 
marginal rate of return is reached. Explanations that stand out most convincingly are the 
systematic overestimation of the rates of return, the distorted selection of R&D projects, 
and the excess burden of taxation. 
 
Allowing the impact of R&D to be differentiated across different farmer groups 
significantly enriches the model. A highly uneven asset distribution among farmers 
translates into different paths of technological development. In addition, the uneven asset 
distribution leads to an uneven distribution of power among farmers in pursuing their 
preferred technology path. Hence, there is good reason to believe that the suboptimality in 
the selection of R&D projects is not random, but is affected by lobbying by the different 
interest groups. More concretely, such a political bias would express itself in a lower 
marginal cutoff rate for R&D projects preferred by the stronger lobby group. However, 
eliminating this political bias does not necessarily result in equal agricultural R&D 
intensity ratios. Differential intensity ratios may very well be warranted, as the innovation 
opportunities for one group of farmers may be considerably better than those for another 
group of farmers. In particular, the farmers with the better assets are more likely to have 
better innovation opportunities. Nevertheless, eliminating the political bias in the 
selection process can be achieved by adhering to a selection mechanism that is strictly 
economic. In that sense, poor smallholders, in particular, can gain from better priority 
setting. 
 
A step further is to argue that an additional dollar earned by a poor farmer should be 
valued higher than an additional dollar earned by a rich farmer. Under the assumption that 
R&D projects can be clearly distinguished in terms of their impact on poverty alleviation, 
the model shows that the effect of a poverty premium is rather modest in terms of both 
welfare loss and the distributional income effect. The intrinsic problem is that the relative 
number of all profitable R&D projects is smaller for poor smallholders than it is for large 
commercial farmers. A poverty premium does not alter this, which reinforces the 
argument made earlier: to focus on policies that enhance innovation opportunities. 
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9. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This dissertation has addressed the following three sets of questions: 
 
1. Why do we invest in agricultural R&D? What, according to economic theory, 
drives investment in agricultural R&D, and what are the constraints? 
2. How much do we invest in agricultural R&D? How have investment patterns 
changed over time? And, how do regions and countries at different stages of 
economic development differ in terms of agricultural R&D intensity? 
3. Why, despite an impressive track record, have we not invested more in 
agricultural R&D? How much more could we have invested? And, are optimal 
levels of investment in agricultural R&D the same for all countries at all times? 
 
Each of these three sets of questions has been dealt with in the three parts of this 
dissertation. Rather than just summarizing the answers to these questions, I will look at 
them in this chapter from a more objective point of view. The three sets of questions 
regarding agricultural R&D investment are important because they may give an answer to 
a far broader question: “Why is it that agriculture is so much more productive in one 
country than another, or more productive today than in the past?” It is an old question, but 
one that has not yet been answered satisfactorily. 
 
Early answers from economists about this question of productivity focused on differences 
in natural and physical assets, but more recent explanations have added knowledge and 
institutions as important explanatory factors for differences in (agricultural) productivity. 
In a rather abstract way, economists capture these two factors in their macro-economic 
models as human and social capital. In contrast to natural and physical assets, knowledge 
and institutions are both nonrivalrous – using them does not necessarily exclude others 
from using them as well, nor does it deplete them. On the contrary, actively using 
knowledge and institutions only makes them better and stronger. In that sense, human or 
social capital depreciates not from being used, but from not being used and passed on. 
 
Most strikingly, perhaps, is that in order to capture human and social capital in a 
traditional production-function approach, economists have had to give up the neoclassical 
paradigm of diminishing returns across all inputs and to assume that human and social 
capital yield increasing returns – making it possible to produce more output with the same 
inputs. As described in chapter 2, only quite recently has some progress been made by 
bringing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge into a growth-accounting 
framework under the banner of endogenous or new growth theory. However, economists 
still struggle with the concept of “social capital” and how to integrate it into an economic 
growth model. While substantial progress has been made in measuring technological 
innovation, no such counterpart for institutional innovation yet exists. At best, very rough 
proxies for differences in social capital are being used in modeling economic growth and 
production functions. 
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9.1 The social capital dimension 
 
Despite being more qualitative than quantitative, the literature on social capital provides 
valid explanations of why agriculture is producing so much more today than in the past, 
or in one country compared to another. Some of those explanations relate to the wider 
economic context within which agriculture is embedded. The switch from subsistence to 
market-oriented agricultural production, for example, has only been possible because of 
the development of well-functioning markets. Society can only reap the benefits from 
specialization and a division of labor when it can rely on the market to facilitate the 
necessary exchanges smoothly. The social capital embodied in these markets cannot be 
easily overestimated. Looking more specifically at agricultural innovation, the 
establishment of the first agricultural experiment stations during the second half of the 
nineteenth century stands out as a major institutional innovation. This new “social 
capital” unleashed a stream of technological innovations that continues today and which 
created a watershed in the growth of agricultural productivity (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). 
During the 20th century (agricultural) innovation systems have greatly increased in size 
and complexity, and the recent rise of the concept of national innovation systems in the 
S&T policy literature reflects attempts to see how such systems can be further optimized 
(chapter 2). Institutional issues that have been featured on the agricultural research policy 
agenda in recent years (and which are discussed in various forms in chapters 3-6) include 
the following: 
 
(1) How can the division of tasks between agricultural R&D agencies at the 
provincial, national, regional, and international levels be optimized? 
(2) How can the mix between public and private and between basic, applied, and 
adaptive agricultural R&D be optimized? 
(3) How can agricultural R&D be made more responsive to the diverse and some-
times conflicting needs of poor and rich farmers, consumers, and government? 
(4) How can the internal organization and management of agricultural R&D agencies 
be improved? 
(5) How can political and financial support for public agricultural R&D be mobilized 
and sustained? 
(6) How can the full potential of the contribution of agricultural R&D to economic 
growth be exploited? 
 
Answers to questions 1 to 4 may lead to more or better research output for the resources 
provided, while answers to questions 5 and 6 may help to optimize the volume of 
resources directed to agricultural R&D as such. Part III of this dissertation has focused in 
particular on the last question and has tried to identify the scale of underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D as well as the factors that could explain why it exists. 
 
The (expected) rate of return of a research project not only depends on the innovation 
itself, but also on factors such as size and structure of the market, rate and speed of 
adoption, risk and uncertainty, and R&D efficiency and effectiveness. Some of these 
factors have strong social capital dimensions that are cumulative. For example, once 
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farmers are used to buying new seeds regularly and seed markets are well established, the 
uptake of new varieties will be a lot smoother and faster. Similarly, risk and uncertainty 
surrounding R&D projects may decrease with the accumulation of experience with 
innovation. Also, the efficiency and effectiveness of agricultural R&D agencies depends 
on the organizational and managerial capability accumulated over many years. Therefore, 
differences in the optimal R&D portfolio across countries and over time depend, among 
other things, on the social capital accumulated in the broader economy as well as, more 
specifically, in the agricultural innovation system. 
 
Social capital not only plays a role in defining the economic potential of R&D and, hence, 
the optimal R&D portfolio, but also in explaining why some countries manage to sustain 
investment levels in public agricultural R&D that are closer to (although still below) its 
optimal level when other countries don’t. Such countries have not only a better capability 
to formulate, assess and select the right R&D projects, but also a better capability to 
mobilize political support and funding. 
 
 
9.2 The human capital dimension 
 
The financial resources and human talent that countries employ in public agricultural 
R&D have increased substantially since the early 1960s. As documented in chapters 3 
and 4, the global agricultural research capacity roughly tripled between 1961 and 1991. 
Over time, however, the growth in investment in public agricultural R&D has slowed 
down quite significantly in both developed and developing countries. Economic and 
financial crises, which hit Africa and Latin America in particular during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, forced many governments to reduce their investment in agricultural R&D. 
This has at times led not only to a reduction of agricultural R&D capacity, but also to 
severe imbalances in staffing and operating budgets and a reduction in the efficiency of 
agricultural R&D. 
 
The capacity to generate new agricultural knowledge is very unevenly distributed 
between developed and developing countries. Relative to agricultural GDP, developed 
countries invest about 4-5 times more in public agricultural R&D than developing 
countries. While the nonrivalrous character of knowledge would suggest that it does not 
matter who produces it (everybody will benefit from it), the location and situation-
specificity of agricultural knowledge limits its application and, hence, spillover potential. 
For example, research into high-tech precision farming using the latest computer 
technology and satellites is of little direct use to resource-poor farmers in developing 
countries. Moreover, knowledge spillovers are neither automatic nor necessarily free. 
Investment in own R&D capacity is often crucial in gaining access to knowledge 
developed elsewhere. But factors such as climatic and economic similarity, geographic 
proximity, trade links, and language also influence patterns of knowledge and technology 
spillovers. In addition, a distinction needs to be made between the spread of knowledge 
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and its application. Farmers may know of a new technology but may not be using it, or 
may only be using it partially. Other factors may form a binding constraint.1 
 
All in all, the increasing returns attributed to human capital (or more specifically, to R&D 
labor) are probably more modest than suggested by some endogenous-growth theorists 
(Jones 1995). Nevertheless, the attribution of even modest increasing returns to human 
capital looks like a blank check for investments in education and R&D. Like all public 
goods, however, knowledge will be underproduced relative to the social optimum unless 
the individual or group responsible for its production can internalize the externality 
involved. This has been a strong rationale for governments all over the world to invest in 
public agricultural R&D. But do they invest enough? This issue has been taken up in part 
III of this dissertation, which revisited the agricultural R&D underinvestment hypothesis. 
 
 
9.3 Underinvestment in agricultural R&D revisited 
 
Starting with the early work by Griliches (1958) on hybrid corn, rate-of-return studies 
have become standard practice in documenting the economic impact of agricultural R&D. 
Although the estimated ex post rates vary substantially, the average is in a range of 40%–
60% (Alston et al. 2000). Despite criticisms about the accuracy of these rates as well as 
on how representative the selected projects are, a widely shared believe is that the 
estimated rates are robust enough to accommodate such criticisms and still be in a range 
that is substantially above the social rate. Based on this evidence, Ruttan (1980) argued 
that there is serious underinvestment in public agricultural R&D. This argument has 
become a widely accepted opinion (if not fact) among agricultural economists. Hence, 
any slowdown in the growth or, even worse, contraction of public agricultural R&D 
expenditures is reason for serious concern. 
 
But what do we actually know about this underinvestment? How real is it? Is it higher in 
developing countries than in developed countries? Is it higher for some types of research 
than others? Does it increase or decrease over time? And, how much more should have 
been invested in agricultural R&D? In order to answer these questions, the under-
investment hypothesis had to be defined more clearly. Hence, the introduction in chapter 
8 of a simple economic model that captures the ex ante selection of R&D projects. 
 
The model assumes that the distribution of all possible R&D projects on an expected rate-
of-return (ERR) scale can be thought of as declining asymptotically and can be 
approximated by a semilog function with a negative slope coefficient. Assuming full 
information and rational economic behavior, the R&D project with the highest ERR will 
be selected first, and this process will continue until the budget is finished or the last 
project hits the social rate. In strictly economic terms, the underinvestment gap can be 
                                                     
1 Mundlak (2000), for example, argues that in many developing countries, the most limiting factor in the 
spread of new technology is not knowledge but capital. 
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defined as the difference between the ERR of the marginal R&D project (the actual rate) 
and the social rate. Only three variables need to be known to estimate the 
underinvestment gap: the social rate, the actual cutoff rate, and the slope coefficient of the 
distribution. Taking less than full information and economic rationality into account, the 
latter two can, under rather restrictive but plausible assumptions, be derived from a 
sufficiently large and representative sample of ex post rates of return on agricultural 
R&D. 
 
The most important findings of the model are the following: 
 
• Not the mean but the mode of the ex post rate-of-return distribution is the 
relevant variable for assessing underinvestment in agricultural R&D. 
• Under the assumption of full information and economic rationality, developed 
countries could have invested about 40% more in public agricultural R&D and 
developing countries about 135% more. In terms of agricultural R&D intensity 
(i.e., expenditures as a percentage of agricultural GDP), developed countries 
could have invested 2.8% rather than 2.0%, and developing countries 1.0% rather 
than 0.4% in the period 1981–85. 
• Low investment in public agricultural R&D in developing countries is caused 
first and foremost by a relatively smaller portfolio of profitable R&D projects to 
invest in. In looking at the difference in agricultural R&D intensity between 
developed and developing countries, underinvestment certainly plays a role (the 
gap is bigger for developing countries), but it explains only a modest part of this 
difference. 
• While efforts to reduce the underinvestment gap should continue, more emphasis 
should be placed on designing policies that help to shift the portfolio of R&D 
projects higher up on the ERR scale, even at the risk of increasing the under-
investment gap. 
 
The presented model of the selection of R&D projects is purely neoclassical. By 
assuming full information and economic rationality, it takes the underinvestment 
argument to its extreme. The usefulness of the model is not that it is a good 
approximation of reality, but that it provides a benchmark against which reality can be 
compared. The estimated underinvestment gaps are not unconditional – they assume full 
information and economic rationality in the allocation of R&D resources. In reality, the 
ex ante selection of R&D projects is suboptimal and this obscures our sight of the under-
investment gap ex post. It has to be eliminated in order to see the underinvestment gap 
more clearly and to be able to estimate its size. Ultimately, however, the model is useful 
not because it estimates past R&D underinvestment gaps, but because it helps to better 
understand why they exist. It is this understanding that may help us to create and better 
exploit the R&D investment opportunities of tomorrow. 
 
One set of explanatory factors relates to the position and shape of the distribution of all 
potential R&D projects. There are important differences in innovation opportunities 
across companies, industries, countries, and over time. Besides pure technological 
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opportunities (which may be enhanced by investing in basic R&D), other factors come 
into play, such as the size and structure of the market, the rate and speed of adoption, risk 
and uncertainty, and R&D effectiveness and efficiency. Each of these factors could, if 
improved, increase R&D benefits or reduce R&D costs and, hence, create a larger 
optimal R&D portfolio. 
 
The other set of explanatory factors relates to why governments underinvest in public 
agricultural R&D. Possible explanations are a lack of information, suboptimal selection 
mechanisms, budget rigidity, excess burden due to taxation, and last but not least, a lack 
of political and organizational capacity in society. Improvements in each of these factors 
should bring the underinvestment gap down. 
 
Both sets of factors have important social capital dimensions that tend to be cumulative. It 
is this social capital that makes it possible for rich countries to have not only a bigger 
portfolio of profitable agricultural R&D projects to choose from, but also a better 
capacity to identify, finance, and implement them. Hence, a prerequisite for poorer 
countries to catch up is that they develop the social capital that can bring innovation 
opportunities within reach. 
 
 
9.4 Some theoretical considerations regarding the R&D opportunity curve 
 
Chapter 2 explored the S&T literature for ideas and concepts concerning technical change 
and its link to investment in R&D. It turned out to be a very eclectic set of ideas and 
concepts, many of which had broken away from neoclassical assumptions such as 
diminishing returns, selection rationality, full information, and general equilibrium. They 
pushed the frontiers of neoclassical economics, or even went beyond. 
 
Also, in this dissertation it was necessary to drop the assumptions of full information and 
selection rationality in order to make sense out of the observed facts, i.e., the distribution 
of agricultural R&D rates of return. It is only by assuming suboptimal selection of R&D 
projects that a more consistent story can be told and some link can be established between 
R&D investment and impact in the form of an R&D opportunity curve. 
 
The R&D opportunity curve has strong parallels with Metcalfe’s innovation opportunity 
frontier (section 2.2.1). However, there are also important differences. Using rate of 
return rather than production cost reduction as the dependent variable, the asymptotic 
form of the curve is not the result of a technological frontier that is imposed on the model. 
Moreover, the speed by which the research is implemented is optimized within each 
project. Another advantage of using a rate of return as the dependent variable is that 
research that does not lead to a cost reduction (e.g., maintenance research and research on 
product innovation) can be accommodated within the same model. 
 
The S&T literature summarized in chapter 2 points to a wide range of factors that shape 
the position of the R&D opportunity curve. Technology, scale, market structure, 
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diffusion, research efficiency, etc., all come together when estimating the rate of return to 
agricultural R&D. All hurdles between the inception of an R&D project and the ultimate 
stream of the R&D benefits realized are accounted for in a rate-of-return estimation. 
Many of these hurdles are project-specific, but there are also those that are more specific 
to technology, industry, country, or time. By differentiating the R&D rate-of-return 
distributions in these directions, one can start detecting how R&D opportunities differ. 
 
It is interesting to note that the outward shift of the agricultural R&D opportunity curve 
through time is consistent with endogenous growth theory, which assumes increasing 
returns to knowledge. There are, however, many other factors that may have caused the 
outward shift as well. As discussed earlier, social capital may be one of them, but there 
are also other factors. 
 
In the oil industry, for example, a major decline in R&D investment took place during the 
second half of the 1990s. This was largely due to low oil prices at that time, which 
negatively affected the expected private profitability of R&D projects across all oil 
companies. This resulted in an inward shift of the private R&D opportunity curve. Still, 
increasing returns to knowledge may have taken place but are now obscured by other 
factors. 
 
 
9.5 Suggestions for future research 
 
Important parts of this dissertation have remained broad and could benefit from further 
detail and filling in. In particular, the social capital factor in explaining differences in 
innovation opportunities and, hence, differences in productivity is for the most part 
unexplored. Why does innovation prosper more in one environment than another? And, 
what are relevant and measurable parameters that differentiate highly supportive from 
less supportive environments? Similarly, a better understanding is needed of what makes 
one country better in identifying, selecting, and funding (agricultural) R&D than another. 
What are the relevant policies and instruments that could help to reduce the 
underinvestment gap as well as the misallocation of resources? 
 
With regard to human capital (restricted here to individuals who are formally involved in 
R&D) in particular, this dissertation has contributed to the measurement of human and 
financial inputs into agricultural R&D worldwide. Future research in this area should 
focus on a better coverage of research undertaken by universities and private businesses, 
as well as of new research themes that have recently been added to the agricultural R&D 
agenda, such as environment, food quality and safety, and biotechnology. Moreover, 
better data on the R&D activities undertaken in the industries involved in agricultural 
inputs and processing should provide a more complete picture of the contribution of R&D 
to increases in agricultural productivity. 
 
As discussed in chapter 7, agricultural R&D rate-of-return calculations are surrounded by 
methodological uncertainties. Three issues that stand out in particular are (1) the assumed 
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lag structures between R&D investment and impact on productivity, (2) the identification 
of technology spillovers from parallel research efforts, and (3) the identification of 
technology spillovers from R&D undertaken in supplying industries. Progress in each of 
these areas should help to improve confidence in the rate-of-return calculations. 
 
The estimation of the implicit cutoff rate and the slope coefficient of the ranked 
distribution of R&D projects should be based on a representative sample of rate-of-return 
estimations for agricultural R&D. However, because they did not pass our minimum 
criteria of comparability, many of the available rate-of-return results had to be dropped 
from the analysis. This reflects the fact that most rate-of-return studies are conducted in 
isolation, without much attention to the question of comparability of the results with other 
studies. This very much limits the usefulness of such studies in a comparative framework. 
Future work in this area should pay more attention to standardization of approaches and 
methods, hence improving the comparability of rate-of-return results. 
 
The limited number of comparable rate-of-return observations very much restricts the 
differentiation of the R&D opportunity curve over time, across regions, and by type of 
research focus. However, some of this differentiation may be possible in the future as 
more ex post rate-of-return calculations become available. It is a hopeful sign that the 
number of rate-of-return studies on agricultural R&D has been increasing steadily over 
the years. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation builds on the work done by many 
researchers who have gone before. I have tried to stand on their shoulders (and I hope 
others will stand on mine) to look further than ever before and see glimpses of Bacon’s 
lost Paradise – of food and peace for all. 
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Annex A: The construction of agricultural R&D indicators 
 
The Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) project, which has been the 
source of most of the statistics presented in part II of this dissertation, started as a spin-off 
from a major survey on national agricultural research systems in developing countries 
undertaken by the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) in 
the mid-1980s.1 The earliest work of the ASTI project focused on reconciling the new 
survey data with previous data collections on national agricultural investments, such as 
those by Boyce and Evenson (1975), Kassapu (1976), Piñeiro and Trigo (1983), Oram 
and Bindlish (1981), and Judd, Boyce, and Evenson (1983, 1986). Pardey and Roseboom 
(1989) reformatted, rescaled, and cleaned up these earlier data compilations and 
combined them with new data obtained from the survey, as well as from a large number 
of annual reports from agricultural research organizations, country reviews, and other 
publications. A major concern underpinning all this work was the weak comparability of 
the data over time and across countries. Building on the pioneering work by the Science 
and Technology Indicators Division of the OECD, better definitions and standard data 
collection and processing procedures were adopted. To the greatest extent possible, the 
ASTI project followed the OECD guidelines for surveys of R&D activity (also known as 
the Frascati Manual [OECD 1981, 1994]).2 
 
This annex outlines some of the more general aspects of the data collection and 
construction of the agricultural R&D indicators reported in chapters 3-6, namely, (1) 
definitions and classification schemes, (2) the measurement of personnel and 
expenditures devoted to agricultural R&D, and (3) the comparability of expenditure data 
across countries and over time. This latter issue is of relevance to all international 
comparisons involving expenditure data. 
 
 
A.1 Definitions and classification schemes 
 
A major challenge in the construction of agricultural R&D indicators has been the need to 
find a compromise between the concept of a national agricultural research system 
(NARS), which bears all the hallmarks of an open or soft system with rather vaguely 
formed boundaries, and the statistical necessity for precise definitions and for boundaries 
that are sharp and stable. 
 
                                                     
1 Since 1995, the project has been implemented jointly with the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). 
2 The OECD also plays a coordinating role in the development of various other statistical guidelines for the 
measurement of certain aspects of science and technology, such as the technology balance of payments, 
innovation statistics (the Oslo manual), patents, and human resources for science and technology. 
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For statistical purposes, the ASTI project has adopted the following operational 
definitions of the three dimensions of a NARS (i.e., national, agricultural, and research): 
 
(1) National research refers to research activities undertaken within the boundaries of a 
nation state and which target local production or societal issues. Research activities 
by international research agencies are excluded and treated separately. 
 
(2) Agricultural research is research that directly targets primary agriculture and includes 
research on crops, livestock, forestry, fisheries, the use of agricultural inputs (but not 
research on the development of agricultural inputs other than those originating from 
within agriculture), natural resources, and socioeconomic aspects of primary 
agricultural production. Also included is research concerning the on-farm storage and 
processing of agricultural products. The off-farm component, however, should be 
attributed to the agricultural/food processing industry. The basic principle is to 
achieve congruency between R&D and production statistics, as our ultimate concern 
is how agricultural R&D affects agricultural production. 
 
(3) Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative work undertaken 
on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture, and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to 
devise new applications (OECD 1994). The basic criterion for distinguishing R&D 
from related activities is the presence in R&D of an appreciable element of novelty 
(OECD 1981). For instance, simply monitoring the incidence of plant and animal 
diseases in and of itself is not considered R&D and may only be undertaken to enforce 
quarantine regulations or the like. But, using this information to study the causes or 
control mechanisms associated with a particular disease is considered R&D. 
 
R&D comprises a continuum of activities ranging from the search for new fundamental 
knowledge to its eventual application and use in daily life. The Frascati Manual (OECD 
1994) distinguishes three principal R&D activities: basic research, applied research, 
and experimental development. The principal distinction between basic and applied 
research is the extent to which the research (i.e., the creation of new knowledge) is 
undertaken with a concrete application or use in mind. Experimental development 
distinguishes itself from research because it draws on existing knowledge gained from 
research and/or practical experience and focuses on producing new materials, products, 
or devices; installing new processes, systems, and services; or substantially improving 
those already produced or installed.3 
 
                                                     
3 These definitions are not really exclusive and leave room for in-between categories such as strategic 
research (in between basic and applied) and adaptive research (in between applied research and experimental 
development). Moreover, experimental development gradually goes over into production, and it is at this end 
of the R&D spectrum that it can be rather difficult to establish the cutting-off point.  
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A national agricultural research system consists of various agencies, which jointly 
support agriculture by creating new knowledge and technology. The approach adopted by 
the ASTI project is to focus on performing agencies (rather than on funding agencies), 
which can, as suggested by the Frascati Manual, be classified in the following three 
institutional categories: 
 
(1) Government agencies. This category includes all agencies that are controlled and 
mainly financed by the government. Agencies that are not directly controlled by the 
government, but which are mainly financed by the government, are also categorized 
as government agencies. Consequently, most national agricultural research 
organizations are classified as government agencies despite their “autonomous” 
status. 
 
(2) Higher education agencies. This category includes all public and private universities, 
colleges of technology, and other institutes of higher education. Also included are all 
research institutes and experimental stations that are controlled directly by, 
administrated through, or associated with agencies of higher education. 
 
(3) Business enterprises. This category comprises the following three subcategories: (3a) 
public enterprises, (3b) private enterprises, and (3c) nonprofit institutions. The first 
two subcategories cover all research activities undertaken within enterprises, while 
the third subcategory covers research activities undertaken on the collective behalf of 
business enterprises, which are controlled and mainly financed by these same 
business enterprises. Within agricultural research, this subcategory includes, for 
example, research activities controlled and mainly financed by commodity boards 
and farmer organizations. This category has sometimes also been labeled “private 
non-profit” or “semi-public.” 
 
In addition to the institutional classification, there is also the often-used distinction 
between public and private R&D, which can relate to the following: (a) the source of 
funding, (b) the status of the performing agency, or (c) the exertion of property rights 
regarding the new knowledge or technology generated. Depending on the perspective 
taken, the public-private picture can look quite different. Moreover, most R&D agencies 
tend to operate somewhere in between the public and private dichotomy. Table A.1 gives 
a rough indication of how funding sources tend to differ across different implementing 
agencies. . 
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Table A.1: Sources of funding for agricultural R&D per institutional category 
 
Business sector 
Source of funding 
Government 
agencies 
Higher 
education 
Nonprofit 
agencies 
Public 
enterprises 
Private 
enterprises 
General tax revenues 80% 80% 20% 30% 10% 
Collective schemes  10% 5% 60%   
Private funds 10% 15% 20% 70% 90% 
Note: This is a very impressionistic illustration that may differ substantially from country to country, 
depending, among other things, on the relative weight of each institutional category in the total. 
 
The most polarized public-private distinction is that between a government agency 
funded by general tax revenues and a private business enterprise funding its own R&D. In 
between these two extremes, many variations are possible. Taking an institutional 
perspective, public R&D is made up of the R&D activities undertaken by government 
agencies and establishments of higher education, while from a funding perspective, public 
R&D would include all R&D activities funded by general tax revenues. Non-profit 
agencies supporting the business sector as well as collective funding schemes find 
themselves somewhere in the middle of the public-private dichotomy. Hence, their 
allocation to either the public or private category is rather arbitrary and may create 
confusion in cross-country comparisons. 
 
The third dimension, which addresses the issue of executing proprietary rights, 
complicates things even more. Publicly funded government agencies may take out patents 
on the knowledge and technology they produce and execute their right to compensation, 
while private companies, financing their own R&D, may find that a great deal of the 
knowledge and technology developed in-house leaks away into the public domain without 
proper compensation. Information on this third dimension tends to be relatively weak, as 
data collection has focused almost exclusively on the input side of agricultural R&D 
rather than on the output side. There is, however, substantial anecdotal evidence that 
government agencies and establishments of higher education are increasingly establishing 
proprietary rights on the output they produce. 
 
 
A.2 The measurement of agricultural R&D personnel and expenditures 
 
In the previous section, national agricultural research has been delineated and institutional 
categories established. In this section, the focus will be on the actual measurement of 
human and financial resources used by agricultural R&D. 
 
There are two international schemes for classifying personnel: one by occupation (ILO 
1990) and one by education (UNESCO 1976). The ASTI project has adopted a hybrid of 
these two classification schemes (see table 5.2), and focuses on qualified researchers, 
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defined as “professionals conducting or managing research, with a formal qualification of 
at least a Bachelor’s of Science (BSc) degree, which is equivalent to three to four years of 
full-time university training.” More detailed surveys covering all staff use three additional 
categories: (a) technical support staff, (b) administrative support staff, and (c) other 
support staff. Persons holding a research position, but lacking the formal qualifications, 
have been attributed to technical support staff. However, technicians holding a university 
degree are not classified as researchers. The minimum qualification for either a technical 
or administrative position is secondary school plus two years of full-time professional 
training. The category “other support staff” is a rest category and is comprised mainly of 
jobs for which more limited educational qualifications are required. 
 
Table A.2: Occupational and educational classifications 
 
Occupational classification Educational qualification Further breakdown 
Research staff Minimum of three years of full-time 
university training 
National/expatriate 
PhD/MSc/BSc 
Technical support staff Minimum of secondary school plus two 
years of professional training  
 
Administrative support staff Minimum of secondary school plus two 
years of professional training 
 
Other support staff No minimum requirement  
 
Statistics on agricultural R&D expenditures cover all intramural expenditures, whatever 
their source of funds, for R&D performed by the agencies that make up the national 
agricultural research system. They cover both current and capital expenditures. The 
Frascati Manual advises collecting actual capital expenditures, so capital depreciation is 
to be excluded. For small or emerging research systems, this may imply relatively large 
fluctuations of total R&D expenditures because of one-off capital investments.4 Total 
expenditures can be broken down in two ways: (a) by type of cost (i.e., personnel, 
operating, and capital) and (b) by source of funding. These two measures are usually not 
exactly the same because, for a given financial year, expenditures may differ from 
funding. 
 
Many agricultural R&D agencies have mandates that are considerably broader than just 
agricultural R&D, either because they undertake R&D that contributes to economic 
activities other than primary agriculture or because they combine agricultural R&D with 
activities such as education, extension, or production. In all such instances, the 
agricultural R&D activity has to be isolated from these other activities, which may 
                                                     
4 As Pardey, Eveleens, and Hallaway (1991) showed for the US agricultural experiment stations, a 
depreciation method of measuring capital expenditure results in a substantially different cost picture than a 
direct measure of capital expenditure. This is particularly true when agricultural research systems are rapidly 
expanding. 
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require prorating of human and financial inputs (e.g., most faculty positions include only 
part-time work on R&D). 
 
 
A.3 Cross-country and over-time comparability of agricultural R&D expenditures 
 
It is difficult to construct measures of expenditure data that are comparable across 
countries and over time. The ideal conversion method – using R&D-specific, chained 
deflators and undistorted, R&D-specific exchange rates – is beyond reach (at least for the 
moment). One has to accept that certain distortions are introduced in the conversion process 
and that these distortions can be quite significant. 
 
There are two sets of issues that need to be dealt with in the selection of a conversion 
method: (1) the choice of deflator and exchange rate and (2) the order in which the two are 
applied. Regarding the choice of deflator and exchange rate, there are only a few that one 
can choose from in an international comparison that covers countries from all over the 
world. Although at the national level, R&D-specific deflators (i.e., those based on the 
composition of inputs used in R&D) sometimes exist, there is no international dataset of 
such deflators. Moreover, most deflator series are of the fixed-weight Laspeyres type, while 
a discrete approximation of a Divisia index is to be preferred as deflator (Pardey, Roseboom 
and Craig 1992; OECD 1994).5 The requirement of availability across a large number of 
countries limits the choice of deflator between the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP 
deflator, both of which are of the fixed-weight Laspeyres type. The latter has been preferred 
as it approximates the bundle of inputs used in R&D better than the CPI. 
 
Also, the choice of exchange rate tends to be limited to the following three options: 
 
(1) the official market exchange rate; 
(2) the Atlas exchange rate as developed by the World Bank;  
(3) the purchasing power parity (PPP) index as developed by the UN International 
Comparisons Project and which is also used by the World Bank nowadays. 
 
While the official market exchange rates are still used in many international comparisons, it 
has long been known that they can be hugely distorted due to interventionist monetary 
policies as well as to speculation in financial markets. The Atlas exchange rate and the PPP 
index have both been developed as a more appropriate alternative for international 
comparisons. The Atlas exchange rate is a rather crude correction of the official market 
exchange rate made by country experts within the World Bank. It is based more on expert 
knowledge than on a transparent and consistent methodology (World Bank 1983; 1985). In 
addition, market-determined “equilibrium” exchange rates are based on an assumed 
equilibrium, involving internationally traded goods and services as well as financial trans-
actions, but they may poorly reflect the value of local production that is relatively isolated 
from world market forces. 
                                                     
5 See also chapter 7. 
219 
 
In contrast, the PPP index covers all economic output and is based on a carefully crafted 
theoretical framework, which has been discussed extensively in the literature. In a nutshell, 
the idea is that by buying the same average basket of goods and services in each country, an 
artificial PPP index or exchange rate can be constructed. The crux of the problem is to 
establish the composition of the “average” basket of goods and services because this 
composition can differ hugely, for example, between the US and India. The International 
Comparisons Project “solves” the problem by using the Geary-Khamis procedure by which 
both the “average” basket of goods and services and the PPP index are calculated 
simultaneously. PPP indices are specific to the set of countries for which they have been 
calculated and deviate significantly from official and Atlas exchange rates. For some of the 
poorer countries, a conversion with an official or Atlas exchange results in expenditure 
figures in US dollars that are only one-quarter of the figure obtained by using a PPP index.6 
 
An advantage of the PPP index methodology is that it provides a conceptual framework for 
the construction of specific PPP indices. Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982) and Summers 
and Heston (1988), for example, have constructed indices for the government sector and the 
capital-goods sector in addition to the economy-wide PPP indices. MacDonald (1973) and 
OECD (1981) discuss at some length the construction of a PPP index specifically for R&D 
in the OECD area. Unfortunately, not much progress has been made in this area and the 
OECD S&T statistics now use general PPP indices for making cross-country comparisons.7 
 
Related to the choice of deflator and exchange rate is the order in which they should be 
applied in the conversion. The method most frequently used in international comparisons is 
to first convert (a times series of) expenditure data to a common currency (usually the US 
dollar) using annual average exchange rates, and then deflate to a constant year by using a 
US deflator. The origin of this method stems from the times that exchange rates were more 
easily obtained than local deflator series. Moreover, it is often assumed that the other route 
(of first deflating with a local deflator to a constant year and then using the constant-year 
exchange rate) should yield the same results. This can only be the case when exchange rate 
adjustments are uniquely and instantly driven by differences in inflation between countries. 
However, as Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1992) have shown, this is certainly not true for 
the often-used combination of official market exchange rates and GDP deflators. Just 
altering the order of conversion results in major differences in measured volumes, which in 
turn affect growth rates as well as a region’s relative share in the global total. 
 
                                                     
6 The most extreme difference between the PPP index and the official exchange rate was observed for 
Bangladesh in 1985. The PPP index resulted in an expenditure figure in US dollars that was 7.5 times higher 
than what the official exchange rate gave. The difference between the official exchange rate and the PPP 
index is strongly correlated with income per capita. On average, the measured volume of resources invested 
in agricultural R&D was about 65% higher for developing countries (ranging from 7% higher in sub-Saharan 
Africa to 123% higher in Asia) when using the PPP index rather than the official exchange rate (Pardey, 
Roseboom, and Craig 1992). 
7 A popular version of the PPP method is the MacDonald index, published once or twice a year by the Economist. 
The basket consists of only one product (the Big Mac), but one that uses a broad range of inputs and is therefore 
considered a reasonable approximation of the general price level in a country. 
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The difference between convert-first and deflate-first is considerably less when a 
combination of a PPP index and a GDP deflator is used. Still, when cross-sectional 
variability is more important than the inter-temporal variability within each country, the 
deflate-first method is preferred, as it demands less of the data (Pardey, Roseboom, and 
Craig 1992). When the deflate-first method is used, one can expect biases in the volume 
measures whenever the composition of each country’s aggregate in the base year is not 
representative for the whole time period under consideration. However, when the convert-
first method is used, volume measures will be biased unless the numeraire country’s 
aggregate in the base year is representative for all other countries in all years of the sample. 
The latter is a far more demanding assumption. 
 
 
A.4 Some closing remarks 
 
Statistics have an aura of being exact as they are expressed in exact numbers. When one 
writes “about half” or “50%,” people tend to identify the latter as more precise. As shown 
in the previous sections, what is being captured in statistics depends a lot on the 
definitions that are used and on how well they can be applied when observing the real 
world. Hence, some error in the construction of statistics is unavoidable. However, those 
who use and interpret statistics often introduce errors that are far more disturbing. A 
selective and loose use of statistics can result in interpretations that are way off from the 
real world. 
 
Statistics on agricultural R&D investments should capture information that is of relevance 
to policymakers and analysts. However, policy issues change over time and require 
statistics to follow suit. In that sense, the emphasis placed on personnel statistics during 
the 1960s and 1970s (reflecting, particularly in the developing countries, a scarcity of 
human resources) has shifted to financial statistics (reflecting a scarcity in financial 
resources) during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen waarin de volgende drie vragen worden gesteld: 
 
(1) Waarom investeren we als samenleving in landbouwkundig onderzoek en wat 
zijn volgens de economische theorie de incentives en wat de beperkingen?  
(2) Hoeveel investeren we in landbouwkundig onderzoek wereldwijd en hoe 
verschillen investeringsintensiteiten tussen landen en door de tijd heen?  
(3) Waarom wordt er, gezien de indrukwekkende impact, niet méér geïnvesteerd in 
landbouwkundig onderzoek? 
 
Deel I van dit proefschrift is een verkenning van de economische literatuur over de rol 
van wetenschap en technologie in de economie. Hiermee wordt een antwoord gezocht op 
de eerste vraag. Wat zijn de concepten die economen gebruiken om innovatieprocessen te 
beschrijven en te analyseren, en hoe kunnen onderzoeksinvesteringen worden gerelateerd 
aan onder-zoeksimpact?  
 
In deel II wordt beschreven hoeveel er geïnvesteerd wordt in landbouwkundig onderzoek. 
Aan de hand van vier eerder gepubliceerde artikelen worden de ontwikkelingen geschetst 
in investeringen in landbouwkundig onderzoek op wereld, regionaal en nationaal niveau. 
De gebruikte data zijn afkomstig van het langjarige Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators project.  
 
Deel III van dit proefschrift probeert een antwoord te geven op de derde vraag. Het test de 
veronderstelling dat er te weinig in landbouwkundig onderzoek wordt geïnvesteerd. Dit 
wordt gedaan d.m.v. een model dat een nieuwe en meer consistente interpretatie geeft aan 
de bestaande rendementscijfers. 
 
 
Deel I 
 
De induced innovation theory en de endogenous growth theory, beiden voortkomend uit 
de neoklassieke traditie, modelleren technische verandering als een verschuiving van de 
productiefunctie; ofwel het produceren van dezelfde output met minder input of meer 
output met dezelfde input. Cruciaal in dit proefschrift is de aanname dat investeringen in 
(landbouwkundig) onderzoek de verschuiving van de productiefunctie bevordert en 
versnelt en dat er een link bestaat tussen onderzoeksinvestering en impact.  
 
De induced innovation theory beweert dat de relatieve schaarste van productiemiddelen 
de richting van de technische verandering stuurt. Bijvoorbeeld als grond relatief schaars is 
ten opzichte van arbeid, dan is het meer winstgevend om te investeren in 
grondbesparende dan in arbeidsbesparende technologieën. Het  resultaat is een hogere 
kostenbesparing. De induced innovation theory richt zich met name op de richting van de 
technologische innovatie, en minder op de snelheid waarmee deze technologische 
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innovatie plaatsvindt. Het legt dus geen expliciete link tussen onderzoeksinvestering en 
impact. 
 
Metcalfe (1995), voortbouwend op Nordhaus (1969), doet een poging om de link tussen 
onderzoeksinvestering en impact expliciet te modelleren en introduceert het concept van 
een innovation possibility curve. Met deze curve probeert hij de relatie bloot te leggen 
tussen de reductie in productiekosten en de omvang van de investering in onderzoek 
binnen een gegeven tijdsperiode. Metcalfe stelt, geheel binnen de neoklassieke traditie, 
dat het optimale niveau van onderzoeksinvestering door een bedrijf wordt bepaald door 
het punt waar de marginale onderzoekskosten gelijk zijn aan de marginale onderzoeks-
baten. 
 
Metcalfe’s model van een bedrijf als optimaliserende innovator geeft een interessant 
inzicht in de verschillen in innovatie-intensiteit tussen bedrijven. Echter het model faalt 
waar het gaat om het modelleren van de interactie tussen bedrijven in een markt of 
industrie en hoe deze interactie de innovatieprikkels of overwegingen voor bedrijven zou 
kunnen beïnvloeden. Macro-economische groeitheorieën geven ook geen antwoord op 
deze vraag – ze abstraheren  industrieën en markten volledig. Wat ontbreekt, is een model 
dat zich richt op de snelheid van technologische verandering op het niveau van een sector 
of een industrie. In deel III van dit proefschrift wordt een model geïntroduceerd dat 
probeert deze lacune op te vullen. 
 
Winstmaximalisatie, is simpelweg het antwoord van de neoklassieke economische traditie 
op de vraag waarom we investeren in landbouwkundig onderzoek. Hoewel daar weinig 
tegen in valt te brengen, laat dit antwoord vele andere factoren die ook een rol zouden 
kunnen spelen buiten beschouwing. Evolutionary economics levert een veel realistischer 
beschrijving van het innovatieproces. Winst speelt daarin een belangrijke rol, maar niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs winstmaximalisatie. Daarnaast heeft de neoklassieke theorie volgens  
institutional economics geen oog voor de rol van instituties in innovatie. Het negeert het 
feit dat hoge transactiekosten kunnen leiden tot vertraging of zelfs blokkering van het 
technologische innovatieproces. Met andere woorden, als we ons afvragen waarom 
innovatiesnelheden of onderzoeksintensiteiten verschillen in de tijd en tussen industrieën 
en landen, vormen instituties en marktstructuren een belangrijk onderdeel van het 
antwoord op deze vraagstelling. Dit inzicht speelt ook een belangrijke rol in het innovatie 
systeem denken dat de afgelopen jaren brede aandacht heeft gekregen.  
 
In de literatuur over wetenschap en technologie wordt vaak benadrukt dat innovatie-
processen vroeg of laat vastlopen en dat om die reden de opbrengsten van investeringen 
in onderzoek op den duur zullen afnemen. Voor specifieke innovatieprocessen zal dit 
zeker gelden, maar er ontwikkelen zich ook telkens nieuwe innovatieprocessen. Het is 
dus nog de vraag of afnemende meeropbrengsten ook van toepassing zijn op het totale 
innovatieproces. Door de endogenous growth theory wordt dit beeld van afnemende 
meeropbrengsten volledig omgekeerd. Het postuleert dat er op macroniveau sprake is van 
toenemende meeropbrengsten wat betreft kennis en, in het bijzonder, kennis gecreëerd 
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door onderzoek. Dit idee wijkt sterk af van het traditionele afnemende meeropbrengsten 
denken en geeft daarmee een heel optimistische visie op de toekomst. 
 
De endogenous growth theory kent een grote rol toe aan human capital in de verklaring 
van verschillen in economische groei en welvaart. Alhoewel een grote stap voorwaarts, 
een groot deel van de verschillen blijven ook in de endogenous growth theory nog 
onverklaard. Er bestaat een groeiende consensus dat er nog steeds een belangrijke factor 
ontbreekt in de huidige economische groeimodellen, namelijk dat van de sociale dimensie 
van de economie. Dit betreft de manier waarop economische actoren met elkaar omgaan 
en de instituties waarop zulk gedrag is gebaseerd. Door velen wordt dit social capital 
gezien als een belangrijke verklarende factor, naast physical en human capital, voor de 
waargenomen verschillen in economische groei en welvaart. Net zoals aan human capital 
worden ook aan social capital toenemende meeropbrengsten toegeschreven.  Hoe social 
capital valt te definiëren en te meten is echter nog onderwerp van diepgaande discussie.  
 
 
Deel II 
 
Gedurende de 20e eeuw is het publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek enorm toegenomen in 
capaciteit en intensiteit. In de tweede helft van de 20e eeuw echter is in deze groei een 
vertraging opgetreden. Groeiden de reële uitgaven aan publiek landbouwkundig 
onderzoek in de ontwikkelingslanden in de periode 1961-71 nog met 7,2% per jaar, in de 
periode 1981-91 was dit gedaald naar gemiddeld 3,9% per jaar.  Voor de ontwikkelde 
landen daalden de groeicijfers over dezelfde periode van gemiddeld 5,5% naar 1,7% per 
jaar.  
 
Met uitzondering van de voormalige Sovjet Unie en Oost Europa, werkten er in 1991 
wereldwijd een geschatte 190.000 onderzoekers voltijds in het publieke landbouwkundig 
onderzoek met een gezamenlijk  budget van bijna $15 miljard (1985 internationale 
dollars). Rond 65% van deze onderzoekers (125.000) was werkzaam in ontwikkelings-
landen met een aandeel in de totale uitgaven van 54%, ofwel $8,1 miljard.  
 
De Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) coördineert de 
activiteiten van 16 internationale onderzoeksorganisaties in de landbouw. Tezamen 
hadden deze 16 instituten slechts een ‘bescheiden’ aandeel van 1,8% van de $15 miljard 
besteed aan publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek in 1991.  In datzelfde jaar bedroegen de 
investeringen in de ontwikkelde landen in privaat onderzoek in de landbouw en 
aanverwante industrieën minstens $6,6 miljard (1985 internationale dollars). In 
tegenstelling tot het publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek dat zich voronamelijk richt op de 
primaire landbouw, richt het privaat landbouwkundig onderzoek zich voornamelijk op de 
toeleverende en verwerkende industrieën. Gedurende de periode 1981-91 groeide het 
privaat landbouwkundig onderzoek in de ontwikkelde landen substantieel sneller dan het 
publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek (5,2 % tegen 1,7% per jaar). Vergelijkbare cijfers 
m.b.t. de omvang van het privaat landbouwkundig onderzoek in ontwikkelingslanden 
ontbreken, maar worden verondersteld beduidend lager te liggen.  
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De jaarlijkse groeicijfers van uitgaven aan publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek geven 
grote verschillen te zien tussen regio’s en landen. Regio’s waar uitgaven zijn afgenomen 
of slechts heel beperkt zijn gegroeid tijdens de periode 1981-91, zijn Latijns Amerika en 
de Cariben (-0,5% per jaar) en Afrika ten zuiden van de Sahara (gemiddeld +0,8% per 
jaar). Voor een groot gedeelte kan dit worden  toegeschreven  aan de slechte economische 
en financiële situatie in deze regio’s gedurende deze periode. Binnen de regio’s bestaan 
echter grote verschillen. In Afrika bijvoorbeeld liepen de jaarlijkse groeicijfers van 
investeringen in landbouwkundig onderzoek tijdens deze periode uiteen van –9,1% in 
Nigeria tot +14,4% in Ghana. In de meeste ontwikkelingslanden overschreed de groei van 
de onderzoeksstaf dat van de onderzoeksuitgaven, wat resulteerde in een (soms 
dramatische) daling in uitgaven per onderzoeker. 
 
De uitgaven aan publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek als een percentage van de 
toegevoegde waarde in de landbouw, de zgn. onderzoeksintensiteit, steeg in 
ontwikkelingslanden van 0,26% in de beginjaren zestig, naar 0,42% in de beginjaren 
zeventig, naar 0,50% in de beginjaren tachtig. Tot de beginjaren negentig is dat rond 
0,50% gebleven.  
 
Voor de ontwikkelde landen steeg de onderzoeksintensiteit van het publieke landbouw-
kundig onderzoek van 0,96% in de beginjaren zestig, naar 1,38% in de beginjaren 
zeventig, naar 1,98% in de beginjaren tachtig, en tot 2,39% in 1991. Ondanks de veel 
snellere groei van landbouwonderzoekuitgaven in ontwikkelingslanden, is het verschil in 
onderzoeksintensiteit tussen ontwikkelde landen en ontwikkelingslanden juist toe-
genomen in plaats van afgenomen. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door het feit dat de landbouw in 
de ontwikkelingslanden doorgaans nog snel groeit, terwijl de landbouw in de meeste 
ontwikkelde landen juist stagneert. Het verschil in onderzoeksintensiteit komt nog sterker 
tot uitdrukking inzake onderzoeksuitgaven per boer. Ontwikkelingslanden besteedden in 
1991 per boer gemiddeld $7 aan publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek en ontwikkelde 
landen $354. 
 
Een specifieke studie naar het Nederlandse landbouwonderzoeksysteem belicht de meer 
institutionele aspecten van het landbouwkundig onderzoek. Het laat zien hoe 
veranderingen in landbouwbeleid, wetenschap, en politieke ideologie t.a.v. de rol van de 
overheid in de samenleving, de institutionele context waarbinnen het publieke landbouw-
kundig onderzoek opereert heeft veranderd. Dit heeft tot belangrijke veranderingen geleid 
in het Nederlandse landbouwonderzoeksysteem m.b.t. mandaat, formulering en 
coördinatie van beleid, organisatie en structuur, management, en ook de financiering van 
het onderzoek. Hoewel  specifiek voor de Nederlandse situatie, worden soortgelijke 
veranderingen ook in andere landen waargenomen.  
 
 
Deel III 
 
Sinds de publicatie eind jaren vijftig van Griliches’ studie naar het economische 
rendement van onderzoek naar hybride maïs in de Verenigde Staten (Griliches 1958), zijn 
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rendementsstudies uitgegroeid tot een vrij algemeen geaccepteerde manier om de 
economische impact van (landbouwkundig) onderzoek te documenteren. De geschatte 
rendementen voor landbouwkundig onderzoek verschillen sterk van elkaar, maar het 
gemiddelde bevindt zich tussen de 40% en 60% (Alston et al 2000). Door velen wordt de 
nauwkeurigheid van deze schattingen (zie hoofdstuk 7), als ook de representativiteit van 
de geselecteerde onderzoeksprojecten in twijfel getrokken. Toch leeft er de wijdverbreide 
veronderstelling dat deze hoge rendementen robuust genoeg zijn om deze kritiek te 
weerstaan en dat ook na neerwaartse correctie zij zich ruim boven het vereiste minimum 
rendement bevinden. Op basis hiervan, heeft Ruttan (1980) de stelling geponeerd dat er 
ernstige onderinvestering bestaat in publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek. Deze 
stellingname is sindsdien door vele landbouweconomen overgenomen. Elke vertraging in 
de groei of, erger nog, afname van investeringen in publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek 
wordt daarom met bezorgdheid tegemoet getreden.     
 
Wat is er nu echter daadwerkelijk bekend over deze veronderstelde onderinvestering? Is 
deze hoger in ontwikkelingslanden dan in ontwikkelde landen? Is er verschil in 
onderinvestering tussen bepaalde soorten van landbouwkundig onderzoek? En, hoeveel 
meer zouden we in landbouwkundig onderzoek moeten investeren om het investeringsgat 
te dichten? Om deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden, is het nodig om het begrip 
onderinvestering nader te definiëren. Om die reden wordt in hoofdstuk 8 een simpel 
model geïntroduceerd dat een weergave geeft van de ideale, economische selectie van 
landbouwonderzoeksprojecten.   
 
Het model neemt aan dat de distributie van alle mogelijke onderzoeksprojecten op een te- 
verwachten-rendementsschaal asymptotisch afneemt. Onder de neoklassieke condities 
van volledige informatie en winstmaximalisatie, begint de selectie van onderzoeks-
projecten met het project met het hoogste rendement en gaat door tot het budget op is of 
het laatst gekozen project het minimum rendement heeft bereikt, al naar gelang wat het 
eerste plaatsvindt. Onderinvestering kan dus worden gedefinieerd als het verschil tussen 
het rendement van het marginale onderzoeksproject en de minimumrendementseis. Drie 
variabelen zijn nodig om het investeringsgat te schatten: het vereiste minimum 
rendement, het marginale rendement, en de hellingscoëffient. Hoofdstuk 8 laat zien hoe, 
rekening houdend met onvolledige informatie en beperkte economische rationaliteit, de 
laatste twee variabelen afgeleid kunnen worden van een voldoende representatieve 
steekproef van ex post rendementen van landbouwonderzoeksprojecten. Vanuit het model 
zelf kan worden afgeleid dat niet het gemiddelde maar de modus van de ex post 
rendementsdistributie de relevante variabele is voor het schatten van het investeringsgat. 
Een hoog gemiddeld rendement op de onderzoeksportfolio is geen sluitend bewijs voor 
onderinvestering.  
 
Een database met rendementen voor landbouwkundig onderzoek, samengesteld door 
Alston c.s. (2000), levert de empirische data voor het schatten van de vorm en positie van 
de optimale selectie van landbouwonderzoeksprojecten voor respectievelijke 
ontwikkelingslanden en ontwikkelde landen. Aan de hand van deze schattingen, kunnen 
de volgende uitspraken worden gedaan: 
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• Onder de aannames van volledige informatie en winstmaximalisatie, hadden in de 
beginjaren tachtig ontwikkelde landen ongeveer 40% meer in publiek 
landbouwkundig onderzoek kunnen investeren, en ontwikkelingslanden zo’n 
137% meer. Wat betreft onderzoeksintensiteit (uitgaven aan publiek landbouw-
kundig onderzoek als een percentage van de toegevoegde waarde in de 
landbouw), hadden de ontwikkelde landen 2,8% kunnen investeren in de periode 
1981-85 in plaats van de daadwerkelijk bereikte 2,0% en ontwikkelingslanden 
1,0% in plaats van 0,4%. 
 
• Lage investeringen in publiek landbouwkundig onderzoek in ontwikkelings-
landen worden in eerste instantie veroorzaakt door een relatief  kleinere portfolio 
van goed renderende landbouwonderzoeksprojecten waaruit gekozen kan 
worden. Onderinvestering speelt zeker een rol (het gat is groter voor 
ontwikkelingslanden), maar het verklaart slechts een klein deel van het verschil 
in intensiteit in landbouwkundig onderzoek tussen de ontwikkelde landen en de 
ontwikkelingslanden.   
 
• Inspanningen om het investeringsgat te dichten (zoals het verbeteren van de 
selectie van projecten en de mobilisatie van politieke steun) moeten zeker worden 
gecontinueerd. Meer nadruk echter moet er worden gelegd op het ontwikkelen 
van beleid dat het rendement van landbouwkundig onderzoek in het algemeen 
zou kunnen verhogen.  
 
Het model is nuttig, niet zozeer vanwege een goede weergave van de realiteit, maar 
omdat het een ijkpunt levert waartegen de realiteit kan worden afgezet. De geschatte 
onderinvesteringen zijn gebaseerd op de aanname van volledige informatie en 
economische rationaliteit tijdens de allocatie van het onderzoeksbudget. In werkelijkheid 
echter is de ex ante selectie van onderzoeksprojecten suboptimaal en dit verduistert het 
zicht op het investeringsgat ex ante, als ook ex post. Om een beter zicht te krijgen op het 
investeringsgat en om het te kunnen schatten, moet deze suboptimaliteit worden 
verwijderd. Uiteindelijk is het model nuttig niet omdat het in staat is om de 
onderinvestering in landbouwkundig onderzoek in het verleden te schatten, maar omdat 
het een hulpmiddel is om te begrijpen waarom onderinvestering zich voordoet. Het is dit 
inzicht dat ons kan helpen de toekomstige landbouwonderzoeksmogelijkheden te creëren 
en te exploiteren.  
 
Eén groep van verklarende factoren betreft de positie en vorm van de rendements-
distributie van alle potentiële onderzoeksprojecten. Er bestaan belangrijke verschillen in 
innovatiemogelijkheden tussen bedrijven, industrieën, landen, en door de tijd heen. Naast 
puur technologische mogelijkheden (welke gestimuleerd kunnen worden d.m.v. 
fundamenteel onderzoek), zijn er andere factoren zoals schaal en structuur van de markt, 
de schaal en snelheid van adoptie, risico en onzekerheid, en effectiviteit en efficiëntie in 
onderzoek. Elk van deze factoren kan, indien verbeterd, leiden tot een verhoging van de 
onderzoeksbaten of een daling van de onderzoekskosten en daarmee een vergroting van 
de optimale onderzoeksportfolio. 
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De andere groep van verklarende factoren betreft het verschijnsel dat overheden te weinig 
in landbouwkundig onderzoek investeren. Mogelijke verklaringen zijn het gebrek aan 
(betrouwbare) informatie, suboptimale selectie mechanismen (inclusief distortie door 
lobbyen), rigiditeit in budgetten, de kosten van economische distortie door 
belastingheffing, en het ontbreken van politieke en organisatorische capaciteit in de 
samenleving. Verbetering van elk van deze factoren zou het investeringsgat kunnen 
helpen verkleinen.    
 
Beide groepen van factoren hebben belangrijke social capital dimensies die cumulatief 
zijn. Het is dit social capital dat maakt dat rijke landen niet alleen een grotere portfolio 
van winstgevende onderzoeksprojecten hebben om uit te kiezen, maar ook een betere 
capaciteit om deze onderzoeksprojecten te selecteren, te financieren, en uit te voeren. Een 
voorwaarde voor armere landen om technologisch en economisch vooruit te komen 
bestaat niet alleen uit meer investeren in human capital maar ook in het ontwikkelen van 
het benodigde social capital om de baten van innovatie te kunnen oogsten. 
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Summary 
 
This dissertation addresses the following three sets of questions: 
 
(1) Why do we, as society, invest in agricultural research and development (R&D) – 
what are, according to economic theory, the incentives and what are the 
constraints? 
(2) How much do we invest in agricultural R&D and how do agricultural R&D 
investment levels differ between countries and change over time? 
(3) Why, despite an impressive record of accomplishment, have we not invested 
more in agricultural R&D? 
 
For an answer to the first question, part I of this dissertation explores the science and 
technology (S&T) economics literature. What are the principal concepts that economists 
use to describe and analyze innovation processes and how do they relate R&D investment 
to impact? In a series of four, previously published articles, part II of this dissertation 
addresses the question of how much we invest in agricultural R&D. These four articles 
describe in detail agricultural R&D investment patterns and trends at the global, regional, 
and national levels. The reported data are based on long-term data-collection efforts 
through the Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) project. Part III 
critically reviews the hypothesis that there is underinvestment in agricultural R&D by 
introducing a model that provides a new and more consistent interpretation of the existing 
rate-of-return evidence. 
 
 
Part I 
 
The induced innovation theory and the endogenous growth theory, both squarely rooted 
in the neoclassical tradition, model technical change as a shift in the production function 
– i.e., producing the same output with fewer inputs. A basic assumption made in this 
dissertation is that investments in (agricultural) R&D enhance and speed up this shift and 
that there is a link between R&D investment and impact. The induced innovation theory 
argues that relative factor scarcities will steer the direction of technical change. When 
land is scarce relative to labor it is more profitable to invest in land-saving rather than 
labor-saving technologies – it will yield a higher cost reduction. While focusing strongly 
on the direction of technical change, induced innovation theory says very little about the 
rate of technical change. It fails to specify an explicit link between R&D investment and 
technical change. 
 
Metcalfe (1995), building on work by Nordhaus (1969), makes this link explicit 
conceptually by introducing the concept of an innovation possibility curve, which relates 
the reduction in unit production costs achieved in a given time period to investment in 
R&D. Strictly within the neoclassical tradition, Metcalfe argues that the optimal level of 
R&D investment by a firm is determined by the point where marginal research costs 
equal marginal research benefits. 
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While Metcalfe’s model of the firm as optimizing innovator provides some important 
elements for understanding differences in innovation rates across firms, the model largely 
fails to capture the interaction between firms in a market or industry and how this may 
affect innovation incentives. At the other end of the spectrum, macroeconomic growth 
theory completely abstracts from industries and markets and focuses on aggregate 
economic growth. What is missing is a consistent model that looks at the rate of technical 
change at the sector or industry level and which links R&D input to impact. This 
challenge is taken up in part III of this dissertation. 
 
With regard to “Why we invest in agricultural R&D?” the simple answer of neoclassical 
economics is profit maximization. There is certainly considerable truth in this, but the 
profit argument abstracts very much from many other factors that may play a role as well. 
As many authors have pointed out, a major weakness of the neoclassical innovation 
theory is its weak foundation in microeconomics. This makes that it is incapable of 
capturing how the interaction between economic actors in a market affects the ultimate 
outcome of the innovation process at the macro level. In that sense, evolutionary 
economics provides a far more realistic description of the innovation process. Profit plays 
an important role, but not necessarily profit maximization. In addition, neoclassical 
innovation theory has according to institutional economics a blind spot for the role of 
institutions. It ignores the fact that high transaction costs at various stages of the 
innovation process may slow down or even block technological innovation. In other 
words, if we want to understand why innovation rates differ or why investments in R&D 
differ over time and across industries and countries, institutions and market structures 
constitute an important part of the puzzle. This is also very much reflected in the 
innovation system approach. 
 
The S&T literature is full of theories that stress that innovation processes eventually run 
out of steam and which predict that returns to R&D will diminish. While for discrete 
innovation processes this may be true, there are also new innovation processes that 
emerge all the time. Therefore, diminishing returns may not apply to all innovation 
activities taken together. The contribution of the endogenous growth theory is that it 
made this idea explicit by assuming increasing returns to knowledge and, in particular, to 
knowledge created through R&D. It is an idea that sits very uncomfortably with what 
economists (and most other people) usually think, but, if true, it suggests a very 
optimistic future. 
 
While a big step forward compared to traditional growth theories, endogenous growth 
theories also leave a large part of the differences in economic growth unexplained. There 
is an emerging consensus in the literature that there is still an important factor missing in 
the present economic growth models, namely, that of the social dimension of economic 
activity – the way economic actors interact and organize themselves and the institutions 
on which such interactions are based. This “social capital” is what many see as perhaps a 
far more important factor that could explain differences in economic growth. Similar to 
human capital, increasing returns have also been attributed to social capital. However, a 
clear consensus on how to define and measure social capital has not yet emerged. 
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Part II 
 
During the 20th century, the world’s public agricultural research capacity saw tremendous 
expansion. This expansion, however, gradually slowed during the latter half of the 20th 
century. Public agricultural research expenditures in developing countries grew, on 
average, 7.2% per annum in real terms during the 1960s, 6.4% during the 1970s, and 
3.9% during the 1980s. For developed countries, these growth rates were 5.5%, 2.7%, and 
1.7%, respectively. 
 
By 1991, some 190,000 full-time-equivalent researchers were employed worldwide 
(excluding the former USSR and Eastern Europe) in public agricultural research, 
spending nearly $15 billion (1985 international dollars). About 65% of these researchers 
were located in developing countries, spending about 54% of the global budget. The 16 
international agricultural research centers under the umbrella of the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) represented only 1.8% of the nearly $15 
billion spent on public agricultural R&D worldwide in 1991 – a very modest contribution 
indeed. In the developed countries, private agricultural and agriculture-related R&D 
contributed at least another $6.6 billion (1985 international dollars) in 1991. Contrary to 
public agricultural R&D that focuses mainly on primary agriculture, private agricultural 
R&D is concentrated mainly in agricultural input and processing industries. During the 
1980s, private agricultural R&D expenditures in the developed countries grew 
substantially faster than public agricultural R&D expenditures (5.2% compared to 1.7% 
per annum). Corresponding private R&D figures for developing countries are not 
available, but are estimated to be substantially lower. 
 
Annual growth rates of public agricultural research expenditures differ highly across 
regions and between countries within regions. During the 1980s, both sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America and the Caribbean stood out as regions with very sluggish growth in 
agricultural research capacity (+0.8% and –0.5% per annum, respectively). Largely, this 
can be attributed to the economic and financial crises that hit these regions quite severely 
at that time. However, a lot of diversity is hidden below these average figures. In sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, growth in expenditures on public agricultural research 
during the 1980s ranged from –9.1% per annum in Nigeria to +14.4% per annum in 
Ghana. In most developing regions, growth in research staff has exceeded that of 
expenditures, leading to a (sometimes very dramatic) decline in expenditures per 
researcher. 
 
In developing countries, the agricultural research-intensity ratio (public agricultural 
research expenditures as a percentage of agricultural GDP) rose from 0.26% in the early 
1960s, to 0.42% in the early 1970s, to 0.50% in the early 1980s, at which level it more or 
less stagnated for the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s. The intensity ratio for developed 
countries rose from 0.96% in the early 1960s, to 1.38% in the early 1970s, to 1.98% in 
the early 1980s, and to 2.39% in 1991. So despite faster growth in agricultural research 
expenditures in developing countries, the distance between developing and developed 
countries in terms agricultural research intensity has expanded rather than narrowed. The 
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gap in research intensity is even more dramatic when expressed in terms of research 
dollars spent per agricultural laborer. In 1991, developing countries spent, on average, $7 
on public agricultural R&D per agricultural laborer, and developed countries spent $354. 
 
These aggregate statistics are rather sterile when it comes to telling the story of why 
growth in agricultural research capacity has differed so much across countries and over 
time. A case study on the Dutch agricultural research system provides important insights 
into how changes in agricultural policies, advancements in science, and ideological 
changes regarding the role of government in society has changed the institutional context 
within which the agricultural research system operates. This has had important 
implications for the Dutch agricultural research system in terms of mandate, policy 
formulation and coordination, organization and structure, management, and financing. 
While a very country-specific story, many of the same issues can be found in other 
countries. 
 
 
Part III 
 
Starting with a study on hybrid corn by Griliches (1958), rate-of-return studies have 
become standard practice in documenting the economic impact of agricultural R&D. 
Although the estimated ex post rates vary quite substantially, the average tends to range 
in the order of 40%–60% (Alston et al. 2000). Though many have questioned the 
accuracy of these rates and expressed doubt about how representative the selected 
projects are (see chapter 7), a widely shared belief is that the estimated rates are robust 
enough to accommodate such criticisms and still be in a range that is substantially above 
the social rate. Based on this evidence, Ruttan (1980) argued that there is serious 
underinvestment in public agricultural R&D. This argument has become a widely 
accepted opinion (if not fact) among agricultural economists. Therefore, any slowdown in 
the growth or, even worse, any contraction of public agricultural R&D expenditures is 
reason for serious concern.  
However, what do we actually know about this underinvestment? How real is it? Is it 
higher in developing countries than in developed countries? Is it higher for some types of 
research than for others? Moreover, how much more should we have invested in 
agricultural R&D? In order to answer these questions, the underinvestment argument 
needs to be defined more clearly. Therefore, a simple model is introduced in chapter 8 
that represents the ideal economic version of the selection of R&D projects. 
 
The model assumes that the distribution of all possible R&D projects on an expected rate-
of-return (ERR) scale declines asymptotically. Under the neoclassical conditions of full 
information and profit maximization, R&D project selection starts with the project with 
the highest ERR and continues until the budget is finished or the last project hits the 
social rate, whichever comes first. Hence, the underinvestment gap can be defined as the 
difference between the ERR of the marginal R&D project (the actual cutoff rate) and the 
social rate. Only three variables need to be known to estimate the underinvestment gap: 
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the social rate, the actual cutoff rate, and the slope coefficient. Taking less than full 
information and economic rationality into account, chapter 8 discusses how the latter two 
can be derived from a sufficiently large and representative sample of ex post rates of 
return on agricultural R&D. One of the things that becomes immediately clear from the 
model itself is that it is not the mean but the mode of the ex post rate-of-return 
distribution that is the relevant variable for assessing underinvestment in agricultural 
R&D. A high average rate does not provide conclusive information about under-
investment. 
 
The empirical evidence for the shape of the rate-of-return distribution for developing and 
developed countries has been obtained from a database on rates of return to agricultural 
R&D compiled by Alston et al. (2000). When the model was applied to the reported rate-
of-return distributions, the following findings emerged: 
 
• Under the assumption of full information and profit maximization, developed 
countries could have invested about 40% more in public agricultural R&D and 
developing countries could have invested about 137% more. In terms of 
agricultural R&D intensity (i.e., R&D expenditures as a percentage of AgGDP), 
developed countries could have invested 2.8% rather than 2.0%, and developing 
countries, 1.0% rather than 0.4% in 1981–85. 
• Low investment in public agricultural R&D in developing countries is caused 
first and foremost by a relatively smaller portfolio of profitable R&D projects to 
choose from. Underinvestment certainly plays a role (the gap is bigger for 
developing countries) but it explains only a small part of the difference in 
agricultural R&D intensity between developed and developing countries. 
• While efforts to reduce the underinvestment gap should continue (e.g., better 
priority setting and mobilization of political support), more emphasis should be 
placed on designing policies that help to shift (the portfolio of) R&D projects 
higher up on the ERR scale, even at the risk of increasing the underinvestment 
gap. 
 
The usefulness of the model is not that it is a good approximation of reality, but that it 
provides a benchmark against which reality can be compared. The estimated under-
investment gaps are conditional – they assume full information and economic rationality 
in the allocation of R&D resources. In reality, the ex ante selection of R&D projects is 
suboptimal and this obscures our sight of the underinvestment gap ex post. It has to be 
eliminated in order to see the underinvestment gap more clearly and to be able to estimate 
its size. Ultimately, however, the model is useful not because it estimates past R&D 
underinvestment gaps, but because it helps to better understand why they exist. It is an 
understanding that may help us to create and better exploit the R&D investment 
opportunities of tomorrow. 
 
One set of explanatory factors relates to the position and shape of the distribution of all 
potential R&D projects. There are important differences in innovation opportunities 
across companies, industries, countries, and over time. Besides purely technological 
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opportunities (which may be enhanced by investing in basic R&D), other factors come 
into play, such as the size and structure of the market, the rate and speed of adoption, risk 
and uncertainty, and R&D effectiveness and efficiency. Each of these factors could, if 
improved, increase R&D benefits or reduce R&D costs and, hence, create a larger 
optimal R&D portfolio. 
 
The other set of explanatory factors relates to why governments underinvest in public 
agricultural R&D. Possible explanations are a lack of information, suboptimal selection 
mechanisms (including distortion due to lobbying), budget rigidity, excess burden due to 
taxation, and last but not least, a lack of political and organizational capacity in society. 
Improvements in each of these factors should bring the underinvestment gap down. 
 
Both sets of factors have important social capital dimensions that tend to be cumulative. It 
is this social capital that results in rich countries having not only a bigger portfolio of 
profitable agricultural R&D projects to choose from, but also a better capacity to select, 
finance, and implement them. Hence, a prerequisite for poorer countries to catch up is not 
only more investment in human capital (i.e., agricultural R&D), but they also have to 
develop the social capital needed to reap the benefits from innovation. 
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